According to Cavelty (701), a security dilemma is a situation in international relations in which actions taken by a nation to strengthen internal security, such as the formation of alliances, committing to use arms, and rapidly increasing military strength, cause other countries to respond in kind, resulting in increased regional tensions and conflict. It essentially means an uptick in diplomatic mistrust as a result of increased defense intervention by militarily aggressive factions. John Herz defines it as: "a structural notion in which the self-help attempts of states to look after their security needs tend, regardless of intention, to lead to rising insecurity for others as each interprets its own measures as defensive and measures of others as potentially threatening" (8).
The underlying ideology that causes and fuels a security dilemma
The underlying ideology that causes and fuels a security dilemma is fear and uncertainty resulting from the prospect of development and subsequent exploitation of military supremacy of another state or faction. It is a common phenomenon that continues to spur the race for arms, technological advancement, space exploration, and other strategic developments. The overall impact of the security dilemma is the demonstration of an unsettling degree of distrust and the establishment of armed formations structurally adequate and ready to mount an offensive or defensive encounter against a perceived enemy. It demarcates states into potential allies, enemies, and neutrals with all sides seeking to gain a strategic advantage over the others. Security dilemmas may start of innocent enough with an unstable internal security or political situation. Intervention by other states, armed external confrontation, or annexation may aggravate the situation as key multilateral partners may examine prospects of intervening the incursion.
A security dilemma is a manifestation of a state's natural instinct to protect itself
A security dilemma is a manifestation of a state's natural instinct to protect itself and preserve its sovereignty. It is an expected reaction that nations assume to preserve their heritage or interests. The prospect of looming conflict is sufficiently distressing and greatly impacts a state's socio-political climate. It redefines the approaches admitted by nations as they engage each other. While actual armed confrontation may never occur, there is great contentment that comes to countries satisfied with their international security arrangements. States with minimal security capabilities are tactically disadvantaged and are often far much targetable than their heavily armed counterparts. Therefore, it is unsurprising nations would commission vast amounts of resources to supersede the military prowess of their counterparts. The struggle for regional and global dominance was at its peak for the better part of the 20th century. The key military players have been obsessed with expanding their capabilities and having interests and friendlies all over the world. Perceived hostility has been at the very pinnacle of the acceleration of the development of weapon systems and war-ready personnel. The largescale drafting and the inclusion of paramilitary competencies in conventional curriculums are just but a few of the extreme exercises occasioned by security dilemmas throughout history.
Security Dilemma in WW1
Also referring to as the spiral model, a security dilemma has been witnessed in many cases in recent history. The 20th century has seen the highest armed activity with the greatest military achievements made. Superior conventional and mass destruction weapons were made, bringing the globe to the precipice of widespread conflict and potentially complete obliteration. The First World War is a frequently cited example of the spiral model. Scholars often argued that European countries assumed armed confrontation over feelings of insecurity in their own capacities. The war begun and was sustained by powers that needed reassurance of their own capacities to mount adequate offensive and defend against external aggression. Many participants were perpetrators and victims of pre-emptive strikes and were drawn into the war merely to diminish the capabilities of their perceived adversaries. With about 17 million people dead and close to 100 million injured, the First World War remains one of the ugliest instances of the security dilemma to date. It devastated the day's political order and left Eastern Europe on the brink of total economic collapse. The war is believed to have been initiated by the murder of the archduke of Austria-Hungary, by a Black Hand operative and Serbian nationalist. The killing was interpreted as a brazen attempt to rubbish the sovereign legitimacy of the state of Austria-Hungary by Serbia despite the measured approach by which the former had engaged the Serbian republic. However, this event is widely assumed to have stoked the embers with the formation of defence alliances being the primary reason for descent into full scale international war. Britain, France, and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics coalesced to form the Triple Entente while Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany constituted the Triple Alliance. These formations were succeeded by an accelerated defence development. Each country sought to expand its arsenal and massive reallocation of national resources towards the development of weapons was the new economic order. The intricate intelligence apparatuses were established with spying and deception taking centre stage. Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia and the subsequent secret pact between the economically superior Germany and Turkey shook Europe and welcomed them to the sudden reality of an impending war. In a few days, Germany would invade Belgium and declare war on its south-western neighbor, France, prompting Britain to join the war effort to curtain the steadily advancing enemy forces. The further expansion of their capacities, the European powers enlisted tactical facilitation from their interests roping in regions such as Australia, India, and many African colonies. WW1 was deemed largely unnecessary and without a discernible legitimate cause. As Cavelty laments, "the fatal mixture of political misjudgment, fear of loss of prestige and stubborn commitments on all sides of a very complicated system of military and political alliances of European states gratuitously led to an all-out war" (703).
Theories of the Security Dilemma
The security dilemma is a common concept among international affairs pundits and cognitive theorists who believe wars essentially arise because of the failure to communicate and effectively engage each other. It consists of certain key theories, including defensive realism, offensive realism. Defensive realism maintains that as there is a lack of the global government, states are essentially anarchic with survival being their primary motivation. It observes states are distrustful of each other and consequently, will always strive to increase their security to match or exceed that of their nemesis. Conversely, offensive realism appreciates the unavoidability of the actions of other states and prescribes the preparation of one's military complex to limit enemy aggression. It stresses the advancement of one's capacities due to the uncertainty of the motivations of the opposing side.
Security Dilemma in the Cold War
The Cold War was yet another prominent case of the security dilemma. In July 1945, two months after the defeat of the axis forces and the end of the Second World War in Europe, Japan approached the Soviet Union to assist in the negotiation of better surrender terms to the United States. Hitherto, Joseph Stalin had enjoyed a relatively warm relationship with U.S leadership and specifically Harry Truman. Japan sought to give up armed resistance towards the US forces with the hope of retaining its political system headed by the emperor and religious leader and feared that America would upset this dynamic. The Soviet Union agreed and approached the U.S who came up with a new plan to accelerate the end of the war. Truman requested the Soviet Union's strongman to vanquish Japan instead and be awarded by any trade concessions that were available in the strategic Far East region. The Soviets agreed and stationed their forces in Manchuria, ready to attack the war-fatigued Japan. A few weeks later, the United States informed Stalin of the success in the Manhattan Project and informed him his assistance in ending the Japan war would not be as consequential. This declaration led to the existence of a passive conflict between two countries commonly referred to as the Cold War. Truman ceased direct communication with the Kremlin and signed off on the use of the atomic bomb Little Boy on the city of Hiroshima, which had been previously purposely spared from bombardments by conventional weapons for this reason. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was noticeably surprised and commissioned the construction of its own atomic bombs fearing nuclear annihilation. The contest would not stop there. The United States developed spy planes that would fly undetected at 70,000 feet and would create vivid representations of the Soviet's military installations (Liff and Ikenberry 52). The Soviet Union surprised the United States by launching a rocket into space. In its turn, the latter grew exceedingly worrisome of the prospect of Russia having the capability of visiting and storing weapons in space and commenced its own exploration program, managing to get two men on the moon. The security dilemma would continue until Russia detonated a hydrogen bomb, 7,000-fold stronger than the Nagasaki bomb and vaporized everything within 10 miles and disappeared with no discernible trace or radioactive effects. The Cold War would not end until the assumption of office by the Soviet pacifist, Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev, and the President Ronald Reagan. It would be one of the closest calls the world has had to respond and one of the biggest illustrations of the dynamic aspects of the security dilemma.
Works Cited
Cavelty, Myriam Dunn. “Breaking the Cyber-Security Dilemma: Aligning Security Needs and Removing Vulnerabilities.” Science and Engineering Ethics, vol. 20, no. 3, 2014, pp. 701-715.
Liff, Adam P., and G. John Ikenberry. “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the security Dilemma.” International Security, vol.39, no. 2, 2014, 52-91.
Herz, John H. “Political Realism and Political Idealism” by Sabine, George H. The Philosophical Review, vol. 61, n. 2, 1952, pp. 8-9.
