The ethical distinction between letting die and killing plays apart over the making of euthanasia legal. The difference between the two gets a usual way that people typically think about the issue of euthanasia. According to James Rachels, the difference between the two is not relevant morally. He used the experiment of Smith and Jones to prove his argument. Nesbitt responds to Rachels, arguing that Rachels’ experiment fails to successfully prove that letting die and killing are morally the same. Nesbitt contends that the more relevant factor of euthanasia morality is the willingness of the actor to kill. Although Nesbitt seems to get closer to the morally relevant factor compared to Rachels, his argument does not seem to be very clear. Thus, I tend to think that the claim “killing is more immoral than letting a patient die” is flawed, as it does involve different factors.
James Rachels (78) argues that people believe in existing of a moral distinction between active euthanasia and passive euthanasia because they deem that killing somebody is worse compared to letting one die. Consequently, Rachels performs an investigation of the matter by considering two similar cases except that one entails killing whereas the other entails letting somebody die. He asks whether the difference in their actions makes dissimilarity morally. He uses similar cases to ensure that it is that one variation and not any other that accounts for the difference in the moral evaluation of the two issues.
In the Smith case, Rachels paints a scenario where Smith will have great inheritance if his six-year-old cousin is dead. Then one evening as his cousin is having bath, he creeps in the bathroom and drowns him. In the other case, Jones will also have inheritance if his cousin is dead. One evening as the child is having his bath, Jones sneaks in with plans of drowning the child. However, just as he goes into the bathroom, the cousin slides and falls in the water facing down and his head is hit (Rachels 78). Jones is happy and he is prepared to thrust the head of the child right back in if required; however, it is not necessary. His cousin drowns by himself, right in front of him and he fails to save him (Rachels 78).
While Smith killed his cousin, Jones only let his cousin die, which is the only dissimilarity. If it is morally important to differentiate between the two behaviors, Jones actions can be said to be less wrong compared to that of Smith. But one does not want to say so. Rachel argues that both men acted with similar motives, selfishness, and expecting exactly similar end during their actions. Jones says “after all I did not do anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I did not kill him; I only let him die” (Rachels 78). If allowing the child to die was perceived as being less wrong compared to killing, then this justification would be valid. However, Rachel (78) argues that it does not, as it can only be considered as an ugly twisting of moral interpretation. Consequently, Rachel (79) concludes that although in euthanasia case the doctors do not stand to gain anything, the point is similar. Rachels claims that, “if a doctor lets a patient, for humane reasons, he is in similar moral position as if he had given the patient deadly injection for humane reasons” (Rachels 79) If the choice of the doctor was immoral, the decision would be similarly regrettable irrespective of the mean in which it was accomplished.
Nesbitt contends that whatever determines whether someone is right or wrong it is not what he actually does but what he is ready to do. Since Smith and Jones were ready to kill for their gain, they were equally wrong (Nesbitt 103). The judgment is independent of what they managed to do. What they did is not relevant to the moral assessment of them. Consequently, Nesbitt argues that nothing follows from the example given by Rachel about whether killing is ethically worse compared to letting die (Nesbitt 104). To determine if killing can be considered morally worse compared to letting someone die, he proposes that Rachels example needs to be modified. He says that the assumption that Jones is ready to kills ought to be removed. The readiness to kill is what each of them had, and it is what produces the moral intuition that Jones is as wrong as Smith. Nesbitt, thus, suggests that if Jones is not prepared to kill, Smith is more morally wrong than Jones (Nesbitt 104). That is because there is more reason to fear Smith, as there is more reason to fear people who are prepared to kill than those who are ready to let die. Based on Nesbitt’s argument, it does not appear to follow that Smith’s killing is worse when compared to Jones’ letting the child die. In this case, the actions of the two are of concern, rather than their character.
From the two arguments, Rachels’ argument is convincing that there exists no ethical variation between killing someone and allowing them to die. Conversely, Nesbitt’s argument is applicable in the case of euthanasia. Rachels’ idea has key impact in the medical euthanasia ream. If one believes that the only reason to render active intended euthanasia unlawful is that it is killing, then if killing can be proven to be morally equal to letting die, it follows that there is no sense in making active euthanasia illegal.
Nesbitt’s argument now becomes important as he claims that even though killing and letting die were morally equivalent, the cases of euthanasia have another relevant factor that should be analyzed-the willingness to kill. By criticizing Rachels’ argument through willingness to kill, Nesbitt is trying to bring out the fact that this is the difference that matters in euthanasia cases. Nesbit claims that there is a distinction between willing to kill and being willing to let die (Nesbitt 103). That is the morally relevant fact that ought to be discussed when comparing active and passive euthanasia. Rachels’ argument can be rejected as in real life euthanasia cases neither the actor’s intentions nor the case circumstances are similar. Since Nesbitt points out that there are no cases in real life that can follow such type of analysis to decide on the morality of euthanasia, then euthanasia ought to be judged by a different factor. Consequently, Nesbitt is closer to the real solution in the debate about euthanasia. He is bringing in factors that can be analyzed whereas Rachels eliminates all the information to analyze two variables.
It can be concluded that killing and letting die are morally equal. Nevertheless, there are no real life cases of euthanasia where killing and letting die are the factors to judge. It is more relevant in such real-life cases to differentiate between a person who is willing to kill and the one who is not.
Works Cited
Nesbitt, Winston. "Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?" Journal of Applied Philosophy. Vol. 12, No. 1 1995, pp. 101-106.
Rachels, James. "Active and Passive Euthanasia." New England Journal of Medicine. Vol. 292, no. 2, 1975, pp 78-80.
