According to Thomas Nigel, humans cannot truly know what it is like to be another entity. Nigel's piece What It's Like to Be a Bat elaborates on his point. According to Nigel's post, knowing that a bat has webbing to enable it to fly, that it has decreased vision, and that it utilizes echolocation to identify objects within range only tells us what it's like to behave like a bat (154). This viewpoint is unquestionably accurate because only bats completely grasp what it is like to be a bat. Human beings’ imagination is greatly influenced by their experiences, and these experiences limit the range of their vision. Therefore, a supposition of what it feels like to be another organism lacks specific facts. In fact, it would be difficult to reveal the real character of experiences undergone by that organism in the physical operation. Therefore, the subjective nature of the experience of an organism is only accurate from the particular point of view the subject apprehends.
According to Frank Jackson, physicalism is incomplete (158). This argument is undoubtedly correct. Jacks employs the example of people who see different shades of the same color. The color experience difference as a result of varying internal physiology is just but physical information. One that only elaborates all the features there is to know in the physicalist accounts of consciousness and mind. This information, however, does not help us understand what it feels like to experience color. Being able to experience that color is what we don’t know. Hence no physical information, no matter how extensive, would fill that gap. This gap incorporates an ineffable conscious experience, one that makes all physical information available to be incomplete. Both Nigel and Jackson establish the fact having all the physical information about a phenomenon, or an organism does not address the real experience of being that phenomenon/organism. Therefore, physicalism is both false and incomplete.
