Task Force Smith primarily discusses the conflict in July 1950 in which North Korea routed the US Army. At the time, the US was still basking in the glow of its resounding success in World War II, so the defeat came as a surprise. The force sent to battle the Koreans is called Task Force Smith, and it is commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Charles Smith. South Korea was invaded by North Korea, an ally of the Soviet Union. The soldiers entered the Korean War without understanding how or why they were assigned their mission. Without any planning or thought, the US entered the war simply because it was better to act than do nothing. (Heller & Stoff, 1986). The leadership of the Army was poor in coordination and had no skills relating to the art of war at the period. The decision to attack North Korea was one made in haste with an underestimation of the power of the enemy and overconfidence in the poor trained and equipped US Army (Garrett, 2000). Task Force Smith was a mission failure due to military leadership failure to fully prepare and equip the Task Force prior to engaging the North Korean Army.
Factors that contributed to the outcome of the event
Poor US UNIT Readiness
Task Force Smith suffered a defeat because its mission was not attainable by a single infantry battalion as deployed in the war. Manpower shortage was one key reasoning resulting in the failure of Task Force Smith. In a rush to get the US Army to help Sooth Koreans, the leaders ordered for the airlifting of the first troop from Japan. The force had more than four hundred men and had the mission of fighting a delayed kind of war as the other troops were on their way to join them. However, the army was too small a number for the fully equipped North Korean Army and could not match their opponents. Outnumbered and with many soldiers losing their lives with no hope of getting back-up, the American Army had to withdraw from the battlefield. Therefore, the scratch force was too small in size to match the number and skill of the North Korean Army (House, 2001).
Inadequate training also contributed to the outcome of the events. The scratch force had few training areas and worked on a limited budget. Following the World War II, the American public was in dire need for things to return to normality. As a result, they did not see a need for a large army thus pushing the government to cut down the budget dedicated towards military funds (Heller & Stoff, 1986). The 1940s Army of the US operated on a minimal budget that had decreased by 45% in 1946 with a constraint of live-fire training and a decrease of the preparation period from ten to eight weeks (Fehrenbach & Foley, 2010). The US Army in Japan also had the simple job of overseeing the Japanese population and thus there was no need for rigorous training. As a result, the task force dispatched to fight North Korea consisted of poorly trained soldiers for the mission.
The scratch force also has limited equipment to match the well-equipped North Korean troops. The Army heavily depended on artillery developed for the World War II. The equipment was thus worn out unlike the advanced military machinery that the Korean Army employed in the war. The US military had the required technology to defeat the North Koreans; however, the firepower was not accessible for Task Force Smith. The artillery that the scratch force had to back them up could not penetrate the armor of the North Korean T-34 tanks. Without the necessary technology, Task Force Smith had no option but to use armor that was inferior to the equipment of the North Koreans thus limiting their chances of stopping the enemies’ advances (House, 2001).
Being the main world power after their victory in the World War II, the US had too much confidence in their army and as a result underestimated the strength of the enemy. President Truman had taken various actions to prevent Soviet Union attacks such as the 1948 Marshall Plan, the 1948 reprieve of Berlin and the establishment of NATO in 1949 (Fehrenbach & Foley, 2010). The Americans were confident that the Soviet Union would not attempt any form of aggression. The sudden attack on South Korea got the American making hasty decisions with the illusion that the North Korean Army could not be as powerful as that of the US. The US obviously had a more advanced technology, however, in their complacency; the military deployed a single battalion hoping that they would be able to delay the battle until the arrival of other troops. The decision was made without a thorough consideration of the enemy’s army but with overconfidence in the US Army (Garret, 2000).
The Enemy Gets a Vote
The brave North Korean drive south depended on a well planned operational design, advanced equipment and adequate training. After the World War II, the Americans assumed that the next battle would be atomic and invested in a powerful navy with a little focus on ground soldiers (House, 2001). Taking the situation to their advantage, the Soviet Union caught the US by surprise with their attacks on North Korea. The North Koreans also positioned themselves on hill masses that gave into the American flanks that were open and susceptible to attack thus enabling them to defeat the Americans. The earlier attack had weakened communication systems of the US Army thus giving the North Koreans an advantage in using the element of surprise in the war. Additionally, the Soviet Union boycotted the UN vote on the matter resulting in the approval of the use of force to deal with the situation (Garrett, 2000).
US leadership Shortcomings
The main challenge was the leaders of the US in their unpreparedness and poor leadership before and during the event. President Truman had yielded to the public demand for reducing the budget allocation to the military without considering the possibility of a threat and the need to have well-trained and equipped soldiers that can defend the nation. Additionally, he approves the deployment of Task Force Smith even though it was clear that the American soldiers were not well trained to fight on the ground (Heller & Stoff, 1986). The senior leaders of the 24th Infantry Division, Eighth U.S Army were also part of the problem as they did not give proper operational guidance. General Macarthur on the other side executed his plan without considering the association of the mission and aim. The other commanders also failed to question the strategies that Macarthur put forward even though it was clear that only two companies were involved in the attainment of the mission, which was unrealistic. Therefore, the daring choice to deploy the Army rapidly to Korea showed the operational flaws in the US leadership that ended up costing the lives of many good men (House, 2001).
Poor US Intelligence
The US did not have adequate intelligence on the situation before making decisions about how to handle the North Korean Army. When the plan to attack the North Korean Army came up, the enemy troops were already crossing Han River. They had made their way into the South. There was no reputable regimental combat team in Japan to set up on the mission, and the US has to come up with one. One full regimental combat team would have successfully delayed the North Koreans. However, the US sent a single battalion without the knowledge that the enemy had a strong and well-trained army. If the US had taken the time to study the enemy instead of rushing into a decision, they would have the needed intelligence to bring down the North Korean Army (Garrett, 2000).
Poor Coordination with ROK Army
The US also did not coordinate efficiently with ROK Army and thus leading to their defeat. The ROK Army together with 13th Infantry Regiments had delayed the North Korean divisions for two days and had suffered the loss of manpower. The team persisted even though they were fewer than the North Korean troops. The addition of two North Korean divisions forced the ROK troops to withdraw, and as a result of poor coordination the bridge across Han River as they retreated was cut off by alarmed engineers. If there had been proper coordination, the ROK Army would have successfully retreated and later joined the US Army to fight the North Koreans (Garrett, 2000).
Significance to Contemporary Leadership
Task Force Smith is significant to contemporary leadership as it provides lessons that leaders can pick from in their work. The event showed the importance of having a strong army that is well trained and equipped. Today, the USA ensures that the Army has sufficient ground to train and advancements in military science to strengthen their ability to defend their country. The significance of intelligence is also vital as the US facilitates various programs to ensure monitoring and evaluation of security to note any threats and deal with them early enough. In contemporary leadership, leaders ensure they consult before making important decisions and adequately make preparations before implementation to avoid any negative repercussion as in the case of Task Force Smith (Fehrenbach & Foley, 2010).
References
Fehrenbach, T. R., & Foley, K. (2010). This Kind of War. Tantor Audio.
Garrett, J. (2000). Task Force Smith the lesson never learned. Army Commandant and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies.
Heller, C. E. & Stoff, W. A. (Eds). (1986). America’s first battles: 1776-1965. University Press of Kansas.
House, J. M. (2001). Combined arms warfare in the twentieth century. University Press of Kansas.
