Introduction
Between 19961 and 1963, the Vietnamese government implemented the Strategic Hamlets Program as the central strategy for the pacification of South Vietnam. The first step in putting the initiative into action was to separate the rural people from the Vietcong community guerrillas. The primary goal was to improve stability, social progress, and economic growth, as well as to foster inclusive engagement in political relations. However, the plan did not work out for a variety of reasons. One of the greatest reflected quote concerning the plan states that "In assessing the situation in Vietnam, we had learned three rules: nothing is what it seems; every statement or comment can be supported by evidence and is therefore true; and, as an extension of Murphy's Law, if the roof can fall in it will." (Higgins 1). This paper looks at the failures of the Strategic Hamlets Program through an analysis of factors contributing to the failure.Improper Planning and Coordination
The plan had characteristics of improper planning and coordination from the conceptualization of initial ideas leading to eventual failure of the program. Scholars quote the timetable for program execution as unrealistic since there were insufficient resources for its implementation (Leahy 153). From this perspective, any optimism linked to the project's progress dissipated quickly after the events of 1963. As Leahy notes in his book, the Viet Cong had their attacks increased hence they suffered from rapidly overrunning many hamlets especially the ones pushed ahead in 1962. The peasants realized that the reforms as promised in the program were not forthcoming and corruption marred the whole process coupled with efficiency in implementation. Therefore, they chose to reject the program as a whole. Since these peasants were centrally expected to rise in the war against the insurgents, their rejection of the program meant the failure of the program.Lack of Tolerance and Patience from the United States
Additionally, the United States lacked tolerance and patience towards the Vietnam government led by President Diem. The US Ambassador to South Vietnam in 1961 to 1963, Frederick Nolting made a quick conclusion that US inability to accept Diem's style of administration led to the coup of November 19963 (Higgins 4). One of the failures of the then president to South Vietnam, Diem failed to match the standards of a democratic government as set by the US. Rather than honouring the earlier pledges to refrain from disrupting internal politics of South Vietnam, US officials started to encourage dissident generals to revolt. Such overturn of things weakened the Vietnam government since it almost entirely depended on the US financial support and furthermore had faith in the finances to fund the program.Impact of President Diem's Assassination
While some may argue that the program was bound to fall following the assassination of President Diem together with his brother Nhu, this was not the immediate cause of failure of the program a subsequent event during the plans unsuccessful bid. For some time before their assassination, the end of the Strategic Hamlets program had been fast approaching. There were increased attacks aimed at the program in mid-1963. Most of the areas that had been previously under the program were slowly being won over by the Viet Cong After the death of President Diem and Nhu, the new regime was in a haste to distance itself from the events of the regime of Diem. The assignation and events thereafter resulted in the falling apart of the Hamlets Program.Failures in Training of Local Officials and Administrative Structures
Other cited failures for the program include poor training of local officials and poor administrative structures. At all local levels, local officials did not have adequate training, hence they failed to understand the philosophy for the implementation of the program. Evidently, officials entrusted with the management of the Hamlets Program were merely political appointees and did have any experience, expertise, or skills in managerial and management duties. Such official got into these positions owing to their political affiliations and the ability to defend their positions was largely dependent on their support to the government (Ellsberg 9). They mostly became overwhelmed by the huge responsibility they had. Others took more interest in the opportunities they stood to gain from the program at the expense of helping the peasants. The compensation to the peasants was inadequate and largely marred by corruption. Due to corruption by the local officials, the peasants grew frustrated and discontent hence rejected the program.Issues with the Civil Service and Lack of Coordination
While the Hamlets program ended up becoming a military affair, there was still need for the South Vietnamese government to control the program. The illiteracy level of the civil service greatly affected the entire program. The senior officials were mainly the former servants of the French regime. They were, therefore, not interested in the issues of the peasants or even in the countryside (Willbanks 2008). The national administrative bodies were of little utility in the program. As for the U.S team, the agencies responsible for the various components of the Hamlets Program were poorly coordinated. From the national agencies down to the provincial levels, coordination of the program was highly suspicious. At some point, the United States opted to provide economic aid at the provincial level in an attempt to avoid the corruption experienced at the national level.Conclusion
Following the 1963 coup, time to implement the program was never available anymore. At all government levels, officials were no longer sure on how to move on with the program. The successor of President Diem did not have a prepared policy for the program as well. These factors finally led to the failure of the Strategic Hamlet Program.Work Cited
Higgins, James M. The misapplication of the Malayan counterinsurgency model to the strategic hamlet program. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 2001.
Leahy, Peter F. Why Did the Strategic Hamlet Program Fail. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS, 1990.
Ellsberg, Daniel. Some Lessons from Failure in Vietnam. No. RAND-P-4036. RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA, 1969.
Willbanks, James H., ed. Vietnam War: the essential reference guide. ABC-CLIO, 2013.
