Civilian Oversight and Walker’s Class System

Introduction

Until the 1960s, police reports were reexamined by the officers themselves. The study followed the Wickersham Report, which found that police officers required further supervision. The police department replied by establishing Internal Affairs Bureaus (IABs), from which people could file complaints. However, the bureaus were unsuccessful because the majority of complainants were coerced to settle their charges and the majority of police officers were exonerated (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 189). People's discontent with the IABs raised the number of cases of urban rioting. Citizen groups and commissions advocated for external review boards with which civilians would lodge complaints. The boards would provide democratic accountability while IABs promoted hierarchical accountability.

The Goals of Civilian Oversight

The four primary goals of civilian oversight of the police are to get rid of deviant officers, to discourage incidences of misconduct in the future, to bring contention to individual complaints, and maintain public confidence in the police (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 189). Philadelphia and New York City were the first cities to establish civilian review boards. These were mandated to examine cases of brutality in the police department, false arrest, charges of discrimination, and any other mistreatment of the citizens by the officers (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 189). Apart from the lack of a political standing, the boards faced other hurdles such as inefficient political backing and cooperation from the police.

Resistance to External Review Boards

Police officers were opposed to the external review boards because they felt that people outside the police force do not understand their day to day hustles in the law enforcement process. Moreover, they feared that the people lodging complaints would be viewed as more credible than the officers. They, therefore, could not use the same initiative, aggressiveness, and discretion in their work. Though many cities implemented some form of civilian oversight in the following years, most of the early boards disintegrated, and people would lodge complaints in the courts. This led to the introduction of the concept of an ombudsman – a neutral figure who received all allegations from the police as well as the public servants (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 190). As the years passed by, different boards were established to serve the same purpose.

Types of Civilian Oversight Systems

Civilian oversight committees take different forms in the current world. According to Walker, each city is different from others in its unique way. However, they all follow four primary systems: Class I to IV (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 190). Class I has an independent body tasked with receiving and investigating complaints. In this system, the police chief's primary role is to approve and oversee the independent institution. San Francisco and Minneapolis use this system. With Class II systems, investigations are handled by internal affairs units, but an oversight agency reexamines the results of the investigations. Kansas City employs this model.

In Class III systems, investigations are handled by internal affairs units. However, if the complainant is not satisfied by the outcome of the investigation, they go to a civilian oversight agency to appeal the decision. Omaha City practices this model. With Class IV systems, the review of police complaints is entirely within the department. Oversight agencies only ensure quality control throughout the complaint process (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 191). Portland and San Jose use this system.

Challenges and Benefits of Civilian Oversight

Several problems arise with each system of police complaint system. The most common one is the dissatisfaction due to the low number of substantiated complaints. Most cases are dismissed if the evidence is not beyond reasonable doubt. Another problem facing the boards is that the public is often skeptical of the investigations where the police investigate themselves. This is despite the fact that officers have access to more information than the board members. The review systems, however, are beneficial in that they keep records of all complaints against officers together with the outcomes of the complaints and the repetitive behavior patterns that may pose problems. As such, an officer with problematic behavior is addressed early enough to prevent serious repercussions (Grant and Terry, 2012, pg. 191).

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are several systems of civilian oversight employed by different cities across the United States and the world as a whole. They all pose different merits and demerits. If implemented well, the systems have been shown to benefit both the police department and the public.

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