In contrast to other institutions, FIFA's organizational structure and vulnerability to corruption
In contrast to other institutions, FIFA’s organizational structure is notable for exposing it to corruption. Numerous fraud incidents involving politicians have surfaced recently, allegedly signaling the need for additional reforms. The structure can be improved so that it functions flawlessly and complies with all ethical and professional requirements by changing the voting system, which previously gave each member an equal number of votes without taking other important factors like population into account. This policy that gives smaller governments similar bargaining leverage in making important decisions greatly increases FIFA’s vulnerability to corruption (Bialik, 2015). Such nations are readily influenced by the masses or willing to take bribes in order to support certain decisions. Similarly, the leadership in the developing nations has experienced many cases of corruption because they lack appropriate mechanisms to deal with such issues. Some individuals have successfully used fraud to fulfill their interests. By basing on these facts, it is evident that small member states will easily be influenced through deception to support a solution that might not have been developed ethically (Bialik, 2015). Therefore, the organization ought to adopt new and apt approaches that will ensure the one vote system is eliminated.
Unequal democracy in the structure and the need for representation based on population
Moreover, there is unequal democracy in the structure whereby officials are not selected depending on the population. FIFA should consider electing representatives based on the number of people in the particular country (Bialik, 2015). For, states such as China, US, and others which have huge population must be represented by more officials to minimize the adverse impacts of “one member one vote” approach that has increased the vulnerability of the body to corruption. Consequently, FIFA will execute its mandate without the influence of any member and will further improve the mechanisms put forth to prevent fraud.
Reference
Bialik, C. (2015). How FIFA’s Structure Lends Itself to Corruption. Accessed on Oct. 10, 2017
from https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-fifas-structure-lends-itself-to-corruption/
