The ability to ask questions that pique interest in the author's line of reasoning helps improve critical thinking. Paul and Elder (2010) assert that there are fundamental, universal intellectual norms that serve as a framework for evaluating the strength of an argument on a given circumstance or problem. The criteria include depth, rationality, justice, relevance, clarity, precision, correctness, and breadth. The application of these criteria to the article Another Intelligence Twist demonstrates the author's thorough thinking in attempting to defend the President Bush administration's sanctions against North Korea.
Clarity
The Central Investigation Agency (C.I.A.) submitted an intelligence report to the US Congress regarding the construction of a uranium enrichment facility in North Korea for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The information led to the suspension of a deal between the United States (U.S.) and North Korea in which Korea received fuel oil in exchange for the termination of plutonium production (The Washington Post, 2007). North Korea restarted the plutonium production in protest of the suspended deal contrary to the Bush administration's expectation.
Accuracy
The sanctions were imposed on North Korea to halt the construction of the supposed uranium enrichment facility. The intelligence report was termed as exaggerated due to the absence of concrete evidence showing the plant construction in North Korea. The Bush administration, therefore, acted on speculations in suspending the supply of fuel oil to North Korea. However, the uncontested knowledge was that North Korea had purchased equipment and materials necessary for the building of a fully functional uranium enrichment facility (The Washington Post, 2007).
Precision
President Clinton's administration made an agreement, named the Agreed Framework, with North Korea in which North Korea was to receive fuel oil and food supplies from the US in exchange for freezing its plutonium production facilities. In 2002, the Agreed Framework buckled after the Bush administration accused North Korea of running a "clandestine uranium enrichment program" resulting into conflict after the North Korean officials confirmed and later denied the accusation (Nikitin, 2007). Pyongyang restarted the plutonium production to show that he had honored the Agreed Framework until the U.S. withdrew the food and oil supplies.
Relevance
The author posits that the U.S. administration lacked enough evidence to warrant the ban on North Korea from receiving fuel oil. The administration was, therefore, seen to worsen world's security after North Korea restarted its plutonium production facilities. The Koreans conducted their uranium program more secretly now that suspicions had emerged from the U.S. administration. Arguably, North Korea continued with the manufacture of the plutonium despite the existence of the Agreed Framework agreement with the United States.
Depth
The actions by the Bush administration based on a speculative report portray the lack of objectivity in addressing the issue. The U.S. government should have sought more detailed evidence to incriminate North Korea. The release of the unconfirmed intelligence report by the C.I.A. compromised the progress made in the disarmament of North Korea. The Bush administration made amends in 2008 when an agreement with North Korea to honor the Agreed Framework was made. The obligations of the U.S. in the agreement were to remove North Korea from the list of terrorism sponsors and the Trading with the Enemy Act (Niksch, 2010).
Breadth
Though the author expresses the condemnation of the Bush administration for sanctioning North Korea, the ban was justifiable by the fact that the Korean officials confirmed the purchase of centrifuges from Pakistan. The North Korean officials had given U.S. experts access to documents and equipment in the declaration of the nuclear activities' extent (Kessler, 2007). However, the chance to investigate their plutonium facilities was restricted to the Yongbyon region. The implication of this restriction is that the North Korean administration possessed a secret facility hidden from the U.S. government.
Logic
The high level of mistrust between the U.S. and North Korea was exposed in the issue about the uranium enrichment facility and the ban on fuel oil. The U.S. believed that North Korea had continually manufactured radioactive elements used in the development of nuclear weapon despite receiving the oil supplied from the Agreed Framework. The North Korean administration claimed that the nuclear weapons produced were for self-defense utilization.
The collaboration by the Clinton administration with Pyongyang of North Korea was opposed by some quarters who later endorsed the C.I.A. report. Though the Clinton administration had arguably achieved some success in disarming North Korea, the opposing quarters believed that Korea was not genuine in keeping their end of the bargain. The country secretly bought centrifuges for the enrichment facility from Pakistan and continued enjoying the food and oil supplies. The defiant confirmation by the Korean officials on construction of the facility during negotiations with U.S. officials reveals the untrustworthiness of the Koreans.
Fairness
The U.S. had the right to question the activity involved in the purchase of centrifuges by the North Korean government since there existed an agreement to refrain from nuclear-related engagement. However, without enough evidence, the ban on North Korea should have been lifted. There was the need for transparency from the North Korean side regarding the uranium enrichment program considering the benefits the country got from the agreements made with the United States administration.
References
Kessler, G. (2007, November 10). N. Korea Offers Evidence to Rebut Uranium Claims. The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/09/AR2007110902364.html
Nikitin, M. B. (2007). North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Latest Developments. CRS Report for Congress. Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=481928
Niksch, L. A. (2010). North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Development and Diplomacy. Collingdale: Diane Publishing Company.
Paul, R. and Elder, L. (2010). Universal Intellectual Standards. Foundation for Critical Thinking. Retrieved from http://www.criticalthinking.org/pages/universal-intellectual-standards/527.
The Washington Post (2007, March 2). Another Intelligence Twist. Retrieved from http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01/AR2007030101507.html
