A trust is valid in terms of justice and trust only if it satisfies the requirements for considerable capacity, certainty, constitution, and formality. The parties in issue have the authority to make a trust disposition if they have capacity. It denotes that a person has a claim to, or is legally the owner of, a property held in trust. Elias, the deceased benefactor was formally entitled to $200,000, 950 shares, and the remaining buildings in the first, second, and third dispositions, correspondingly. The element that defines the standards by which trust and equity are rendered is certainty. For instance, in the first disposition the statement does not provide the exact values in which Scathach, a partner, is going to share the amount, $200,000
with three sons; Ambrose, Matt and Lee. In the second disposition the statement specifies that 950 shares are going to be under Thompsin to provide the dividends to a member of Roanoke Island. The constitution is the book containing the rules governing the equity and trust decisions. Among three dispositions only the second one is valid to be a trust because it satisfies the needs of a trust and equity. The question whether a disposition is in force or not is determined by the court of law basing on the constitution. Formality describes the rationale in which trustees are going to handle the property of the deceased benefactor. In all three dispositions Elias provides his wish to the trustees. In the first disposition he gives his partner the power to divide the $200,000 among the sons and herself. In the second disposition he gives this right to Thompsin.
As for Knight vs Knight (1840) 49 ER 58 the deceased benefactor had left his genuine and individual property as a will. There was instability who could be the recipients of the will, therefore, the court was required to decide the legitimacy of the will being referred to. Langdale MR decided that the will did not imply the end goal to offer ascent to a legitimate trust in the law. He gave the particular prerequisites that are important to make a legitimate trust alluded to three assurances. They include: (1) the sureness of the topic: the property of the departed benefactor that is confided should be clear, (2) the sureness of goal: it must be obvious that the departed benefactor wished to make a trust, (3) the conviction of items: people who are to profit by the trust need to be sketched out plainly.
Arguments
In the case of Elias’s property, the trustees are only going to be legitimate if the elements of the consideration are the trust essential elements under Girozentrale v Islington that is a trust is fulfilled if a trustee has an ownership to a property and if he rightfully has the right to own the same property. The above elements bring the arguments on whether the legacy left by Elias is going to be legally binding to the equity and trust law. In our discussion, we are facing the explanations about the existing equity and trust laws and the basic elements of them.
The first written disposition by Elias will be rendered in the court of law since it lacks a substantial support of the requirements of equity and trust. Firstly, the case will flop in the official courtroom for not satisfying the certainty. Elias has not specified the exact amount of money to be allocated to his children.
According to Knight vs Knight three convictions must exist for a trust to be held as substantial. There is an unmistakable expectation from Elias to leave his partner and three children monies. Having recorded his partner, Scathach, three kids, Matt, Lee, and Ambrose, they are ones specified to get advantage from the trust. Be that as it may, this can not be upheld against the trustee exclusively in light of the fact that it neglects to meet the sureness of topic. As Elias did not express the measure of cash three kids ought to get from the £200,000 the received amount was obscure. For example, when he says that the young son Ambrose ought to get minimal part of the foremost sum. For this situation, he should have expressed plainly that Ambrose ought to get, for instance, £200 from the main sum. Giving a chance for his partner to use the money to around-the-world cruise instead, it renders Elias to lack certainty on the means of the distribution of the money. The kids would be disadvantaged. Hereby, the money of the deceased has not been stated and therefore the formality of distributing the $200,000 by the partner could be unlawful.
Basing on Palmer v Simmonds (1854), the court should render the disposition invalid because it lacks certainty and cannot provide formality of distributing the $200,000. The court can also base its decision on MacJordan Construction v Brookmount Erostin case where the uncertain money of two kids, Matt and Lee has not been segregated from the certain amount of the partner and the youngest son.
In the second disposition Elias has met all three necessities of a substantial trust. In the main occasion including Shelby, she consequently turns into the protest of this trust, satisfying the conviction of question. Elias basically expresses that Shelby is to get 950 of his 1000 shares, obviously laying out the measure of valuable intrigue she should guarantee from the total shares; it fulfills the required certainty of topic (Boyce v Boyce, 1849). The advantageous intrigue which Shelby should claim is clear, which implies that the trustee can not claim uncertainty inasmuch as the correct extent of shares distributed to the recipient has been distinguished. Andre Golay provides that the interests from the shares have to be provided. In this disposition the depositor has specified the beneficiaries of the dividends.
In Hunter versus Moss (1994) 1 WLR 452 the offended party was to get 50 shares from a deceased benefactor's domain. The trust did not particularly set out which of the 950 shares of the departed benefactor the recipient should get. In any case, the court held that since everyone of the shares was inside a similar organization, it was not important to recognize the 50 shares and, therefore, the gratuity passed as the trust was substantial. Shelby can uphold this manner against the trustee on the grounds that the instrument has met three conditions of a legitimate trust.
With regards to one who may profit Elias was certain that it can be any of the occupants of Roanoke Island, giving the trustee the prudence to choose one. The conviction of topic from the start was met on the grounds that the chose resident is just constrained to get profits and not offers, this recognizes the advantageous intrigue that Shelby and the chose occupants are to claim from this disposition. The court, therefore, should approve the legitimacy of the trust and ensure leave Thomasin with the mandate to own the trust as deposited by Elias.
In the last disposition the statement does not specify the ratio and the formula of giving out the proceeds of the residue is uncertain. The court would therefore render the disposition invalid for a trust. In Re Denley's Trust Deed (1969) Goff J held that the recipient standard is restricted by different reason for trusts. Hence, an impersonal trust can be legitimate if the even-handed right should be enforceable.
The court in Re Astor's Settlement Trusts (1952) held that the advancing of comprehension amongst countries and the conservation of the autonomy of daily papers were even-handed rights that could not be implemented and in this manner the trust of the departed benefactor was invalid.
In spite of the fact that it is apparent that the deceased benefactor, Elias, has the expectation to make an arrangement, however, he is not certain of the topic. Elias intended to give a dedication to him. The court will neglect it in view of interminability; there is nobody to authorize the terms.
The deceased benefactor, Elias, would have specified the period of his memorial. In that unique circumstance, the court may consider maintaining the legitimacy of this non-magnanimous reason trust. In Re Endacott (1960) Ch 232 CA the deceased benefactor words “some helpful dedication to myself” were esteemed to be life-term and not legally valid. The court clarified the meaning of “ceaseless” as something endless and lasting forever.
Once the above piece of the dedication is void, this likewise makes the development of another Island Coven void. Since one section influences the other, it does not meet three-pronged trial of conviction. In Re Shaw (1957) 1 WLR 729, the court expressed that trusts which do not meet the prerequisites of magnanimous tests are bound not to succeed with regards to non-beneficent reason trusts. Hence, it can not be upheld against Thomasin.
