An Authoritarian Government
An authoritarian government exercises monopoly by concentrating absolute power in the hands of a few people and constrains democracy by limiting citizens’ liberties and rights. The state subordinates its people’s freedoms in this sort of administration, with no form of constitutionalism. Masashi Sekiguchi (2016), p. 92.
Juan Linz’s Powerful 1964 Portrayal of Authoritarianism
Juan Linz’s powerful 1964 portrayal of authoritarianism (Richard Shorten 2012 p. 256) describes tyrannical political frameworks by four major qualities:
Restricted Political Pluralism
Restricted political pluralism, that is such administrations put limitations on political establishments and bodies like governing bodies, political parties, and intrigue groups.
Reason for Authenticity Based on Emotion
A reason for authenticity based on emotion, particularly the identification of the regime as a fundamental evil to battle “effectively recognizable societal issues, for example, underdevelopment or uprisings.
Insignificant Social Activation
Insignificant social activation regularly caused by constraints on people in general, for example, suppression and silencing of political adversaries and administration hostile activities.
Casually Defined Executive Power
Casually characterized executive power with regularly obscure and shifting powers (Gretchen Casper 1964 p. 40-50).
Authoritarian Regimes after World War II
Since World War II, authoritarian regimes have been of particular interest. However, authoritarianism dates back to the 12th century, as seen with the templar knights.
Graph 1: Authoritarian regimes after World War II
From the graph above it is evident that a large majority of authoritarian regimes existed during the Cold War (1947-1991). This is attributed to the fact that Russia and the United States of America had a significant amount of influence in smaller countries to protect their interests if a war was to ever break out. This saw people rise to power either personally or by being sponsored.
Military Dictatorships
These are dictatorships that are controlled by “men on horseback” (Janowitz 2002 p. 56). These military rulers amass power through a rebellion after the past regular civilian institutions have been deemed redundant. Without noteworthy countervailing powers, the military’s restraining infrastructure over the physical methods for intimidation makes the less productive civilian governments an easy prey for armed militia. The social bases of these administrations are generally rather thin.
Some military rulers act as temporary caretakers and endeavor to restore their nations to civilian rule (as Olusegun Obasanjo did in Nigeria in 1980). Others, despite what might be expected, try to set up their authority permanently. The three subtypes of military dictatorships can be recognized:
Personal Military Authoritarianism
These regimes are based on a “strong man” and his immediate followers. Since there are bare, if any, formalized input structures, they depend vigorously on their centralized output apparatus. In numerous Latin American nations, this kind of rule was practiced by the famous “Caudillo” in the nineteenth century. Despite the fact that the Caudillo’s ascent to power was to a great extent because of his own qualities (i.e., his military ability and maybe alluring appeal), this rule cannot be comprehended without reference to the established landed oligarchy.
The extensive haciendas stayed as one of the steady components in turbulent circumstances, and Caudillos regularly were (or progressed toward becoming) haciendados too. In situations where a Caudillo figured out how to set up a durable administration, this was frequently refined through an arrangement of territorial and nearby sub patrons, the “caciques.” Since this kind of rule is exceptionally personalistic, it remained characteristically unstable. Caudillos were regularly toppled by successful rivals.
Corporate Military Authoritarianism
In the 1960s some Latin American states, for example, Brazil and Argentina, saw the development of more “modern” military administrations. In these nations, power had been amassed by the military on a corporate premise. Within the top ranks of the military, a specific systematized exchange of power was set up. In spite of the fact that the political orientation of these administrations was “national” and ideal to “modernization,” they have left more seasoned social structures basically intact. Formal intrigue groups and politicians were firmly regulated, and the severe nature of the administration was especially outright.
Socialist Military Authoritarianism
This regime sets up its power permanently through the formation of a solitary party system. As opposed to alternate types of military rule, these administrations have a socialist and lower-class orientation. In such cases (e.g., Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt, or Peru after 1968), the power of the military was coordinated toward social policies. In the long-haul, the achievement of such changes depends, however, upon the administration’s capacity to secure cooperation from below. On the off chance that these endeavors come up short, a move to a semi-competitive kind of regime (e.g., Anwar as-Sadat’s Egypt), a polyarchic framework (in Peru after 1980), or a return to personalistic military control may occur.
Monarchic Dictatorships
Most of the time, these regimes comprise of a King who is a part of a certain dynasty. He becomes the ruler belongs to this dynasty. Every major power rest with him, including control of the military, police, judiciary and so forth. Vital positions are generally occupied by his relatives. Upon his passing, the power is transferred to his next of kin, most of the time his first-born son (one exception to this is Saudi Arabia, where a special council handles succession matters). Other monarchs include Qatar, Brunei, and Swaziland (where the ruler claims 75% of the nation’s riches). Hypothetically, the ruler employs unlimited control over the general population, yet there will other prominent groups within the nation like religious pioneers (the Ulema of Saudi Arabia), businessmen and so on. Absolute monarchs ought not to be mistaken with constitutional monarchies like the UK where the illustrious families employ only ceremonial power.
Another case for an established constitutional monarchy in Bhutan (a little-landlocked country between India and China). Monarchic dictatorships have four subtypes: Its premise of authenticity is customary and is frequently connected to legendary suspicions with respect to the establishment of the respective dynasty. Cases of this sort are Ethiopia (until 1974) and Saudi Arabia. Ascension to the throne is generally directed by heredity, and there is little, if any, open political rivalry. Formal separation of powers is nonexistent, the power structures are personalistic and fortified by distinguished upper-class axioms. In previous circumstances, most regimes of this kind were based upon medieval agrarian structures. Today they have a tendency to have concentrated and absolutist qualities.
Civilian Dictatorships
A regular civilian dictatorship is a unique type of government unique in comparison to military autocracy and governments where the dictator does not get their power from the military. Among civilian autocracies, dominants-party dictatorships have a tendency to outlive personalistic tyrannies (William Roberts & Matt Golder 2012). This is the most common type of dictatorship in the modern-day setting. Elections are often held but these do not give an actual outlook on what is on the ground. There are two major subtypes of civilian dictatorship.
Personalistic Dictatorship
A personalistic dictatorship is not quite the same as an absolute monarchy, and the ruler does not generally base his power with respect to the idea of celestial right. The transition of power inside a family is required by general law as a feature of the state’s projected course of action and keeps on applying to all progressions in the administration (Azerbaijan 1993, when Heydar Aliyev was succeeded by his son). This arrangement is not required by general law. At times, an exceptional law may be sanctioned to formally choose one specific relative of the present leader as the successor. In different cases, the law of the state may even formally accommodate elections, however, control applied by the current leader on the political and discretionary process guarantees an innate succession (Gabon 2009, when Ali Bongo succeeded his late father Omar Bongo after a disputed election). Besides, regardless of whether every progression succeeds relies upon the level of expert and control of the leader. Thus, current family fascisms regularly change into a non-familial (non-personalistic) administration after few progressions: typically, only one, and seldom more than two.
This kind of dictatorship gets its support from the predominant urban groups in a contemporary setting. In this “hegemonic” regime, open rivalry for open office does not happen. Usually, there is a single party structure, which, be that as it may, is dominatingly formal and not extremely viable. Rather, accentuation is placed on the bureaucratic. Popular sentiment and the media are controlled, while the administration is incorporated and exceedingly personalistic. In this regard, some appealing components of authenticity may exist. Consistency is set up either as far as a passive acknowledgment or by harsh measures. Both the social base and “comprehensiveness” change in ethnic and class terms. In many cases, a generally wide ethnic base is combined with more limited class intrigues that support the prosperous groups in society. Nations, for example, Cameroon, Tunisia, and the Philippines (under Ferdinand Marcos; 1917– 1989) are good examples).
Dominant-Party Dictatorship
A dominant party dictatorship is where there is “a classification of political associations that have progressively won elections and whose future defeat cannot be visualized as it is deemed impossible” (Suttner, R. 2006 p. 277-297). More often than not, the ruling party reliably holds the majority of government, without the requirement for coalitions. These include the Liberal Party of Canada In Canada and the Awami League in Bangladesh.
Those who do not agree with the “dominant-party” hypothesis contend that it sees the importance of citizen democracy as given and that it assumes a specific origin of representative democracy (in which distinctive political parties are often in power) is valid (Suttner, R 2006 p. 277-297). An author contends that “the dominant party ‘framework’ is profoundly imperfect as a method of examination and needs an informative limit. Be that as it may, it is an extremely moderate way to deal with legislative issues. Its principal political presumptions are limited to one type of democracy, appointive legislative issues and unfriendly to well-known political matter. This is shown in the fixation on the nature of the electoral opposition and its or overlooking of well-known political activities sorted out in different ways. The supposition in this approach is that different types of organization and resistance are of constrained significance or a different issue from the solidification of their adaptation of democracy” (Suttner, R 2006 p. 277-297).
This kind of dictatorship approaches what Wiarda calls an “open corporatist” framework. The contending components are frequently organized in “traditionalist” and “liberal” parties, for example, those found in nineteenth-century Chile, Colombia, or Uruguay. The “dominant one-party” framework in post-revolutionary Mexico is a valid example. Dynamic involvement remains limited to the center and upper class of the populace, while mass mobilization is to a great extent forestalled or confined to more emblematic capacities. In an alternate social setting, one-party dictatorships typifying focused components (e.g., that of Kenya until 1992) and states in which “managed rivalry” wins (e.g., Singapore, Lebanon until 1975) can likewise be subsumed under this classification. Semi-competitive administrations have a tendency follow constitutional laws within a presidential or parliamentary framework. Regular transfer of power happens inside the set system. They are less severe than “oligarchic” systems. The media also appreciates the more prominent flexibility.
Discussion
Under an authoritarian regime, the people end up reluctant request assistance from their government, as attracting the attention of a dictator is generally a very bad idea. The disregard and sadness that set-in result in a low birthrate and inevitable monetary impacts as there are fewer laborers to fill employment positions, since apathetic individuals have few or no children, and rotting hopeless nations from time to time attract outsiders. ‘Life is not worth living,’ turns into an unsaid understanding all through the nation. Romania under Ceausescu is a case of an autocracy where forbidding birth control medication was done to constrain Romanians to have large families in spite of their neediness. In this way shelters in Ceausescu’s Romania turned out to be filled with malnourished children whose guardians had deserted them.
As the all-inclusive community sinks further into hardship and hopelessness, two potential outcomes emerge; resistance and war. Successful rebellions will tackle the quick issue by removing the dictator, however, the revolutionaries should be watchful for fear that their interim government ends up being as unjust and heartless as the past one. War and subsequent defeat spare the populace if enough survive and the adversary cares enough to help revamp and partner with the previous tyranny. The worst outcome imaginable is that the tyranny will win the war and subjugate or execute the general population of the enemy nation, increasing injustice and human suffering.
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Works Cited
Gretchen Casper, Fragile Democracies: The Legacies of Authoritarian Rule, pp. 40–50 (citing Linz 1964)
Holding, APA Information Agency, APA (2017-02-21). “Mehriban Aliyeva appointed a first vice-president of Azerbaijan”. Accessed 5th December 2017.
Richard Shorten, Modernism and Totalitarianism: Rethinking the Intellectual Sources of Nazism and Stalinism, 1945 to the Present (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 256 (note 67).
Sekiguchi, Masashi. Government and Politics – Volume I. EOLSS Publications. p. 92. ISBN 9781905839698. Accessed 12th December 2017
Suttner, R. (2006), “Party dominance ‘theory’: Of what value?”, Politikon 33 (3), pp. 277-297
William Roberts Clark; Matt Golder; Sona N Golder (23 March 2012). “Chapter 10. Varieties of Dictatorship”. Principles of Comparative Politics. CQ Press. ISBN 978-1-60871-679-1. Accessed 11th December 2017
