The article Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap

Stephanopoulos and McGhee's article Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap focuses on understanding the consequences and improving the laws used in political and legal science. First, the article discusses the efficiency gap, a new measure of partisan symmetry coined by the authors. The article discusses the differences between perspectives on the doctrinal opportunities established by positive comments by the court partisan symmetry in LuLAC (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 838). According to the authors, there is a partisan bias that must be calculated by focusing on how voting fluctuates. They also point out that the efficiency gap negates the requirement for such counterfactual analysis.  The source defines the new measure of partisan symmetry that the authors refer as the efficiency gap. The article presents the distinctions that exist between perspectives related to the doctrinal opportunities established by positive comments by the court partisan symmetry in LuLAC (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 838). The authors indicate that there exists a partisan bias which must be calculated by focusing on how the voting shifts. They also note that efficiency gap eliminates the need for this kind of counterfactual analysis.
The source defines the new measure of partisan symmetry and provides a comprehensive discussion of some of the fundamental properties. The authors offer a comparison of efficiency gap to the partisan biases and identify some of gap's limitations (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 855). The most critical insight of efficiency gap regards the number of wasted votes. It contends that some individuals vote for losing and other winning candidates but in excess of what the person needs to prevail. This is associated with gerrymander as the scholars assert that the term is related to one party wasting a vast number of votes as compared to their adversary. The important properties of efficiency gap are that this is linked to measuring of underserved set share, requires identification of specific relationship between a number of votes and seats corresponding to the partisan, can be calculated for any district, and does not require any counterfactual analysis.
Further, the authors provide empirical evidence regarding efficiency gap of state house and congressional plans since 1972 to 2012. At the same time, the article offers highlights and gaps of the strategies that have been used which have given rise to gerrymandering litigation. In particular, they focus on the gaps exhibited by districts over the years across the states. They note that there has been an unprecedented increase in the level of efficiency gap in the recent decade in both state and congressional house plans (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 878). The most critical conclusion that the article draws from this evidence is that most of the approaches are reasonably fair to favor different candidates at distinct points during their lifespans. It also notes that most of the present plans are exceptional to the general rules because many show large efficiency gap that demonstrates a little likelihood of dissipation than ever in modern history. As a result, the authors demonstrate that this provides what courts and litigants have been missing, that is, a reliable examination of the implication of partisan's plans.
Finally, the article establishes an option that can be used to incorporate the efficiency gap into the doctrinal test. Here, Stephanopoulos and McGhee provide an analysis that compares the gap of plans to the legal threshold. In other words, they explain the way in which efficiency gap can be converted into doctrine. The article proposes a need for development and setting thresholds which if the plan exceed is presumed and termed as unconstitutional. The authors propose 8% for state house and two seats for congressional plans respectively. Any plan perceived to have gaps above these standards would be regarded as unlawful unless the state manages to demonstrate this has resulted from consistent application of legitimate policies (Stephanopoulos and McGhee 885).
Works Cited
Stephanopoulos, Nicholas O., and Eric M. McGhee. "Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap." The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 82, no. 2, 2015, pp. 831-900.