Being free and the argument of alternate possibilities
Being free, as it is commonly understood, involves doing what one wants to do. Most philosophers have opted to use the argument of alternate possibilities in assessing whether or not a person has free choice (Frankfurt 829). The precise interpretation of this idea, however, has been hotly contested. This essay will use the ideas of G. Strawson, J.J.C. Smart, and H. Frankfurt to make the case that an addict who is eager to seek help is actually not free.
Strawson's viewpoint on a willing addict
According to Strawson's viewpoint, a drug addict who is willing to use drugs is not truly free. The foundation of Strawson arguments is the idea that nothing can cause itself (Strawson 7). In his argument, Strawson allows moral discourse to include various slighter claims of responsibility. The likelihoods might include emotional states of responsibility even if a person has no objective duty as well as clearly non-moral forms of obligation. However, in essence, Strawson has tried to come up with an argument, which refutes unusual moral duty (Strawson 7). Therefore, he refutes the validity of assuming that people make decisions in the way they think they do. Based on this opinion, morality is a misconception. In other words, one cannot be held morally responsible for his or her actions. This supports the argument that a willing addict might not be actually free.
Strawson's argument on how a person acts for a reason
In his view, Strawson argues that when a person acts for a reason, what he or she does is a function of how the person is, mentally speaking (Strawson 13). Therefore, whatever an individual decides to do is something that is already decided. This is mainly because it reflects what that person already is. In a sum, the implied assumption according to Strawson is that there are only two probable causes of actions, that is, they are either impulsive or deterministic (Strawson 7). If that is the case, then there is no free will. Therefore, a person has no free will if his or her nature is deterministic. Similarly, if a person's nature is to act impulsively, then they do not have free will as well as moral responsibility. This supports the view that a willing addict is actually not free because according to Strawson, such actions are already decided.
Frankfurt's perspective on a willing addict
Frankfurt, in his views also supports the argument that a willing addict is not actually free. According to Frankfurt, people are considered to have a free will only if they are free to have the self-control they desire (Frankfurt 19). In other words, based on the first-order wishes, a person is at liberty to either give in to the desire or choose to accomplish another first-order wish he or she wills. Therefore, regardless of a person's will, he or she can choose an alternative if he or she has free will. The claim that an individual is morally accountable for his or her actions does not mean that the individual was in a capacity to choose his or her will. The claim, however, depicts that the person acted on his or her own free will. Regardless, it is erroneous to think that people act on their own free will only when they are at liberty to do whatever they want.
The over-determination of a willing addict's desires
Based on the above argument, a willing addict is not actually free. This is because his or her desires to use drugs will be in effect irrespective of whether he or she requires the desire to establish his or her will (Frankfurt 19). However, when the person takes the drug, he does it freely and of his or her own self-determination. This situation involves the over-determination of the person's first-order aspiration to use drugs. In this case, this would be an effective aspiration since the individual is psychologically addicted. It is also his or her effective desire because that is how he or she wants things to be. Therefore, given that it is not just because of addiction that the person's longing is in effect, he or she might be morally responsible for using the drug.
Smart's opinion on free will and chance
The argument that a willing addict is not actually free can also be supported by Smart's opinion on free will. For instance, Smart argues that pure chance could have an effect on an individual's character and that some events cannot be predicted (Smart 294). This could be used to support the view that a willing addict is not free because his or her character might be dictated by chance, which could not have been predicted. In other words, a person's actions are largely attributed to chance. However, Smart also argues that despite the role of chance in dictating people's actions, it is still not conclusive enough. In his argument, he strongly points out that people's actions are largely determined (Smart 303). For example, he uses the effectiveness of threats and punishments to support the claim that there is no free will and that actions are largely determined.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the essay has presented an argument that supports the view that a willing addict is not free. The arguments have been mainly based on Strawson, Smart, and Frankfurt's views on the concept of free will. According to the essay, it would not be right to think that people act on their own free will just like a willing addict.
Works Cited
Frankfurt, Harry. "Freedom of the will and the concept of a person." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 1, 14 Jan. 1971, pp. 5-20.
Frankfurt, Harry. "Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 66, no. 23, 4 Dec. 1969, pp. 829-839.
Smart, John. "Free-will, praise and blame." Oxford Journals, vol. 70, no. 279, July 1961, pp. 291-306, www.jstor.org/stable/2251619.
Strawson, Galen. "The impossibility of moral responsibility'." Philosophical Studies, vol. 75, 1994, pp. 5-24.
