Egoism, psychological or ethical, is the thesis that our self-interests motivate our actions. Egoists hold that the good should seek to aim at his wellbeing and maximize possible advantages from any available resource. Ethical egoism can approve behavior that benefits other people, but the underlying factor is promoting self-interests through cooperative relationships. Conversely, altruists believe in a motivational state that is other-regarding. Psychological egoism and psychological altruism may seem the same but are opposites (Perry, Bratman, " Fischer 485). These two opposing theories lead to circumstances that challenge morality; is altruism psychologically possible? Deontology, on the other hand, suggests that the actions taken by an individual should be based on whether the act itself is right not based on the righteousness of the consequences.
From the reading where a student finds a way of accessing all computer files and can alter students grades in various universities and even bank account balances, there exists a conflict between morality and self-interest. Based on the case study, some psychologists like David Hume argue that the farthest reasoning and sentiment can enter moral judgment is up to the point that they are still useful to the self-interest beyond which morality stops (Perry et al. 486). From this argument, altruism, and deontology only operate within the self-interest of an individual after which the person pursues personal wellbeing.
Based on the case, some of the unclear concepts concern the point where one should care about the welfare of other people when making decisions. Psychological egoists would confess that they would consider helping other people only if that assistance promotes their interests. Therefore, application of altruism is challenging since people find it difficult to hold themselves to a lesser standard while trying to assist others.
Work Cited
Perry, J., Bratman, M., " Fischer M. “Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings, 7th Edition.” Teaching Philosophy, vol. 37, no. 3, Sept. 2014, pp. 481–489. EBSCOhost, doi:10.5840/teachphil201437333.
