This essay discusses the argument against functionalism made by the absence of qualia.
The paper will explain the functionalism hypothesis of the nature of mental states and provide an introduction to the argument for absent qualia.
The argument that qualia do not exist is used to refute attempts to explain qualia in terms of functionalism.
The nature of mental states is a topic covered by functionalism theory.
It is among the proposals that have been provided as answers to the problem of mind/body by trying to explain what the ultimate mental nature is, what constitutes the mental state to be mental, and what is shared by thoughts in virtue of which they are held or in simpler terms, the theory attempts to show what makes a thought a thought.
According to the theory, the states of mind are identified by what they do and not by what they are made of.
The theory's main arguments depend on depicting that it is greater than the theory of identity and behaviorism, which are its primary competitors.
Unlike the behaviorism theory, functionalism holds the notion that states of mind are thinking creatures' internal states.
On the other hand, unlike the identity theory, functionalism supports the idea that states of mind are multiply comprehended.
The functionalism theory asserts that mental states are created or established by their causal relations to each other and to both sensory and behavioral inputs.
Its main motivation is appreciated by attention to concepts of artifacts or biology.
For example, a carburetor is a functional concept because it mixes fuel and air in the combustion engine internally, while biologically, the kidney has a scientific functional concept as its role is to filter the blood.
Similarly, according to functionalism, what being in pain for example means is that the pain disposes an individual to say ouch and start wondering whether he or she is ill.
Therefore, mental states can be completely characterized in terms that entail a language that is longico-mathematical as well as terms for signals as inputs and behavior as output.
However, the theory has been charged by objectors on the basis that it classifies many things as possessing mental states against what is accepted by psychologists.
Qualia are referred to as the experiences' qualitative properties.
The qualia of each experience are what provides them with individual characteristic feel and are what also differentiates one experience from the other.
Absent qualia argument indicates that there can be the existence of functionality equivalent systems that on the other hand lacks the same mentality.
For example, one system like a person can be in pain, but an alternative hypothetical system is not in pain, even though they have functional equivalence.
According to the argument, Qualia cannot be explained in terms of functionalism.
The disagreement proceeds by taking any qualia's functional account and recounting a circumstance in which those functions are realized in something that has no capability of experiencing Qualia.
Premises
The first premise is that functional definitions of states of mind abandon the qualitative factor of mental states.
The second premise is that a system may realize the same functional states like a human but the ability to experience qualitative states cannot be attributed to the system.
The third premise of the absent qualia argument is that two qualia can exist that lead to a similar functional state.
The forth premise of the argument is that just because a machine like a robot can act like a human it lacks feelings or qualia.
The fifth premise is that mental states cannot be said to be functional states that can be explained in physical terms.
In conclusion, the meaning of phenomenal mentality cannot be explained by functionalism.
First, it is worth noting that a system has a distinct experience when subjected to similar stimuli as others.
One of the features of qualia is that they are private as other people lack access to an individual's qualia as they are not able to observe that qualia like a given individual.
He phenomenal experiences of people to different signs are different.
The second premise is explained by Block using the Homunculi head which whether the China nation or little men operates can be said to realize similar functional states as a human, but cannot be associated with the same experience of qualitative state (Block 276).
Thirdly, it is worth noting that the view of functionalism is that there is an equal correspondence between states of mind and functional states.
Therefore, based on the third premise, the functionalist view is contrasted if two mental states or two different qualia are present that have similar functional state.
For instance, when a person is bitten by a mosquito, the feeling is different from when bitten by a horsefly, but the two states of mind have a similar functional state because the individual can slap the bug at its biting location.
Fourthly, robots have a potential to act like humans.
They have similar behavior to humans.
Block says that the robots are just machines that lack qualia or feelings and cannot be said to have minds or mental states.
Even though there are functional systems that possess the same functions as humans, these systems may not be conscious as they have no qualia, and can be said to lack mental states.
This means that some mental states are not functional states, thereby depicting the falsification of functionalism.
This premise is concerned with the absent qualia claim that all functional models of mental organization are capable of being comprehended by systems that do not have phenomenal properties or qualia (Savage 98).
Fifthly, features of qualia show that other persons lack the potential to observe a given individual's qualia like that individual.
No words or concepts can be used to explain qualia completely.
If a given person can observe more shades of a given color than an average person, the lacks no physical information that explains how that person sees that color because no amount of information is enough to tell the exact experiences of that individual (Davies and Glyn 262).
The absent qualia argument against functionalism depicts that functionalism cannot explain phenomenal mentality.
According to functionalism, states like pain, which are qualitative, are seen as system's functional states that are interconnected to inputs, outputs as well as other states that are internal.
In addition, there is no amount of information that is fed through artificial ways can have the potential to establish the experience of qualia because despite the fact that an individual might possess all the scientific and physical information concerning the taste of a given fruit, one cannot ever know the taste until he or she tastes it.
Since absent qualia are possible, functionalism theory fails to account for every possible mental state, which also means that functionalism has failed to capture the idea of qualia.
Critical Evaluation of the Argument
Functionalism is refuted by the absent qualia argument based on the discussed premises of the argument that can be used as the foundations of the opponents' claims.
According to the opponents of absent qualia argument against functionalism, a system can realize any functional organization, but that does not necessarily mean that that is does not have a conscious experience.
For instance, Block (275) notes that the brain's functional organization can be instantiated by China's population, but it are illogical to think that this lead to a group mind.
On the other hand, the defenders of functionalism respond to the premises upon which the absent qualia argument is based by noting that the knowledge of what something is like does not mean the possession of information, but the possession of abilities.
For example, one cannot read about swimming and be able to swim, but through experience, and this illustrates the non-existence of qualia as mental states.
The functionalism defenders also assert that being in a given state of mind equates feeling that specific mental state.
For example to have pain is similar to feeling pain, which depicts that qualia could be the causal effects of mental states.
Works Cited
Block, Ned. "Troubles with functionalism." Readings in philosophy of psychology 1 (1980): 268-305.
Davies, Martin Ed, and Glyn W. Humphreys. Consciousness: Psychological and philosophical essays. Blackwell Publishing, 1993.
Savage, C. Wade. "Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology." (1981).
