The decision to focus on Al Qaeda was motivated by its potential to plan terrorist attacks on US territory. The current study built on earlier research on Al Qaeda. The present study concentrated in particular on the appropriate intelligence methods that were used in the gathering of information on the Al Qaeda terror network. Additionally, the research assessed which human resources would be most effective in gathering intelligence data. A thorough analysis was conducted in the article's final part to determine which techniques were best for gathering information about the terror network. Additionally, measures employed by the local law enforcement agencies in responding to the terrorist events were highlighted in the current section.
Literature Review
The constantly evolving threat of terror organizations (Gunaratna & Oreg, 2010; Riedel, 2012) had necessitated the adoption of novel approaches in intelligence gathering on terror organizations. According to the CIA, different approaches had been implemented in covert operations against terror organizations such as Al Qaeda. The approaches included secrecy and protection, disguise, secret writing, codes and deciphers, intercepting the communication and the employment of technology (CIA, 2017a). Notably, secrecy and protection were the hallmarks of all successful covert operations.
History of the Intelligence in the US
Prior to the World War II, the US intelligence system had not adopted a unified approach; however, after the Second World War, the US increasingly became involved in an international crisis that necessitated the adoption of a national intelligence system. The current intelligence structure in the US was a product of the of Truman's administration's initiatives including the enactment of the National Security Act (US Department of Justice, 2013). However, radical changes were made in the US intelligence system following the 9/11 attacks (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).
Intelligence Programs
Notably, the US intelligence service had successfully employed cover operations in the Operations against Al Qaeda. For instance, before the capture of Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan, the CIA had employed multi-faceted approaches in intelligence gathering (Owen & Maurer, 2014) that led to the interception of communication from an Al Qaeda courier and strategic information from Al Qaeda suspects in custody. In addition, the US intelligence agencies launched a pilot Hepatitis vaccination program in the area where Osama was suspected to be residing by using native Pakistani officials to undertake the program on behalf of the US intelligence sector (Owen & Maurer, 2014).
After the capture of Osama bin Laden by US Navy Seals, it increasingly became difficult for intelligence agencies to employ cover operations against Al Qaeda after 2011. The above assertion was justified based on case studies undertaken by (Byman, 2015). The author noted that it was almost impossible for the external intelligence agencies to place spies within the Al Qaeda because the terror network had established robust vetting mechanisms for all its agents. The failure to infiltrate the terror network partly explains why the US had primarily focused on interception of communication and the capture of Al Qaeda couriers and terror agents.
Some of the key intelligence programs that were employed in the war on terror included SIGINT, OSINT, HUMINT, and IMINT (Byman, 2015). In particular, HUMINT and SIGINT involved the employment of human intelligence agents and the interception of communication signals from the terror agents, respectively. In contrast, IMINT involved the employment of imagery in evaluating terror activities with a higher likelihood of occurrence (Byman, 2015). MASINT was another approach employed by the US intelligence agencies in the collection of intelligence information from terror networks. In particular, the program involved the evaluation of both quantitative and qualitative information derived from radar intelligence, infrared intelligence, and nuclear intelligence. Given that Al Qaeda did not have access to nuclear weapons, it was postulated that the approach was not suitable for intelligence gathering.
The OSINT approach was another common method employed in the collection of intelligence information (Akhgar, Bayerl, & Sampson, 2017). For instance, the former USSR used this approach to collect intelligence information that was publicly available. The widespread use of electronic gadgets such as smartphones had personal computers; intelligence agencies had a comparative advantage gathering information from personal computing devices. However, in light of the fact that Al Qaeda seldom used personal computing devices, the use of the OSINT approach would not be effective.
The use of covert operations in intelligence gathering in the US predates the independence period (CIA, 2017a). In particular, the covert intelligence operations had enabled the CIA to undertake covert operations without compromising the security of the agents. Therefore, in light of the successes of the cover approach in intelligence gathering, it was deduced that the US intelligence service could recruit dependable Afghans, Syrians, and Iraqis and embed them within the terror network's organization. However, one of the key limitation of this approach was that there were no reliable means of ascertaining whether the covert agent would convey reliable intelligence. For instance, in the recent past, operational intelligence was hampered by double agents who provided intelligence to enemy camps (Lowenthal, 2003). In addition to the employment of covert agents, other approaches that could be employed against Al Qaeda included the use of codes and decipher in relaying intelligence information. The use of coded messages is regarded as one of the earliest approaches to be employed in the US starting from independence war (CIA, 2017a).
Technology
The recent advances in telecommunication, defense, and espionage had enabled the collection of intelligence information, without the need of compromising the lives of the intelligence agents. The employment of technology in intelligence gathering against Al Qaeda could build upon previous intelligence successes. For instance, the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles had made it easier for the US intelligence agencies to collect intelligence information regarding terror activities. Ronconi, Batista, & Merola (2014) observed that military-grade drones could be employed in mapping out high-value targets before the actual attacks were undertaken. The use of surveillance technologies had enabled the CIA and other intelligence agencies to map out and create models of the Abbottabad complex where Osama bin Laden was found. It is of note that surveillance technologies enabled the team to derive detailed information regarding the house such as the conspicuous absence of telecommunication technology, opaque windows, and high perimeter walls (CIA, 2017b).
Justification
After considering the potential intelligence gathering options available, it was noted that the use of selected technologies was the most appropriate approach in gathering intelligence information from Al Qaeda. The choice of technology over human agents, secret writing, disguise, and codes and deciphers was because the employment of technology had previously proven successful in obtaining actionable intelligence from Al Qaeda cells. Besides, it was noted that it was not feasible for the US intelligence to embed agents into the Al Qaeda network given the fact that the terror network had instituted broad precautionary measures after the capture of Osama. It is also of note that the use of technology (SIGINT) programs enabled the intelligence operative to have precise information regarding the scale of the threat posed by the terror network.
The success of the SIGINT intelligence program was evident after the 1998 terror attacks orchestrated by Al Qaeda terror network on US embassies. The US intelligence system was able to use the SIGINT program to intercept communication from the al-Hada telecommunication system that was employed by the terrorists. For instance, the SIGINT approach enabled the US intelligence to locate a clearinghouse that was used to relay information from Osama bin Laden and his terror agents around the world. According to (Andrew, Aldrich, & Wark, 2009), the employment of the SIGINT approach enabled the US and its allies to obtain real-time information of the terror activities that were planned by Al Qaeda. Given the fact that SIGINT was a minimalist approach in terms of the intelligence agents on the ground, it was postulated that the US intelligence could employ the SIGINT intelligence program in the fight against Islamic terrorism. Byman (2015) observed that the employment of the SIGINT approach had significantly increased post-9/11.
Given that Al Qaeda had exhibited aversion towards modern technologies and most of the terror cells operated independently, it was deduced that the employment of the MASINT approach would have a minimal positive impact. The same applied to the OSINT approach because there was no reliable open source information in the public domain regarding the terror network activities or operations.
Intelligent Community Policing
In addition to the intelligence approaches employed by the US intelligence sector, various techniques had been instituted by the US Department of Homeland Security in countering homegrown terror cell affiliated to Al Qaeda. For instance, federal security agencies had adopted a policing model that was guided by intelligence (McGarrell et al., 2007). The intelligent community policing approach was markedly different from the standard community policing in which the primary source of information was the citizenry. Therefore, the adoption of this approach had enabled the law enforcement agencies to enhance the reliability of the actionable intelligence employed in community policing. Notably, the intelligent policing approach encompasses various information collection mechanisms such as CCTV cameras on the streets, interrogation of terror suspects in custody and informants at the community level. It is of note that the suitability of the intelligent community policing approach was manifest in the arrest of the terror suspects in the Madrid train bombing and London subway (McGarrell et al., 2007).
Conclusion
The current research article highlighted different intelligence gathering approaches in use today and their suitability in the collection of intelligence information against the Al Qaeda terror network. After considering all the merits of the intelligence collection methods, it was deduced that the SIGINT approach was the most appropriate in gathering intelligence information from the terror network. The choice of this method was informed by the fact that it was previously proven successful in the interception of communication between bin Laden and Al Qaeda terror cells. It was hypothesized that the use of HUMINT, OSINT, and IMINT programs was unfeasible given that Al Qaeda had developed a thorough vetting process in the recruitment of the terror agents and there was no reliable or actionable intelligence in the public domain.
References
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