During the civil wars that occurred between 1940 and 1990
Various parties participating in the conflict were frequently unable to reach an agreeable negotiated solution to their dispute unless an outside force was involved that ensured their safety during the succeeding transition times (Annual Reviews of Political Science, 2017). The defeat can be attributed to the civil war opponents’ avoidance of negotiated settlements, which would have required them to surrender significant fallback defense mechanisms. There were no neutral police forces at the time, and there were no legitimate governments to assist in the enforcement of peace (Walter, 1997). The involved parties in a conflict are usually reluctant to strike a deal since they very well know that if they sign these agreements, and are likely to enter a period of high vulnerability. Thus, no side is ready to commit to such arrangements that are likely to become less attractive once they are implemented. The purpose of this paper is to show that there is tangible evidence that shows that the civil war adversaries require additional assurance from the outside security guarantees to persuade them before they implement peace accords willingly (Walter, 1997). This shows that merely resolving the underlying matters that cause civil wars is not enough to call for peace to the involved parties. Short-term security assurances as well the long-term institutional measures are necessary for ensuring durable and stable settlements. Therefore, it is evident that the outside actors play a crucial role in resolving of civil wars as they offer guarantees and assurances to the involved parties.
Discussion
Roles Played by the Outside Actors in Civil War settlements
Most civil wars are ethnic or religious based. The prevalence of many civil conflicts today is due to the accumulation of protracted conflicts that date back to as far as the 1940s. To amicably solve these conflicts, an outside actor should be involved (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). The third party is crucial in the negotiations and settlements of civil wars since the involved parties feel safe and secure as there is a guarantee and assurances that the terms of negotiations will be implemented and respected. For example, the Rwanda genocide ended after the intervention of the international community (Walter, 1997). The warring parties are usually willing to fight to the end unless there is the intervention of the outside powers. Negotiations are typically successful irrespective of the original ethnicity, ideologies or goals if a third party agrees to implement the formulated terms of the peace agreements. Negotiations which do not involve outside forces usually fail because the opponents are asked to do the unthinkable while there are no guarantees. Therefore, the outside actors ensure that the terms of the treaties and agreements are implemented and respected.
The external actors reduce the level of insecurities and fears that usually accompany the treaty implementation, thus helping in the facilitation of the settlement process.
The third parties guarantee that the opponents will respect the terms and formulate the consequences for the individuals that will not uphold the conditions of the agreement. They also ensure that at least peace will prevail until a new national government or even a national military is formed (Annual Reviews of Political Science, 2017). To make sure that the promises by the third party are credible, the guarantee must fulfill at the very least three essential conditions. The first condition is that the outside nation has its self-interest so that the other parties believe that this state will uphold its promise. These interests can include strategic interests, alliance loyalties, old colonial ties as well as economic investments which will encourage commitments to intervene. The second condition is that the third party is able and also willing to use force where necessary. Thus, its military capabilities are supposed to be sufficient to punish any side that violates the terms of the treaty. This is why the United Nations is the usual preferred outside actor due to its military might (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). The third party should be capable of signaling resolve by stationing sufficient forces to prevent further aggressions without necessarily sending additional troops as Syria did in the conflict in Lebanon. The above factors show that there is hope that the outside forces can alleviate the suffering that is usually associated with civil strife since they help in reaching to an agreement and restoring peace. In this way, the safety of citizens can be ensured.
Importance of International Intervention in Resolving Civil Wars
Civil wars can be multiparty if the external states mediate and intervene in the ongoing conflict. The law recognizes the international intervention in the resolution of Civil Wars. The international community led by the United Nation Security Council has gained recognition in successful mediations that have resulted at the end of various civil unrests (Cunningham, 2006). The modern law ensures that no state uses force against another, except self-defense and the actions that are directed by the UN Resolution Council. There is also another exception that the help in maintaining law and order that allows forcible interventions commenced upon a consent or an invitation from a government that wishes to seek help in dealing with armed opposition groups which exist within its territory (Cunningham, 2006). The historical examples that the international law has been used and has borne significant but not full success include the Spanish Civil War and the recent cases in DRC Congo, Libya, Syria and Somalia (Jervis & Art, 2015). Involvement of international mediators has lessened the duration of many civil wars since these foreign states help in reaching to an agreement as quickly as possible. Therefore, the external states play two crucial roles in the resolution of civil wars, which are intervening to make sure that an agreement to end the war is reached or offering help to one side to help that team win the conflict (Cunningham, 2006). The external states can also intervene out of the desire to pursue their independent agenda, for instance, the intervention of Uganda and Rwanda in the Congo conflict. In situations whereby the external states intervene to chase an independent motive, they usually represent an additional actor who has a different set of preferences, which may block the agreement (Annual Reviews of Political Science, 2017).
Civil War Resolution Process and Tools
Civil war resolution is a process that is comprised of various interdependent stages that comprise of the battle, negotiations and treaties and the implementation of an agreement. The earlier stages of the war resolution process usually have various implications for later stages, however, not always in a similar manner. The stalemates and the number of actors significantly affect the civil war resolution process as they inspire cooperation in the early stages of the peace process. The resolution process starts with the identification of the civil war, then conflict management and bargaining mechanisms are implemented followed by conflict termination which eventually leads to interdependence (Cunningham, 2006). The best tools to use in the civil war resolution include the number of veto players, autonomy, cohesiveness and the viability of the affected entities to shorten the duration of the resolution process and ensure early settlement for peace and order (Annual Reviews of Political Science, 2017). The scientific studies on civil war resolution using the above tools have shown how crucial the international relations have always contributed to the meaningful and significant solutions to civil wars.
Theories, Research Designs, Findings and Policy Implications on Civil War Resolution
The Research Design involves a theoretical framework that shows the studies that have been made for the attempts of explaining the criteria used for identifying various civil wars are those that are applied to Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). The research carried involves determining the number of veto players, autonomy, cohesiveness and the viability of the parties. The findings show that the number of veto players determines the durations of the civil wars and the ability to negotiate and reach a settlement. The findings showed that civil wars of which there were many veto powers, there also was a more substantial resistance to resolution (Cunningham, 2006). The theory and the analysis suggest that there are many implications for the policymakers interested in the designing of the responses to civil wars. The first implication is that since the two-party clashes are easier to resolve and reach a settlement than the multiparty conflicts, the policy makers that are designing the responses to various civil wars should aim at reducing the number of the veto players participating in the battle. Secondly, the international parties that are interested in the resolution of the conflict should always seek to identify the outlined combatants who are the veto players and ensure that they work primarily towards a peace treaty that would include all the parties involved. Lastly, when an all-inclusive consensus among the involved veto players is impossible, the international actors should always seek to institute peace between the strongest domestic rebels and the government first and then finally integrate the smaller groups (Cunningham, 2006).
Conclusion
The failure to end the civil wars between the year 1940 and 1990 without the intervention from outside actors shows that both domestic and international players have a crucial role in the early settlement of various civil wars. The civil war opponents require additional reassurance from the outside security guarantees to coax them before they implement peace agreements willingly. These outside actors have a very crucial role in the resolution of civil wars as they offer guarantees and assurances to the involved parties that the terms of the agreements will be followed as well as stating the consequences to those that do not keenly adhere to the conditions of the accords (Walter, 1997).
References
Annual Reviews of Political Science, (2017). Bargaining Failures and Civil War, Barbara F. Walter Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093. Available Online at: http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.101405.135301?journalCode=polisci/ Accessed 26 May 2017
Cunningham, D. E. (2006). Veto players and civil war duration. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations. Princeton University Press.
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science review, 97(01), 75-90.
Jervis, R., & Art, R. J. (2015). International politics: enduring concepts and contemporary issues. Pearson Higher Ed.
Walter, B. F. (1997). The critical barrier to civil war settlement. International organization, 51(03), 335-364.
