About Terrorism

On October 7, 2001, the United States of America declared terrorism to be a global enemy against which all civilized nations would have battled. The primary goal of the United States was to combat al-Qaida and its centers in Afghanistan, which were secure at the time by the Taliban authority (Taddeo, 2010). The Taliban had a friendly connection with Al-Qaida and found a helpful ally in the organization. This was especially true in light of Al-considerable Qaida's support for the Taliban's military efforts against the Northern Alliance. Since then, the U.S. operation in Afghanistan expanded in the region adopting diverse strategies such as counter-terrorism tactic centered on the adversary and counterinsurgency line of attack that centered on the residents. Nonetheless, after years of war with the enemies, the Al-Qaida are far from conceding defeat while the Taliban still have a resilient influence. Terrorism has become an everyday threat, and while most of the countries in the Middle East including Afghanistan are not stable and secure, the U.S. soil faces threats of terrorist’s payback for their involvement in the war against terrorism.

Global terrorism continues to be one of the most persistent and deadliest threats to the U.S. security. The techniques, perpetrators as well as the motives of the terrorist groups have constantly evolved in a myriad of ways that thwart counteraction, collection, and analysis of their operations (Bhatia, 2008). This necessitates the ability to strategize in the flexibility of shipping resources and having prompt reactions. Even worse, the upswing of the different breed of terrorists such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are interested in inflicting mass death and destruction to the United States and its allies. This does not bode well concerning the impending security interests of the United States. Of note is that these groups can attack anywhere and at any time spurred by the ostensibly distinct proceedings that they judge the United States to be at fault. While they have a broad international influence and a high degree of adeptness with more sophisticated weaponry and strategies, the U.S should be alert and prepared for what strikes next.

This paper seeks to analyze appropriate targets that the Taliban may find suitable to carry out their attacks on the U.S soil. The selected targets are sure to cause devastating destruction as well as the high death toll. The hypothetical scenarios are created following the assessment of the Taliban tactics and strategies over the years. It includes hypothetical approaches of the terror group to the targets and a contingency plan as a means of escape after the attack. The research is conducted on previous studies on the terror group as well as various publications on the Taliban and terrorism in general. The topic is significantly important for the safety and security of the U.S. citizens and the international community in general. It also provides insights on how to combat the unlawful use of violence against property and persons for the sake of nerve-wracking or intimidating the civilian population and the government in furtherance of the social and political objectives.

Domestic Terrorism

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack marked a histrionic intensification concerning the inclination toward the disparaging terrorist assaults that began in the 1980s (Ash, 2014). Since then, the domestic extremists have not received as much consideration from the federal law enforcement in comparison to their overseas counterparts stirred by the Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported that in the past two to three decades the deadly terrorist attacks on the U.S. soil have been perpetrated by the domestic extremists ("The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States," 2002). Reports from the Southern Poverty Law Center revealed that the number of terror groups existing in the United States is about 900 (Taddeo, 2010). The figure is reported to have more than doubled from 1999 to 2016. There is no doubt therefore as to how domestic terrorism fit into the new counterterrorism landscape. The recent years has seen the terrain significantly influenced and molded in reaction to the terrorist motivated by foreign ideologies.

Currently, it is challenging to evaluate the scope of domestic extremism in the U.S. soil. Perhaps this can be attributed to the fact that the government has largely focused on international terrorist ideologies (Taddeo, 2010). For instance, the federal agencies have deployed varying definitions and terminologies in attempts to describe it. When it comes to the characterization of the Afghan Taliban, the U.S. government has not appeared to dodge the inconvenient truth that the Taliban are terrorist. Instead, they have tried to make the case that they are armed insurgents. This is attributable to the fact that they previously backed the Mujahedeen forces against the Soviet invasion in the early 1990s that later morphed to form the Taliban. The truth is the Taliban are a terrorist group even going by the definition of a terrorist organization by U.S. government.

However, while domestic terror may not be the top priority of the U.S. government concerning counterterrorism, the concerns over the same have prominently featured among various law enforcement officers. The deputy police chief in Los Angeles once noted the white and black supremacists as some of the chief counterterrorism concerns. Another factor contributing to domestic terrorism concerns is that the perpetrators do not necessarily deploy the use of traditional tactics of terrorism. Also, besides intending to harm people and create fear among residents, domestic terrorists use theft, destruction of property and the encumbering of the U.S. courts with vengeful but legitimate filings as alternative tactics.

Taliban

The Taliban emerged as a far-right Islamist militant organization in 1994. The terror group was under the spiritual leadership of Mullar Mohammad Omar. A significant number of the Taliban supporters and members hailed from Pakistan and Afghanistan and were well educated at Islamic religious schools known as ‘Madrassas,’ (Ehlke, 2010). The direct translation of ‘Taliban’ by Pashto means ‘students.’ However, while the group was officially formed in 1994, its roots lies with the Mujahedeen forces that fought the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the previous years, furtively supported by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The origin of the Taliban leadership emerged from the many refugees that studied at religious schools in Pakistan. The schools were funded by the Arab philanthropists and Pakistan with the intention that it would sway the construal of Islam that was practiced in the county. However, the Madrassas developed the belief of stringent Islamic law, which they later imposed in Afghanistan. They were inspired by the suffering Afghanistan people who were victims of supremacy brawls between Afghan groups that did not abide by the Islamic moral code (Stenersen, 2009). Under the leadership of Mullah Omar, they took control of important regions such as Kabul and established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. They imposed strict Sharia laws that were widely criticized following its treatment of children and women. Worse, they denied access to humanitarian food and aid to the starving citizens. The Taliban was determined to use conventional and unconventional warfare techniques to realize their objective and strictly establish a Shariah-governed Afghan state.

By 1998, they had assumed control of about 90% of Afghanistan. They continued to abuse human rights and even refused to hand over Osama Bin Laden and other internationally wanted criminals (Taddeo, 2010). Even so, the Taliban regime was recognized by the United Arabs Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia and Pakistan governments. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan and destabilized the Taliban forcing them to flee across the Pakistani border where they regrouped and gained new followers. While a post-Taliban government was established and a transitional administration elected, the U.S. pulled its resources and attention away from Afghanistan. The resources and energy were channeled to Iraq instead. The Taliban capitalized on the opportunity and reasserted itself with new strategies and tactics such as suicide attacks (Kamel, 2015).

Planning Attacks

A blend of guerrilla combat and terrorist assaults were deployed by the rejuvenated Taliban insurgents. A majority of the attacks were targeted on international troops, Afghan civilians, and Afghan police and security (Stenersen, 2009). NGO workers and foreign diplomats were also on the target list. Their attacks sought to accomplish propaganda and political gains from NATO states. For instance, most of the attacks on the U.S. forces among other NATO state’s forces was followed by the justification that the foreign troops were involved in the killing of the innocent civilians. The Afghan Taliban expressed their enmity towards the West citing various reasons other than military involvement (Abrahms, 2008). Some statements by the Taliban leadership encouraged all Muslims in the western countries to retaliate and take vengeance against insults propagated against them. Videos have also been used to instigate threats and encourage the Muslims to retaliate on their behalf.

The threats by the Taliban are bound to happen after much planning and careful selection of the suitable targets that will have devastating destruction and high death toll. The Taliban will select their attacks in Los Angeles especially ingress and egress points at major events such as sporting events. The Taliban will be motivated by the recent attacks in Manchester and London in Britain that targeted large crowds and ware relatively successful owing to casualty rate and devastation caused. They will assess the capabilities of the existing security and discern the weaknesses of the facilities. The attack will certainly be at the point of greatest vulnerability such as transportation centers, walkways, malls and even on college and university grounds in Los Angeles where there is limited security. With these targets, the Taliban will settle on the Union Station (an opulent train station that is a major rail hub with shops eateries and waiting areas) and California State University Los Angeles and the Universal City Red Line station as prime targets.

To plan and implement the attacks, the Taliban operatives will have to familiarize themselves with their respective targets. Their foremost move will be to carry out a detailed surveillance of the two targets. They will seek to determine the presence of security guards and officers as well as the surveillance cameras in place. Through a physical survey, they shall be able to identify the ideal locations within the targets where they can plant a bomb or stage a close range shooting at their targets. As with the case of the California State University, Los Angeles, the Taliban operatives will require to physically assess the geographical landscape of the campus and the positions of the crowded buildings such as the John F. Kennedy Memorial Library. The internet through the Google Maps will also come in handy by providing the aerial view of the University’s landscape. This will provide insights on the daily expectations and activities of the targets. Perhaps most significantly, the surveys will enable the operatives to plan on the execution time at prime spots to yield mass devastation. Of note is that the campus grounds is a significant target for suicide bombers since helpless students will provide the numbers wanted by the operatives. It would also take time for security personnel to respond to the attack and thus provide the time for suicide operatives to first engage in close range shootings.

Targets 1: The Union Station Ornate, mission-style railway hub is located in the northeastern corner of Downtown Los Angeles. The station is across Alameda Street from Los Angele’s historic Olvera Street and the El Pueblo de Los Angeles State Historic Park. The station offers hundreds of trips every day. However, the appropriate time to launch an attack will be during peak times of the day. This includes dinner and lunch hours.



Figure 1: Union Station Ornate, mission-style railway hub

Increasing the chances of success will necessitate the use of a suicide bomber. The attack can be coordinated by a team of six operatives. Two operatives possibly ladies to aid with the shipment of the weapons of attack that includes, hand grenades and bombs that can be detonated through the use of a cellphone. The bombs are modified and fixed in electronic gadgets such as laptops to evade metal detectors. They are be placed in travel bags and left at the MetroLink waiting area of the terminus

Target 2: The Universal City Red Line station is adjacent to Universal CityWalk. The area is packed with nightclubs, eateries as well as entertainment goings-on. The target is ideal to the Taliban operatives for the reason that it is often crowded with people and especially tourists. It has a big parking lot that is always full revealing it is often a crowded place. Riders can cross the street and board the tram to go to city walk as well as the theme park and the studio itself.



Figure 2: The Universal City Red Line station

The best time to stage an attack will be during lunch hours and the evening times. On a weekend or holiday will see the target crowded with tourists and riders. This will be the ideal time to carry out successful attacks. The several entrances to and from the station will ensure that the terrorists can unsuspiciously enter the station and escape the scene of attack soon causing havoc and as many casualties as possible. To enhance the odds of success, three operatives can carry out the attack. Explosive devices such as hand grenades, AK47 rifles can be used to attack. One of the three operatives can be a suicide bomber so as to conceal the identity of the other two operatives after the attack.

In the event of an attack, as noted above, the victims of the attack can use various means of escape out of the scene. The obvious means is through running in the opposite direction of the point of attack. Vehicles can be used if there is a clear way and mostly by those already inside their vehicles. The public would need evacuation to safety and possibly to a holding facility if any. However, the security personnel should impose a lockdown on the scene of attack so that everyone leaving the area passes through a checkpoint. This will prevent the terrorists from getting away with the civilians.

Threat Breakdown

It is evident that the Taliban operatives pose a significant threat to the targets mentioned above. The two targets, the Union Station, Ornate, mission-style railway hub and the Universal City Red Line, are potential targets that will ensure mass devastation. They targets would almost guarantee a successful attack by the Taliban operatives. The attacks regardless of the impact will trigger wide media coverage globally. As seen from the hypothetical scenarios, the attacks will instill fear in public and paralyze economic activities for some days which is exactly what the Taliban operatives would hope for. The country would be left wondering just where and when the next target would be. Terrorists become successful when they can instill fear upon the public consequently paralyzing the political, economic and social deliberations in the meantime.

The possibility of an immense attack of a similar scale to 9/11 happening on the U.S. soil underlines the need to have contingency plans in place. Even so, it questions the capability and intelligence of the Central Intelligence Service for not pointing out such a high profile attack that would take months and coordination to stage. Contingency plans that seek to prevent more attacks, reduce casualties, protect the public, preserve the crime scene as well as identify the perpetrators is very vital. Nonetheless, it takes the coordination of various agencies to execute a contingency plan successfully. The need for coordination cannot be emphasized enough.

If the U.S. government continues to overlook the threat posed by domestic terror, then it is just a matter of time for a terror act to be committed beyond our imagination. The triggers of such attacks are very much in places such as an upswing economy and a political culture that allows room for resentment toward the government and barely veiled tirade against immigrants and minority. Besides, firearms can easily be accessed through legal and illegal means while the use of internet has made it possible for the propagation of the extremist ideology. The Taliban operatives will surely employ such tactics to cause havoc on the U.S. soil.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the topic of terrorism while taking note of the domestic terror groups in the United States. It has analyzed the strategies, beliefs, and the motives of the Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan and the potential threat they pose on the U.S. soil. Through hypothesized scenarios, two prime targets in Los Angeles have been identified as potential targets that are vulnerable to attacks by the Taliban operatives. These potential targets are the Union Station Ornate, mission-style railway hub, and the Universal City Red Line station. The sites were selected for a variety of reasons including high chances of success regarding mass destruction and death toll. The insecurity challenges are exposed at the said potential targets which need to be urgently addressed. Furthermore, the need for a contingency plan is emphasized to reduce their impact in the event of an attack.





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