I hereby take this opportunity to first and foremost thank the almighty God for enabling me to get this far by giving me the gift of life, knowledge, patience, strength, above all, the wisdom that helped me carry out my research diligently and insightfully.
I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to my professor and other members of the faculty who helped me throughout this project in one way or another. I will forever be thankful.
Lastly, my heartfelt gratitude goes to my family and close friends who encouraged and pushed me to go on even when it seemed impossible. I am here today because you did not give up on me or doubt my ability to achieve this great fete. Thank you for all your moral, emotional, and sometimes financial support. To you I say be eternally blessed.
Abbreviations:
MHA – Ministry of Home Affairs
CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
PDPA – Personal Data Protection Act
IPA - Investigatory Powers Act
PoFA - Protection of Freedoms Act
PSI - Private Security Industry Act
RIPA - Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
FoIA - Freedom of Information Act
CDA - Crime and Disorder Act
DPA - Data Protection Act
HRA - Human Rights Act
HDB – Housing and Development Board
SPF – Singapore Police Department
IDB – Inter-American Development Bank
FMM – Fiscal and Municipal Management
ESCI – Emerging and Sustainable Cities Initiative
CTI – Competitiveness and Innovation Division
KRIHS – Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements
SEDB - Singapore Economic Development Board
SSIPO - Safety and Security Industry Programme Office
SCTB - Safe City Test Bed
SNV - Smart Nation Vision program
PAPP - Protected Areas and Protected Places Act
C.o.P - Code of Practice
NSCS – National Surveillance Camera Strategy
SCC - Surveillance Camera Commissioner
DPR - Data Protection Rights
ANPR - Automatic Number Plate Recognition
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements. 2
Abstract 9
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.. 10
Background of Study. 12
Security in Singapore’s Context 14
The External and Internal Terrorism Threat 15
Problem Statement 16
Research Aim and Objective. 22
Scope of the Current Research. 22
Research Question(s) 23
Hypothesis. 24
Assumptions and Constraints. 24
Disclaimer. 24
Chapter Organization. 24
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW... 26
Regulatory Requirements on CCTV Installation. 27
The Government’s Position on Public CCTV Security Systems in Singapore. 27
CCTV Acceptance Rates in Singapore’s HDB Housing Estates. 28
Effectiveness and Efficiency of CCTV Systems in Singapore. 30
Protected Places and Protected Areas in Singapore. 32
The Future of Personal Data Protection Regulations. 33
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.. 34
Panoptic Theoretical Framework and Modern Government Surveillance. 35
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.. 37
The Personal Data Protection Act of 2012 (PDPA) 39
CCTV Deployment in the UK - A Brief Background. 39
Lessons from the UK to Singapore. 41
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.. 45
Recommendations: What further changes for CCTV surveillance can be instigated by the MHA or SPF (Singapore Police Force) at Singapore’s housing estates to fully comply with both data and privacy protection laws?. 48
References. 52
Appendix A.. 53
Appendix B.. 54
Appendix C.. 55
Organisations supporting the NSCS for Wales and England. 55
Appendix D.. 56
Appendix E.. 57
List of Tables
Table 1: Overall Crime Rates and Cases in Singapore 2008 to 2015........................................... 17
Table 2: Number of Reported Cases by Crime Class in Singapore 2008 to 2015........................ 18
List of Figures
Figure 1: Conceptual Thematic Review process...………………………………………….. 34
Figure 2: Sources of Thematic Review................................................................................... 35
Figure 3: Number of Reported Cases in Singapore from 2008 to 2015...................................56
Figure 4: Singapore Reported Cases by Crime Class from 2008 to 2015................................57
Abstract
In the past, civil liberty was protected through the reduction of data acquisition, dissemination constraints, and ensuring that retention was limited. However, as a result of the current data proliferation, ease of retention and speed of dissemination, those limitations may no longer be applicable. Video surveillance systems are deployed by different organisations with varied interests on the development of regulations, code(s) of practice, and policies. Most importantly, the world is now witnessing an explosive use of audio-visual surveillance systems in private and public places by key industry players in various sectors such as the police, local authorities, transport, government, and the general public (lateral surveillance) in order to maintain safety and deter antisocial behaviour or crime, as well as to aid in the investigation of committed offences. However, it is the litigious use of CCTV systems in public areas mainly by “panoptic governments” has culminated to numerous privacy and personal data protection issues. Consequently, this has necessitated the need for suitably formulated and enacted protection laws to not only regulate the collection, storage, and dissemination of personal data, but also to promote respect for the privacy of individuals. The current study seeks to determine the legality, efficiency, and effectiveness of the “disingenuous” deployment of CCTV cameras in HDB housing estates across Singapore through the unfettered government sponsored Polcam initiative currently championed by the collaborative effort of the MHA and the SPF.
Keywords: Public CCTV Surveillance, Singapore HDB Polcam, Privacy Protection, Personal Data Protection, Mass Government Surveillance, Panopticism
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Currently, coupled with efficient lighting, CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) systems are among the best security measures for public areas (Welsh, Farrington and O’Dell 2010, p. 9). Recent years have witnessed the sustained and steady growth of streamlined CCTV use in public areas, especially in Western nations such as the UK (Welsh et al. 2010). On the other hand, Southeast Asia nations such as the city-state of Singapore that are progressively building custom versions of ICT driven Smart Cities seek to harness similar technologies to create more efficient and effective nationwide security measures. However, this study recognises that even though CCTV systems have be used productively to combat insecurity and deter crime, the government of Singapore should regulate the invasive use of CCTV at HDB housing estates because they violate personal privacy protection laws, they are intrusive, and they are not always effective or efficient in crime reduction.
Singapore, the Lion City, is one of the densely populated sovereign island states in Southeast Asia with an approximated population of about 5.5 million Eurasians, Malays, Chinese, and Indians among other ethnic groups (Lee et al. 2016). The current research presents a thematic review of public areas designated as “crime defensible spaces”, the impacts of CCTV deployment in HDB housing estates by the Singaporean government in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and personal privacy violation; and lastly, a contrast of CCTV implementation laws in Singapore and in the UK. The comparative study seeks to establish key regulatory lessons that Singapore can learn from the UK with regard to protected areas, personal data handling, and privacy protection. In the author’s logical view, the government of Singapore has the ethical obligation not to break the law while serving the law. Fusing public space surveillance technologies requires improved control and an unprecedented amount of command in order to ensure: (1) uncompromising adherence to regulatory compliance issues, and (2) to coordinate the different agencies through the use of multi-level access rights.
Video surveillance systems are widely used in public places for diverse purposes such as controlling traffic in large cities or towns (Kurdi 2014), and keeping the general population and property safe (Welsh et al. 2010). Other emerging uses of CCTV surveillance include building or property management and access control where these systems are linked to databases, software, and the internet (Porter 2017). However, while these advances in surveillance technology may offer expansive opportunities, the current study firmly opines that the use of these systems should be conscientious to the impacts on people’s privacy rights and the challenges associated with educating people on the awareness of these social impacts. Generally, people are within their rights to expect non-intrusive video surveillance that does not cause fear or infringe on their private lives even when such systems have been deployed to keep them secure and safe. Nonetheless, this can only be achieved through systems that are operated transparently and effectively, ideal for the intended purpose, and compliant to any relevant obligatory legislation (Porter 2017). The use of CCTV surveillance systems by governments is usually justified as a proactive measure to detect and deter crime as well as to direct relevant security personnel responding to any identified emergency situation (ICO 2017).
Considering the high expenditure on surveillance systems and the interconnected groups of data controllers and data intermediaries involved at different stages of implantation (Accenture 2014), there arises a growing need for a coherent and overarching strategy that streamlines and underpins video surveillance among related groups of CCTV users (Piza et al. 2013). The current study recognises that this approach provides better comprehension of the opportunities and links for effective cross-organisational collaboration. Additionally, this research also rationalises that the resultant economies of scale are likely to ensure taxpayer’s funds are prudently spent when used to implement surveillance camera systems.
Background of Study
CCTV systems are primarily deployed not only to enable, but also to support overall building or public space security management (Governance and Compliance Coordinator 2017, p. 5-7). The utilisation of video surveillance aids in monitoring sensitive or vulnerable areas and places. Additionally, although CCTV surveillance systems can act as post-incident investigative tools to provide overwhelming evidence, they can also deter potential terrorists or criminal activities if the “would-be” perpetrators realise they are being monitored (Mclean et al. 2013). Most importantly, it should be categorically understood that CCTV systems do not play an active role in protection and therefore should be part of a holistic security policy that includes good lighting, and other forms of non-intrusive security measures such as alarm systems, or controls for access (Welsh et al., 2010).
New forms of media enthused by diverse information technology advancements allow for the anomalous sharing of collected personal data (Accenture 2014). Numerous types of surveillance systems proliferate due to the combination of governmental strategies and rapid technological developments. For instance, Accenture was at the vanguard of a major government project headed by SSIPO (Safety Security Industry Programme Office) – a joint establishment of the SEDB (Singapore Economic Development Board) and MHA (Ministry of Home Affairs) - aimed at using Singapore as a test bed for sensor and complex video analytics in the on-going Safe City program (Accenture 2014). The decision to turn Singapore into a secure state using high-tech methods began in 2012 (Wang et al. 2015).
According to the 2014 Accenture report, the installed system(s) used GPS-based real-time tracking during the agile pilot testing to access government surveillance cameras located in public places where it was used for crowd simulation and movement prediction both in the 2013 Marina Bay New Year Countdown party, the Singapore Grand Prix Formula 1 event, as well as for estimating crowd sizes at the City Hall MRT station with an accuracy rating of over 85%. The 4-month trials were conducted every 2 weeks to provide sprint reviews used to determine the feasibility and reliability of the Safe City project in Singapore (Accenture 2014).[1]
According to the another report by Wang et al. (2015) “20 analytics capabilities were successfully tested. Some 370,000 faces were detected a day. Crowd behaviour was correctly detected 75 per cent of the time and crowd counting was 80 to 90 percent accurate.” (p. 73). In light of such deep intrusion, it becomes extremely difficult to not only regulate or analyse the expansion of video surveillance, but also to follow how the installation of CCTV cameras at HDB housing estates touches on various dimensions of an individual’s everyday public or private. The current study recognises that poor planning is likely to cause a panic atmosphere that may result to emotional decision making leading to serious consequences.
According to Purpura (2013, p. 66) the concept of “crossing the river when you get to the bridge” is inauspicious for the security industry that requires defined budgeting and planning control.
Evidently, this demonstrates that the Singaporean government has the imperious unabated power to both collect personal data without the public’s consent or awareness, and also share the collected data with unlimited third parties who may not be fully compliant with personal data protection or privacy invasion regulations. Furthermore, the government is conveniently exempted from the Data Protection Act in situations where its self-qualified assessment deems it necessary to implement such invasive security measures in public places, including housing estates as revealed in Shanmugan’s 2016 Parliamentary speech. Interestingly, despite being one of the most accredited “smart” safe cities in the world, the lack of information on Singapore’s implementation and acceptance of preventive security measures such as CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) systems is evident in the limited research and scholastic publications in this knowledge area. Little is in the public domain regarding the government sponsored Polcam program spearheaded and fervently guarded by the MHA in close association with the nation’s police force.
Security in Singapore’s Context
Singapore has long enjoyed reasonable peace and tranquillity since gaining its independence from British colonial rule in 1963 despite the co-existence of mixed cultures in an overly crowded island state covering approximately 597 square kilometres (Lee et al. 2016, p.3). Protected areas and places in Singapore include common areas such as car parks, lobbies located at most main building entrances, pavements, boarding and alighting vehicle terminus such as bus stops or taxi stands, direct building entrances and exits, checkpoints, and lifts (Protected Areas and Protected Places Act 2013). According to Accenture’s report in 2014, Singapore is “one of the safest and most efficient cities in the world.” (p. 1). To better optimise its security workforce, the government of Singapore sought after smart solutions for public safety through the SC (Safe City) program and other government initiatives such as the E3A – (Everyone, Everything, Everywhere), SG Secure (Shanmugan 2016, p. 2), and the Smart Nation Vision (SNV) program among others that required the capturing of video data to compute different crowd factors such as suspicious behaviours or to discover individuals showing signs of criminal intent. Such developments led to the effecting of the 2012 PDPA Act in 2014 with detailed and sufficient provisions among other legislations.
The External and Internal Terrorism Threat
Claims by the Singaporean government through the MHA’s office state that Singapore is under continuous impending extrinsic threats from extremist factions such as ISIS and Katiba Nusantara, as well as rising cases of rampant, sometimes unreported, domestic criminal acts perpetrated by local criminals or devotedly radicalised Muslim citizens and resident foreigners. Mr. Shanmugan, the Minister for Home Affairs, highlighted the four major Singapore’s threats as; (i) the possibility of non-Muslim communities growing dangerously “islamophobic” leading to intolerance and mistrust, (ii) the possibility of radicalisation among citizenry of the Muslim community, (iii) direct attacks by terrorists, and (iv) the seclusion of Muslims in Singapore from mainstream society (Gunaratna and Kam 2016). As a result, the government of Singapore engaged four consortia led by NEC Acia Pacific, and arbitrarily installed audio-visual surveillance systems across Singapore as part of the security measures to combat crime and promote the Safe City agenda (Ehsan et al. 2013).
In light of Mr. Shanmugan’s edifying speech, the implications were a clear indication that the government favoured the promotion of intrusive security measures without regard to the law(s) that protect personal data capturing, storage, dissemination or individual privacy in varied case scenarios. As a matter of fact, in his long speech, the minister revealed plans of ongoing amplified installations of video surveillance equipment under the proposed Polcam 2.0 to all HDB housing estates among other identified areas of interest with high human traffic.[2]
However, of interest to note is that the configurations supporting and interlinking the operations of this Smart City initiative - under the 2014 SNP (Smart Nation Program) - are distributed into numerous autonomous control centres, applications, and databases[3]
because the relatively “novel programme” has not developed a centralised framework with details that link individual agencies acting in the capacity of “controllers” (Lee et al. 2016, p. 15). The recently instituted - but vaguely implemented – PDPA 2012, which came into full effect in 2014 (Yongquan 2017, p. 287), borrowed heavily from data protection and privacy legislations from Australia, Canada, OECD trans-border guidelines on the flow and privacy protection of personal information, New Zealand, the wider EU community, but most specifically, the UK (PDPC 2017).
Problem Statement
Despite the vigorous government funded installation of CCTV systems in most HDB residential blocks across Singapore, the overall crime rate only recorded a mere 1% drop between 2016 and 2017 according to a report released by the SPF in 2017. However, a perfervid scrutiny of the numbers presented by this report shades a different light on the purported improvement. In essence, overall reported criminal cases consisting of home breaks and burglary, snatch thieves, “outrage of modesty” amounting to molestation, harassment by unlicensed money lenders, and any criminal acts resulting to serious or violent property damage, only decreased from 33, 099 in 2016 to 32, 773 in 2017 showing a, virtually negligible, difference of about 326 cases (SPF 2018, spf.gov.sg). Figures presented in the fairly elaborative annual police crime brief released in 2017 showed an overall reduction in crime rate per 100, 000 people was only an insubstantial 6 cases – from 590 to 584 cases. Interestingly, Statista.com places the 2016 figures at 588 which further trivialises the margins (Statista.com 2018). The reduction of reported cases by only 4 or 6 cases for every 100, 000 citizens in a state where most of the moderate to low impact crimes go unreported cannot be termed as enough success to warrant the expansion of the Polcam program despite the obvious crime deterrence factors. Table 1 shows the estimated crime rates and crime cases in Singapore between 2008 and 2015. Table 2 represents crime cases reported by class (I-VI). The rationale behind this thematic review is that these security measures need to be approached through less intrusive, less risky and cost effective methods.
Year
Overall Crime Rate/100, 000 Population
Overall Annual Recorded Crime Cases
2008
684
33,113
2009
665
33,186
2010
653
33,152
2011
608
31,508
2012
584
31,015
2013
555
29,984
2014
591
32,315
2015
611
33,839
Table 1: Overall Crime Rates and Cases in Singapore 2008 to 2015 (Source: adopted from Data.gov.sg 2018)
*See line chart representation in Appendix A
Year
No. of Reported Cases Represented by Crime Class
Crime Class I
Crime Class II
Crime Class III
Crime Class IV
Crime Class V
Crime Class IV
2008
3,926
962
898
19,918
3,488
3,921
2009
3,907
751
1,025
20,445
3,359
3,699
2010
4,177
567
896
19,560
3,804
4,148
2011
3,969
443
706
18,314
3,880
4,196
2012
3,824
389
598
18,476
3,507
4,221
2013
3,822
418
543
17,075
3,947
4,179
2014
4,269
535
360
16,722
5,687
4,742
2015
4,139
299
340
15,615
8,426
5,020
Table 2: Number of Reported Cases by Crime Class in Singapore 2008 to 2015 (Source: adopted from Data.gov.sg 2018)
* Crime Class I: Crimes Against Persons
* Crime Class II: Violent/Serious Property Crimes
* Crime Class III: Housebreaking and Related Crimes
* Crime Class IV: Theft and Related Crimes
* Crime Class V: Commercial Crimes
* Crime Class IV: Miscellaneous Crimes
**See representative bar chart in Appendix B
As a result of the data presented in Table 1 and Table 2, the author of this research recognises that these numbers are barely adequate justification to support the existence of the current Polcam network in HDB housing estates, or other government efforts to increase the covert audio-visual surveillance of the general public while infringing on the privacy rights of Singapore citizens. More specifically, the present research project observes this case from the perspective that although the government can use reasonable video surveillance at designated sensitive public places, the continued recording and storing of private personal data at different ill-secured control centres may pose more risk to the general citizenry in case this information or the system is accessed by unauthorised persons or groups of persons with criminal or malicious intentions. A good example of the vulnerability in the Singaporean government sponsored CCTV network can be illustrated through two article published in the Straights Times.
In the illuminating articles written by Amir Hussain for the Straights Times, the author revealed a shocking event where one aggravated engineer decided to hack and disable Police CCTV camera’s at an event citing non-payment for services provided. Mr. Daniel Tan Khoon Guan, a 59 year old engineering director and owner of Serron Technology, was angered by his business partners St Electronics (Info-Comm Systems) for not making due payments to his company that was involved in the setting up of the CCTV systems at the SEA Games (Hussain 2016). Mr. Tan managed to hack into the system 16 hours prior to the event using his laptop and a software program since he had knowledge of the systems passwords as well as the camera IP addresses and usernames that granted him full access to the 30 surveillance cameras in the area around the Singapore Sports Hub. Mr. Tan was able to accomplish his socially undesirable behaviour from a carkpark located close to the Sports Arena in the cover of the night (Hussain 2016).
Furthermore, entrusting such powers to a country where intercepting telecommunications requires no court order and laws place virtually no limits on surveillance by the government could be potentially detrimental. For instance, since there is no distinct centralised command or clear established protocols for sharing of sensitive data between Singaporean government agencies acting as data controllers at different capacities and security levels, the current research observes that, just like most digitally stored data, this crucial information is at risk of hacking, loss, distortion or unauthorized modification by rogue in-house agents. The control and security of personal data has become a major concern due to the increased remote storage of portable data by third party “data controllers” using shared cloud computing resources which does not contribute to a conducive and stable environment for the management of sensitive personal data (Chik 2013, p. 556). Case in point, a Transparency Report from Google revealed that the Singaporean government had succeeded in acquiring its citizens’ private data in about 75% out of the 185 requests made in 2012 (Chesterman 2013).
Moreover, it is the logical deduction of the present study’s author that this information can be both vital and unfairly advantageous if used by corrupt regimes for political gains. Private firms in the security industry also show a significant increase in CCTV use without the promise of any improvements of personal security or delivery of service. Despite the huge amounts of public funds directed towards this video surveillance project to provide security to the public, the interconnected elements are encompassed by complexities that ultimately contribute to the failure of service delivery standards concerning individual privacy in particular. The author of this study correspondingly believes that these surveillance proposals made by the Singaporean government are not only poorly framed, but also indistinctly broad such that they raise significant privacy concerns for families residing in HDB housing estates.
According to the ICO (2017) video surveillance systems have long ceased to be passive technology only deployed to record and store data. Currently, video surveillance is used proactively to identify PoI (People of Interest) and to record activities of these characters similar to the ANPR technology. However, there are rising concerns from the public that this technology may be presently used for more than just the fit or lawful purposes (ICO 2017). Interestingly, it is now in the public domain that CCTV surveillance can be used for not only protecting property and people, but also as part of a decision making process that includes the collection of evidence to inform other sophisticated decisions such the need to identify criminal behaviour before the perpetrator actually commits the crime, or profiling and area to determine the eligibility of sending a child from that area to a particular school. Such “unwarranted” use of video surveillance has necessitated the enactment of data and privacy protection laws such as PoFA in order to strengthen the regulatory setting.
Since legislative documents like PoFA were successfully passed, there have been numerous amendments focusing on new video surveillance code(s) of conduct issued by various governments such as the ICO’s code of practice or the NSCS referenced in this study and/or appointments such as the Surveillance Camera Commissioner’s office in the UK which promote the impacts and operations of these surveillance systems. Contributions made by the ICO have led to significant changes in the regulatory landscape. Excessive and unwarranted use of CCTV as well as other affordable and powerful video surveillance systems has been restricted through the enforcement of such actions. The updated ICO code of practice is reflective of the current developments in CCTV technology, its use, and the broader legal setting.
Research Aim and Objective
The current study presents a thematic review of related literature, laws, and theories, as well as other media content in order to:
1. Define Security in Singapore’s context.
i. Regulatory requirements on installation of monitoring devices (CCTV)
ii. Acceptance rates of monitoring devices (CCTV) at Singapore’s housing estates
iii. Privacy laws infringement and protection
2. Ascertain the effectiveness and efficiency of the security protection measures at
Singapore’s housing estates.
3. Conduct a comparative analysis of CCTV utilization and the associative code of conduct in Singapore and the UK.
By including various facets related to the current study’s main focus, this research project seeks to evaluate the implementation of CCTV systems by the Singaporean government and the acceptance levels of this invasive security measure among the citizens. The key objective will be to evaluate effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the legal implications of CCTV surveillance deployment that the MHA has, and relentlessly continues to exercise across all HDB residential blocks without restraint. Subsequently, the expected outcome of the present research is a comprehensive thematic review of its impact on personal privacy and data protection.
Scope of the Current Research
Due to the limited scope and resource requirements for this research, this project will cover:
a. Government’s direction on security monitoring devices (CCTV) in Singapore and the UK.
b. Areas protected by security monitoring devices (CCTV) in UK and Singapore
Research Question(s)
i) Is the Government of Singapore infringing on the privacy of its citizens while promising security?
ii) Does the MHA really implement audio-visual surveillance to protect HDB housing estates?
iii) Are the citizens of Singapore under any direct practicable danger as a result of risks associated with how government CCTV surveillance systems are handled?
iv) How does Singapore’s regulation of CCTV surveillance differ from the UK’s relatively defined CCTV code of implementation, conduct and data protection?
v) Does the MHA promote or adhere to strict data protection regulations in the use of video surveillance systems at HDB housing estates?
v) What further changes for monitoring devices (CCTV) can be instigated by the MHA or SPF (Singapore Police Force) at Singapore’s housing estates to fully comply with both data and privacy protection laws?
Hypothesis
The MHA and SPF in Singapore implement intrusive video surveillance systems at HDB housing estates undermining the successful upholding of the PDPA principles on consent, as well as personal data and privacy protection.
Assumptions and Constraints
The accomplishment of this research followed the proper authorisation and acceptance of the chief course instructor. Importantly, all the information covered herein is used with complete assurance that plagiarism and copyright issues have been appropriately considered. Nevertheless, although the following research report is not intended to be exhaustive, key emphasis has been placed on the preparation of the research in its entirety to assure reliability and validity of the study findings and recommendations.
Disclaimer
The following study report shall be distributed subject to the condition that it will not be resold or traded in any way, circulated commercially, or lent without the researcher’s or the instructor’s direct approval.
Chapter Organization
Chapter 1: Introduction - The first chapter of the dissertation presents an overview of the subject matter in addition to stating the thesis. To further give credence to the current research, this chapter also includes the topic’s background information, statement of the problem, the scope, the research question(s), assumptions and constraints, and the hypothesis.
Chapter 2: Literature Review – All related studies used to support the fundamental views of this research are elaborately reviewed in the LR. The LR presents a thematic review to include different dimensions impacting on the subject matter.
Chapter 3: Methodology – The Methodology section provides an overview of the theoretic methods used to collect and analyse data throughout
