Ciaran Cronin's translation of Habermas' book makes the most recent contribution to ethical theory, explaining and expanding on discourse ethics. It is divided into five chapters that are chronologically ordered. The book begins with a translator's note and an introductory note by the translator. Later, it discusses themes like "On the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral Use of Practical Reason," "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," "Neo-Aristotelianism and Lawrence Kohlberg," and "Reflection on a Max Horkheimer Comment." Finally, the book finishes with an interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen on themes such as the origins of discourse ethics, its contentious features, and interrelationships with communicative action theory. Habermas defends the claim of discourse to a central positioning contemporary moral philosophy.
Pragmatic, Ethical and Moral Employments of Practical Reason
The first chapter provides a comprehensive examination of practical rationality that establishes a clear difference between ethical, pragmatic and moral questions. The section also distinguishes between spheres of practical discourses and forms of volition. Habermas elaborates and refines fundamental concepts of his approach and extends his argument in aspects such as treatment of rational reason and the challenges of motivation and application. He provides an excellent critique of competing positions such as those of Charles Taylor, Albrecht Wellmer, Bernard Williams and John Rawls. He also establishes the wide-ranging defense of discourse ethics.
The book attempts to expound on the implication of communicative rationality in the scope of normative validity and moral understanding. It is a composite theoretical effort to reorganize the valuable ideas of Kantian deontological beliefs regarding the assessment of communicative structures. Hence, the book attempts to elaborate on the universal and essential nature of morality by conjuring the global responsibility of “communicative rationality.” Habermas believes that justifying the validity of moral standards can be effected in a way comparable to the rationalization of facts. The whole project uses the reasonable construction of moral intuition. In his work, Habermas goal is to find a middle ground between the relativistic implications of contextualizes and communitarian position of Hegel and Aristotle and abstract universalism. He undertakes an elaborate defense of discourses of ethics against its skeptics from the neo-Aristotelian camp.
After identifying different types of discourse, Habermas goes ahead and explain how the two interrelate. From the book, it is clear that several discussions depend on each other. The most obvious one is ethical and moral discourses that somewhat rely on empirical claims hence depending on the result of practical discourses regarding situations and the consequences of behavioral laws and the shared pursuit of decent life. Habermas rejects the notion of a meta-discourse that sorts out the boundary matters.
On addressing the theory of communicative actions, Habermas believes that it lies on the idea that social order is contingent upon the ability of the players to identify and understand the inter-subjective soundness of varying assertions on which social collaboration relies. Consequently, Habermas elaborates the cognitive and rational character used to conceive the cooperation in regards to efficacy claims. He argues that to identify the validity of claims is to imagine that worthy reason can be justified in case of criticism. Habermas refers the theory of discourse or argumentation as the reflective communicative deed.
Furthermore, Habermas suggests a multi-variant conception of reason that depicts itself in varying form of “cognitive validity” both in actuality and rightness claims relating to the treatment we owe others, technical-practical claims concerning the means of achieving our goals and factual allegations relating to good life amongst others. Habermas recognizes that the “surface grammar of speech acts” does not suit to found this collection of validity. Therefore, he proposes that we must supplement semantic analysis with practice analysis of varying argumentative discourse to ground the multi-dimensional validity claims.
But the model involved in learning different traditions is open to several objections including; that it is too selective. The recognition of the rational superiority of alien culture may sufficiently motivate one’s tradition if the learning subject can compare the explanatory power. However, in the book, MacIntyre posits that, if leaning from foreign culture is feasible, the two traditions must be able to communicate with each other without assuming universal standards of rationality. Maclntyre experiences essential inaccessibility which he delivers to readers in a third language. However, Maclntyre posits that the fact that the knowledge of untranslatability is expressible should raise concerns.
In the book, Habermas quotes Guenther Patzig and states that moral judgment differs from ethical decision only in their degree of contextually. Deontological ethical theories assume that moral issues arise in circles of subjects capable of action and speech because we depend on consensus and cooperation of others. We direct our moral judgments and feeling to animals which aren’t capable of speech. Conversely, animals cannot enter into reciprocity relationship with a human being. Patzig agrees that humans have duties towards animals but animals do not have obligations towards people hence humans need to protect animals
The various contentious discussions should be inter-subjectively justified. Regardless if Habermas theory of meaning thrives or not, the discursive scrutiny of validity shows the vital variances in arguments requires that we come with varying forms of legitimate claims. Habermas argues that such kind of validity is separate from other ways, only if someone can prove that its “discursive justification” includes characteristics that separate it from different types of explanations. Hence, the discourse theory by Habermas assumes that the cognitive topic of argumentation defines the particular argumentative practice suitable for such validation. Thus, the “discourse theory” requires logical analysis of arguments as a social practice. Habermas presumes that one cannot comprehensively articulate normative presupposition solely on valid properties of arguments. Somewhat, he/she must distinguish argument as a procedure, a product and as a process. It is evident that Habermas regards these perspectives as constituting the practical idea of cogency.
Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism
The book also focuses on Lawrence Kohlberg theory of moral development based on his believes that person advance in their ethical thinking through a sequence of six identifiable stages: punishment and obedience, individualism, instrumentalism and exchange, good, social contract and principled conscience. In the initial stage, individuals behave according to socially tolerable norms. The second level is readily available in the society while the majority does not reach the third level. Stage five is a comprehension of social mutuality, and stage six bases on respect for global principle and demands of personal conscience. The book summarizes the objections against moral theories of the Kantian type as follows: they make an abstract differentiation between good and right unavoidable leading to abstraction from motivations. More so, the cognitivist privileging raises critical questions of the application of norms while the formalist leads to abstraction from ethical life that assumes concrete forms within a particular type of life.
Following articles by Tulum, Habermas considers most argumentations as final resting on implicative discussions whose findings don’t follow deductive certainty but less plausible. The logical power of such kinds of arguments relies on consideration of all possible objections and information. However, critical testing of competing cases relies on the rhetorical value of the convincing process. Habermas considers the rhetorical levels regarding the highly idealized property of communication; presented as “ideal speech situation” he suggests that a perfect situation should have real discourses measuring up to motifs that he employs.
Discourse Ethics
Habermas defines the notion of adequate rhetorical process as a combination of indispensable yet practical presuppositions that persons should make if they have to consider the real implementation of dialectical procedures as a sufficient fundamental test. He goes further and identifies the four presuppositions namely: participants have an equal voice, no exclusion of anyone who can make relevant contributions, honest of opinion free from self-deception and deceit and finally, no coercion in the procedures of discourse. These conditions are counterfactual since actual conversations can never achieve noncoercion, full inclusion, and equality. Hence, Habermas advocates for measuring all relevant arguments reasonably, weighing discussion on merit and the pursuit of truth.
As an understanding of the periphrastic viewpoint, Habermas formal model does not do fairness to the central abundance of the rhetorical practice. However, he argues that a person can complement his/her design with Aristotle’s “substantive rhetoric” that bases on pathos and ethos. The book discusses that A rhetorical perspective deals with crafting discourses for their capability to place the audience in proper social-psychological space for making an accountable judgment.
On differentiation of argumentative discourses, Habermas states that, if a different validity claim needs a modified form of argumentation, relevant differences must emerge through a closer examination of how the aspect of argumentative adjusts to varying sorts of content. He does not regard as proper, each validity claim to discourse and states that correct assertions that actors make about his or her subjectivity such as moods, feelings, desires, and beliefs are prime examples of validity claims. According to Habermas, such claims are open to critical and rational assessment, not in discourse but by comparison with the claimant's behavior.
Additionally, the books state that “strict discourses” or “rightness claims” are prone to argumentative validation in the proper sense. Habermas recognizes that moral and empirical discourses and truth discourses have a lot in common. Though the kinds of reasons are varied, ethical discourses rest fundamentally on the need for interpretations. In both the cases, the relevant reasons should be tolerable to any sensible person. Regarding empirical truth assertions, the foundation of the process level presumption is that the impartial world is the same for everyone. In the aspect of moral correctness, it falls on the knowledge that valid moral principles and rules hold for all persons.
Habermas identifies a class of ethical questions that do not acknowledge universal consensus. Selection of technology that affects the future of human nature such as genetic engineering poses broad moral concerns. The concerns impact our understanding of culture and tradition and human dignity. Habermas concludes that the center of social pride lies in the capacity of persons for autonomous self-determination.
Reflection on Remarks By Horkheimer
This part refers to the statement that, seeking salvage without God is a fruitless undertaking. Horkheimer advances his arguments by reflecting from a damaged life perspective and finding a religion that satisfies the longing for ultimate justice. Hence the book elaborates on the moral intuition that guided Horkheimer, understand the kinship existing between philosophy and religion and then explains the basis of Horkheimer’s premises. The book draws on writings by Alfred Schmidt. Schmidt made several claims such as, once the secularized world rejects the rationality of religiously tortured conscience, its place is acquired by moral sentiment of compassion. The other claim is that, irreversible metaphysics critique destroys religious doctrines and that, solidarity, freedom, and justice derives from practical reason. Marx Horkheimer demonstrates that he is consistently drawn to reflection on religion in response to perceived limitations in Marxist practice and theory. As Horkheimer struggle s to overcome dogmatism and the dominating effect of the scientific method, he views religion as an area in which people encounter substantive moral justice and negative concept of truth.
Morality, Ethics, and Society: Interview with Torben Nielsen
In the interview with Torben Hviid, the main topic of the discussion focuses on Rubens views on moral theory and ethics since the publication of Theories des kommunikativen Handelns in the 1980s. The first part of the interview focused on morality, justice, care, and law while the second part dealt with issues concerning universal-pragmatic justification of discourse ethics. Habermas focus on inquiries such as, can discourse ethics be philosophical? The third section discusses ethics and morality about lifeworld and system. He states that in modern times, conditions of life do not claim prima facie validity any longer and that the questions of justice are the only relevant questions since ethical issues are of far more pressing concern for us. He further states that norms and principles are situated on different stages regardless of their validity. Regarding justice and useful life, Habermas articulates that ethics of care needs contextual rather than formal, abstract or mode of thought. Moreover, he recognizes that conventional post morality and positive law complement each other to affect ethical life and disagrees with Kant’s idea that the rule of law in it exclusively moral.
Conclusion
Habermas defines not only empirical truth but moral rightness regarding ideal consensus. Later on, he distinguishes moral rightness from fact by describing the former but not the later, regarding the idealized agreement. Authenticity assertions, unlike rightness and truth assertions, do not come with resilient consensual anticipation. Habermas relates this kind of claim with “ethical discourse.” Hence, Habermas’s discourse theory bring into line diverse forms of validity assertion with varied types of justificatory discourse. Cogent arguments need to use different sorts of reason to validate various claims. Though, logic may enter into every kind of application; there will be variations in the type of reasoning in making logically persuasive arguments. Hence claims on the human being needs are essential reasons in discussions on welfare duties but not for substantiating the truth that quarks are in existence. At the dialectical stage, a person needs to meet multiple loads of proof by responding various forms of challenges. The depth and scope of agreement vary about the kind of claim advanced at the rhetorical level. Empirical truth and Moral rightness claims require reasons that are recognized and accepted by the universal audience while moral claims should address persons who share the tradition of values and history. He argues that legal validity has empirical and enforcing components hence both components must be justifiable simultaneously and warrant the normative expectation of merit. In the book, Horkheimer seems to struggle to overcome dogmatism and the dominating effect of scientific methods. He views religion as an area in which people encounter substantive moral justice and negative concept of truth.
Bibliography
Habermas, Jurgen. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discource Ethics. Cambridge , Massachusetts , and London, England: Translated by Ciaran Cronin. The MIT Press, 1994.
