In “The Subjectivity of Values”, Mackie makes a case in favor of an error theory concerning objective morality. According to him, moral judgments essentially presuppose moral objectivity (Mackie 12). The essayist argues that moral objectivity necessitates two elements: the ability to unconditionally inspire people to act, and an intrinsic reason-giving power. In view of Mackie, moral values lacks both of these features, and are hence not objective. However, before presenting his argument that moral values lack the intrinsic reason-giving ability and categorical power to inspire, the author delimits his theory from the theories of other popular metaethics theorists (Mackie 15). He refers to his theory as moral skepticism, and concludes that moral values can best be understood as subjective.
Notably, Mackie’s theory is not subjectivist. The reason is that the theory does not state that humanity need to do whatever they feel is right. What is more, the theory is not emotivist. Unlike the emotivists who believe that moral judgment is just a mere expression of the feelings of the communicator, Mackie contends that moral judgments rightfully attempt to explain reality (Mackie 18). The implication is that while emotivists argue that moral terms are neither false nor true, Mackie maintains that they are all false.
To defend his argument, Mackie clarifies that he is not talking of moral values obtained or derived from theoretical or hypothetical imperatives. Rather, his opprobrium’s targets are values that are objectively categorical (Mackie 19). Having clarified his philosophy, Mackie, criticizes the idea that moral standards should be inherently reason-giving. He believes that this notion is false as he argues that moral standards can best be described as subjective. In particular, Mackie quotes the pervasive divergence among cultures, concerning moral norms, arguing that this discrepancy can be understood as being brought about by conflicting ways of life and not by conflicting views of objective morals.
Works Cited
Mackie, J.L. “The Subjectivity of Values,” Ethical Theory: An Anthology. Edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
