The Sri Lankan Civil fight was the armed rivalry between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The insurgency was fighting for the independence of Tamil state which is situated on the northern and eastern part of the island. However, the battle lasts for 26 years of military campaign and ended in may 2009 when the government soldiers defeated the LTTE militias (Arjona et al. 132). Further, the Nepalese civil fight was the armed aggression between the government and communist party (Maoist) between 2006 and 1996. The Maoist launched the battle with the aim of overthrowing the monarchy and create People’s Republic but the battle ended with no loser or winner through the comprehensive peace accord of 21st November 2006 (Bohara et al. 14). Although the two countries experienced civil wars, their termination differed significantly because of international responses, the aim of the insurgency and tactics used by the government.
Situation
Conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal have been the fight for poor men, ethnically isolated Tamils and marginalize Nepali people which brought massive economic and political impacts in the continent. When political power and voice became inaccessible to the segregated marginalized faction in both countries, democracy became a casualty. However, civil battles were not only independent measures of erosion in both nations but also an indication of the democratic deficit. Maoist rebel landed safely into the mainstream by joining the administration coalition while Tamils were conquered by the Sri Lankan military by killing the movement leader (Arjona et al. 178). Nonetheless, civilian supremacy in the two nations is challenged by an omnipotent military organization with genuine ethnic grievances and concerns being stoked and exploited by trailblazing as well as opportunistic political parties. Moreover, the political landscape is frequently influenced by transnational authorities particularly India and China.
The military victory was established in Sri Lanka and will continue to remain unless the political landscape that is dominated by the Sinhalese accommodates the Tamils for the inclusive democratic state. The government viewed the LTTE as insurgency and terrorists who focused on brutalizing people and ending democracy (Cherubini and Debbio 78). Although the war in Nepal ended, there were no winners or losers given that the Maoists landed safely on the political parties who consolidated their struggle to restore democracy. In two countries, there was democracy deficit but each nation had its means of ending the conflict for the sake of peace under the influence of foreign forces.
International Response
The divergence on how the war ended in both countries was highly influenced by international reactions to the atrocities and state of battle in the two nations. Different countries had a distinct action to the two nations. Specifically, the Sri Lanka government was strongly supported by the western nations to fight the insurgency while peace treaty and negotiations were made between Nepal administration and communist party (De Juan and Pierskalla 17). The international society led by USA, Britain, and India responded to the Nepal crisis by suspending military and development aid although India’s case proved to be short-lived. Initially, the international community was supporting the Nepali government with the fear that the country would fall into the hands of Maoists. As a result of the boost, the security forces depended on the foreign weapon imports together with military training and assistance to maintain their operation. There were many cases of abuse of human rights and violation of battle laws which made the international community to call for the cease of fire leading to the end of war via the treaty (DeVotta 16).
India was much concerned with the Nepal civil far because it hoped for reconciliation between the outdated and wayward political parties and the government. As result, India opted to continue supporting the Nepalese military but ceased the support after the international community called for peace negotiation. Furthermore, the existing parties and leaders in Nepal had nothing much to give except demonstration and protest which would only strengthen the rebels rather than yielding the democracy. The Maoist insurgency within Nepal was a problem to India which made the country unwilling to suspend the arms supply but did so as a way of expressing lukewarm sympathy to the political leaders and international society (Diaz and Murshed 12).
India had sensed a real peril from the Maoist rebellion and feared that some of its states such as Andhra Pradesh and Bihar would be red as Nepal. Therefore, the Indian government tried all means to crush the rebellion including prioritization of stability and democracy (Sharma 9). Additionally, India played a significant role in ending the civil war without a military victory since it had the capability and power of persuading the broad international community about the need and actual problem of the conflict. By November 2006, the foreign efforts in Nepal succeeded in facilitating the creation of a comprehensive agreement that ended the conflict between the government and Maoist. The accord comprised the ceasefire including the control of armies and arms of both the moist group and national services by the United Nations (Seoighe 19). Moreover, the treaty called for a social, economic and political adjustment in the state as well as adherence to the human right principles and humanitarian law such as the establishment of reconciliation and truth, human rights, and rehabilitation commissions. Also, the call for an election was part of the accord which aimed at ending the transition period while UN was supposed to assist and observe the electoral procedure.
On the other hand, the Sri Lankan administration made four non-victorious attempts to terminate the war politically with two initiatives comprising of third nations. Initially, India was supporting the LTTE between 1987 and 1990 hence it sent the peacekeeping forces to the island but the approach failed both militarily and diplomatically (Uyangoda 10). Secondly, Norway joined the war towards the end of the 1990s which led to the signing of the cease-fire treaty between the fighting parties. However, the truce continued until 2008 although peace talks collapsed in 2004 with hostility resuming in 2006. In the hindsight, the international reaction to the Sri Lanka war seemed to be inadequate since both the Indian military approach and the Norwegian civilian mission offered the situation for the LTTE’s unification hence contributing to the prolongation and intensification of the conflict. When President Rajapaksa was elected in 2005, he adjusted the tactics by rejecting successive political negations with the rebels and ordered the national army to crush the Tigers in 2008 (Cherubini and Debbio 74). The administration deflected the international community pressures successfully as well the calls to restore political dialogue and stop fighting. Irrespective of continued humanitarian crisis such as the death of 15000 civilians, people trapped in fighting regions and human rights violation, soldiers pressed on with the offensive until LTTE was defeated.
Different foreign nations intervened the Sri Lanka war differently by either taking part in the peace procedure, assisting in the reconstruction and development of the nation and trying to negotiate with the fighting parties. Furthermore, some the states accused both the government and LTTE for committing serious felonies during the battle while others proposed the creation of the investigation commission. Together with European Union and United States, Japan supported in 2002 supported the role played by Norway in promoting the peace procedure (Arjona et al. 133). A donor conference was held in 2003 which was attended by the most important global donors, private funds, development banks, NGOs, states and UN departments. Although the peace process failed, Japan did not end reduce or cease its aids to Sri Lanka but joined other members of the international community in calling for the protection of civilians as well as provision of humanitarian assistance.
Although for the first 20 years of the civil war in Sri Lanka America had the interest of supporting other countries in re-establishing peace, the policy changed after 2001. The new American interest emerged as a determination to defeat terrorism. Previously, America had included LTTE in the list of Foreign Terrorist organization meaning that the US administration would not offer any material help to the rebels as well as blocking LTTE funds (Cherubini and Debbio 64). Moreover, LTTE officials were denied the visa to visit America unless a waiver was offered. The USA political decision of labeling LTTE as a terrorist group excluded the insurgency from 2003 allocation of resources. As result, LTTE was economically marginalized make it withdraw from all forms of political negotiations.
Even if the US strategy towards LTTE as severe, it was expected to be rigid with the government. America made its military help to Sri Lanka conditional upon human rights performance and announced that none of the assistance offered would boost the offensive capability of the government forces. Furthermore, United States affirmed that enhanced military association and amplified help levels were not intended to escalate the battle but to deter the fight. When the peace efforts started to fade, USA reduced aids and resources that were allocated to Sri Lanka although it repeatedly and openly supported the government in the fight against terror particularly after the start of the Eelam war IV (Cherubini and Debbio 67). By naming LTTE a terrorist group, US was strongly suggesting the military solution to the disagreement rather than negotiations. In 2007, Sri Lanka and China issued a mutual statement by affirming to fight tirelessly against extremism, separatism, and terrorism. By 2008 Chinese government had become the biggest aid and military donor to Sri Lanka by offering about one billion dollars (Cherubini and Debbio 79). Despite the allegation of battle crimes, China continued to guarantee military assistance and economic investments to the nation.
Furthermore, Pakistan started to create strong associations with Sri Lanka by 1990s aiming at intelligence and military spheres. The new relationship with Pakistan meant a boost in defense and fight against the rebels since it included military training, intelligence sharing and sales of arsenals. Together with other allied states of the government, Pakistan opposed the calls for the independent investigation (Arjona et al. 167). Additionally, Sri Lanka was supported by Iran with 1.9 billion dollars to purchase military equipment, Iranian oil, develop the electric scheme and create the oil-refining facility. In return, Sri Lanka was supposed to support the development of Iran’s autonomous nuclear energy capability. Based on the foreign state support to the government, rebels had no chance for negotiation but opted to fight for their rights since they felt oppressed. On the other hand, the administration took the advantage of military boost and supply to defeat the insurgency (Cherubini and Debbio 77).
Until 2002, the United Nations managed the Sri Lankan rivalry mainly by assuming the duty of the independent and international observer. Nonetheless, the human rights agencies started to give warnings regarding the violation such as alleged disappearances of the state actors, children recruitment in the LTTE and the killing of innocent individuals by the LTTE and government forces. Since 2002, the UN planned visits in the country by the UNHQ seniors so that to talk with the government but the administration rejected most of the suggested initiatives (Cherubini and Debbio 112). Although the UN organized various functions in the country using different bodies, its action was limited by the administration by obstructing the attempts to increase humanitarian staff. However, the 2004 Tsunami changed the policy towards the assistance leading to the increase of humanitarian experts on the ground. The association between Sri Lanka and the UN was complicated during the battle. The organization utilized its control of visas together with harsh and defamatory articles in the media as a way of intimidating and pressuring any person regarded as critical to the state (Arjona et al. 177).
Although there was a humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, the UN was hamstrung by the needs of its powerful members. When the situation unfolded, the interests of India and China became apparent. Rather than coming up with the resolution, the united nation issued a warning to the government meaning it offered both the humanitarian aid and at the same time withhold a rigid political action (Arjona et al. 132). In general, the international community failed to solve the Sri Lanka conflict peacefully. Most nations except Norway supported the use of military intervention in fighting LTTE which was declared as the terror group. Furthermore, the United Nations failed to play its neutral role in resolving the disagreement since it boosted the interests of its strong member states.
Grand Strategy
Rather than international interventions, Nepal and Sri Lanka had different strategies in fighting the rebellion. A grand strategy illustrates the peace sought, economics, military actions, diplomacy, intelligence and information operation. When compared to that of Sri Lanka, the Nepal grand strategy was inferior which led to negotiation rather than military victory. Maoists were challenging the Marxists by illustrating their manifestos and the discrimination of particular population which made them win the public interest. Despite the guerrilla warfare, rebels in Nepal were ready for negotiation as well as combining their efforts in building and restoring democracy in the country. Furthermore, the government forces failed to win public trust due to the accusation by the United Nations as well as allied states (Seoighe 8). Human rights were misused while war rules were violated which made the entire country to seek alternative means of resolving the conflict rather than aggression. Moreover, the Nepal government depended on the foreign military aids but it was cut after allegations and humanitarian crisis which left the two parties with no other option except entering into the treaty.
On the other hand, the new government in Sri Lanka decided to increase another 4% of the GDP to defense as well as amplifying armed forces budget with forty percent. As result, the government borrowed loans and grants from China so that to avoid strains on the country’s limited financial resources. There were forms of fiscal help including credits for arms and oil purchases provided by Libya, Pakistan, Russia, and Iran. Diplomatically, Sri Lanka to steps in isolating LTTE making the administration to receive 60 percent more funding and military equipment from the foreign nations. Additionally, LTTE officials were banned from visiting 32 states while the close function association was established with India which was the only nation capable of interfering with the new administration’s grand plan (Diaz and Murshed 12). Moreover, America helped Sri Lanka by disrupting the insurgency offshore military weapons procurement, intelligence sharing, provision of the coastal guard vessel as well as supplying significant countrywide naval control system and command. Both European Union and Canada outlawed LTTE’s financial connections in their nations which severely affected the group fiscal base.
Internally, the Sri Lanka administration planned to gain the active support from the population. By 2006, the majorities of citizens were exhausted and doubted the authority’s capability to attain victory. To win popularity and boost, the government recognized that development tasks were to be continuing despite the battle. Various national schemes aiming poverty were developed such as subsidizing fertilizer to poor farmers and recruiting more soldiers annually (Arjona et al. 213). The amplified support and budgets made the armed forces grow significantly making it easy to extend in regions that were controlled by the rebels.
Tactics
In addition to raids and guerrilla fights, Maoists used demonstrations and protests to demand their rights and present their grievances. As a result, the rebellion was able to win the government and international support hence being able secure safe landing in the political parties. Contrarily, LTTE focused on aggressive means of fighting the government since it even refused any political negotiation after being declared as a terror group. Moreover, the organization had limited number of militia thus astute tactics would be overwhelmed. The Sri Lanka forces had won major success prior the mid-2006 battle making some of the militias to defect to the government. Additionally, troops in Sri Lanka had enhanced training in a multifaceted jungle fighting mission thus becoming more capable and professional than the opponents (Cherubini and Debbio 148). Also, the tactic of using guerrilla warfare in fighting the government was ineffective during the civil battle in Sri Lanka given that the approach delayed the achievement of results.
Conclusion
Conclusively, both Nepal and Sri Lanka experienced civil battle that resulted in economic, political and social consequences. However, there was a divergence on how the wars ended due to international reaction, tactics and grand strategy. Initially, the global community responded differently to the two crises. In Nepal, the political negotiations were promoted which lead to the signing of a peace accord between the government and the rebels. Contrarily, western nations and the entire worldwide society had varying resolution plan for the Sri Lanka conflict although most of the states viewed LTTE as a terror faction hence advocating the use of military intervention. Sri Lanka was significantly supported by various countries such as Russia, Pakistan, USA, Iran, and Libya in purchasing military equipment and intelligence sharing. Furthermore, Maoists opted for a peaceful resolution but LTTE did not want political negotiation thus losing public and international support.
Work Cited
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