The end of the Cold War saw major political changes in world security policies. During this particular era, there occurred a heated debate over the role of a nuclear weapon in security matters. While some scholars, policymakers, and various world leaders felt that possession of a nuclear weapon was irrelevant, others argued that possession of these destructive arsenals was still an effective way to maintain peace and stability[1]. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, twenty years on, the debate over the relevance of nuclear weapons still continues. More recently, the effectiveness of the use of nuclear deterrence has been questioned and several doubts cast as to whether this method still possesses any effective motive. Given the fact the practice remains a bare expression of force; nuclear deterrence is not an effective approach to security issues especially in the present-day society. Furthermore, the deterrence approach is flawed as it is based on archaic perceptions of the world security systems. However, at the same time, there exist elements that point to the renewed significance of the deterrence strategy in this century.
Often nuclear deterrence remains asserted as a security strategy that works and has for many years kept us safe. Furthermore, scholars like Lieber, Daryl and Keir argue that nuclear deterrence remains a significant effort to support stability in an arising crisis[2]. Despite all these benefits that the security strategy comes with, nuclear deterrence heavily relies only on the shock and awe tactic[3]. The shock and awe tactic employed by nuclear deterrence provides for a threat to the enemy in order for them to coerce. It would be said that the strategy relies on the theory of faith. The apparent probability of city destruction creates a decisive force. It is likely that no nuclear attack exchange would occur if the both of the adversaries have nuclear weapons. This scenario is due to the fact it remains unacceptable for the destruction of numerous cities in a war
Consequently, if one state in the conflict falls short of nuclear supremacy, it is likely to surrender to the other that possesses nuclear power[4]. History, however, does not bear this notion and theoretic faith. There are instances, such as Nagasaki and Hiroshima, where attacks on cities had a minute impact on the war course hence regarding nuclear deterrence as a threat remains quite problematic.
While based on threats mostly, nuclear deterrence remains an indecisive military strategy yet it promises on an action. This suggests that the chances of the enemy coercing to only threats of a non-decisive action remain quite low. The other arguments of nuclear deterrence as terrorism remain even less indulging and convincing. This is because in most instance terrorism barely works. Worse still, terrorism gives the enemy the notion that your main intention is to exterminate him, therefore, would not likely to surrender. Although terrorism on a small scale level may not work out, nuclear war contemplating to high scale terrorism does work. Graham Allison presents pieces of evidence for two main conclusions; a nuclear terrorist attack on America is inevitable, or it can be avoided if the government changes its strategies[5]. The author offers a blueprint for eliminating the possibility of nuclear terrorist attacks[6]. Allison argues that the only way to remove nuclear terrorism's threat is to stop the production of atomic weapons and to lock down the trade network between terrorist organizations and European companies that are supplying weapons to the terrorists
Another factor leading to the irrelevance of nuclear deterrence is that the strategy is surrounded by the basic ideology of attitudes that arise from nationalistic motives and egos of nations. Subsequently, nuclear deterrence also relies on the fact that only the state that has the most effective and biggest nuclear warfare would likely to win. However, times have changed. Since the end of the Cold War, technology and the political situation of various nations have taken major changes and evolution. This means that the theory practices that were used nearly two decades ago remain obsolete[7]. Additionally, deterrence goes side by side with the non – proliferation, and prevention of uneven and one-sided disarmament. The 21st Century, however, remains problematic to establish this type of system. There have occurred numerous instances of trouble with countries such as North Korea and Iran who face threats adamantly from the United Kingdom and the United States of America yet the same countries continue to upgrade their nuclear hardware.
As a general rule, evidence suggests that nuclear deterrence mostly affects conflicts in which its application was threatened and appeared rational to the other conflicting side. It could be argued that the possession of nuclear weapons may not be enough for states. Furthermore, at the peak of the 21st Century, it has come to prior knowledge and understanding that barely can a state with possession of nuclear arsenic deter another conflicting state with no nuclear power from unleashing destruction. However, an exception arises if the non-nuclear power had threatened the interests of the other state that possess nuclear weapons.
There occur several explanations to the above scenario with legal constraints becoming a major limit. While most non-nuclear states belong to the NPT, it becomes illegal to threaten on applying nuclear weapons for destruction against them. Nuclear powers are deterred from trying to threaten any of those NPT member states that have no nuclear capability. In addition to the legal constraints that face nuclear deterrence, there also exist the normative limitations. These limitations have a basis on the international consensus regarding the rule and regulations governing the use of threats and force. The normative constraints disregard any use of nuclear weapons to target innocent civilians. Subsequently, nuclear powers ought to use their nuclear capabilities sparingly and at the most extreme and needful circumstance. Instances of breaching the nuclear attack and threat restraints are met with high reparations.
Propagators of the abolishment of nuclear weapons cite nuclear deterrence as no longer viable or a working method to sustain world peace. Furthermore, they argue that the existence of nuclear weapons as a justification for security in the bipolar world may only result in hazardous effects[8]. Even though the application of nuclear deterrence has since been used to mitigate global tension has characterized arising crises such as terrorism, food shortage among others, its existence over the years. Additionally, nuclear deterrence has also aggravated the global disparities and environmental degradation of states[9]. Some nuclear states have also excessively channeled much energy and resources to the development of nuclear weapons rather than confront important issues facing their citizens.
Nuclear deterrence often gets mixed up with a state having nuclear protection against any form of physical protection against an enemy’s attack. However, this idea is untrue. The possession of nuclear weapons by the various nuclear powers and their ability to threaten others of how they could apply them bears no physical protection. The only protection that nuclear deterrence offers may be termed as psychological. Instilling fear to the enemy through threatening them of how you would unleash you nuclear weapon upon them remains vital. For this reason, nuclear deterrence only instills a false sense of confidence upon nuclear powers. False sense of confidence and at times unchecked nationalistic ego by the nuclear states may pose a danger of the occurrence of a nuclear war.
Despite its glaring flaws and major setbacks, nuclear deterrence may still work in the post-cold war era. However, for the strategy to become relevant, its guiding principles have to change drastically. The world has evolved over the years after the end of the Cold War hence even the security structures within it have changed. Some of the concepts of the nuclear deterrence remain null and void due to the time effect. William argues that in the contemporary world, the major role of deterrence is not to exclusively threaten to delude an enemy to surrender when in conflict[10]. Davis then gives an overview of cultural traditions of violence, how deterrence could be effective against specific terrorist groups based on their organization's obligations[11]. The author goes ahead to explain the existing connection between the use of weapons and mass destruction; he also describes a framework for understanding how best to deter terrorists, analyzing deterrence and how it would influence the structure of trading in terrorism.
Essentially, nuclear deterrence was formulated to help human race desist from waging irrelevant wars. This strategy works through the shared assured destruction that takes away the feasibility of any war that is to happen. Although the political situation has changed since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence still plays a slight part in trying to maintain world peace and stability. Efforts of states, both nuclear powers and non-nuclear powers, coupled with those of organizations such as United Nations remain prolific in developing diplomatic regulations that ensure that deterrence would work best. Hltaky and Wenger address the NATO alliance's present and the future with United State's extended deterrence[12]. The authors analyzed extended deterrence commitments seemed riskier over time due to military budget cuts and anti-nuclear sentiments. They assess the future of international security of the US nuclear deterrence against countries that are a threat. Hltaky also argues that the role of nuclear weapons has slowly become the backbone of extended deterrence in the US today.[13]
In conclusion, the prevailing surrounding of the nuclear deterrence strategy has not changed much. However, various aspects of political, technological and security issues are dynamic hence constantly changing over time. These two conflicting scenarios mentioned above, however, posse a major threat to how relevant nuclear deterrence still is, years after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. With a lot of outdated perception from the Cold War era, the strategy of nuclear deterrence risks losing its effectiveness in trying to maintain peace and stability among other roles[14]. Subsequently, the present risks for miscalculations and misguided opinions increase the high chance.
Bibliography
Allison, Graham T., Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York; Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004.
Davis, Paul K., Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda. Santa Monica; RAND Corporation, December 19, 2002.
Delpech, Thérèse. Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: lessons from the Cold War for a new era of strategic piracy. Rand Corporation, 2012.
For a fresh view on nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conferences, see Robert Einhorn, “The NPT Review Process: The Need for a More Productive Approach,” Arms Control Today, September 2016.
Hlatky, Stéfanievon, and Wenger, Andreas., The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond. Washington D.C; Georgetown University Press, 2015.
Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. "The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict." Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1 (2013): 3-14.
Powell, Robert, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, June 5, 2008.
Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. "Deterrence in the age of nuclear proliferation." Wall Street Journal 7, 2011
William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order New York: Routledge, 2012.
[1]
William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order New York: Routledge, 2012(12-15).
[2]
Lieber, Keir A., and Daryl G. Press. "The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict." Strategic Studies Quarterly 7, no. 1 (2013): 3-14
[3]
Ibid., 13
[4]
Shultz, George P., William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. "Deterrence in the age of nuclear proliferation." Wall Street Journal 7, 2011
[5]
Allison, Graham T., Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York; Times Books/Henry Holt, 2004(57-90)
[6]
Ibid., 47
[7]
For a fresh view on nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty review conferences, see Robert Einhorn, “The NPT Review Process: The Need for a More Productive Approach,” Arms Control Today, September 2016.
[8]
William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order New York: Routledge, 2012. (75-99)
[9]
Ibid., 87
[10] William Walker, A Perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order New York: Routledge, 2012. (75-99)
[11] Davis, Paul K., Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on Al Qaeda. Santa Monica; RAND Corporation, December 19, 2002.
[12] Hlatky, Stéfanievon, and Wenger, Andreas., The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond. Washington D.C; Georgetown University Press, 2015.
[13] Hlatky, Stéfanievon, and Wenger, Andreas., The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond. Washington D.C; Georgetown University Press, 2015.
[14] Delpech, Thérèse. Nuclear deterrence in the 21st century: lessons from the Cold War for a new era of strategic piracy. Rand Corporation, 2012.
