Deterrence theory implies that the punishment should be significantly prompt so that lawbreakers can associate actions with the outcomes. However, due to the lack of knowledge about habitual sentencing statutes, irrational decision making by the offenders as well as a false perception of the statutes, the deterrence effect fails to read office. The above statement is contrary to the argument that affirms, habitual-offender laws deter offenders.
Imposing specific and severe punishments to habitual offenders is aimed at deterring criminal conduct. Still, simulating that the lawbreakers are knowledgeable about the habitual sentencing statutes is unrealistic. Thus, despite the implementation of the laws, the figure of the offenders may increase significantly. For instance, many nations in the United States have enacted ‘Three Strike “statutes. This statute imposes a lengthy prison term to an offender who has committed three serious felonies. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Three-Strikes laws will not deter criminals. Neither will it reform them (Beres and Thomas, 103).
Research indicates that a significant number of offenders suffer from mental disorders such as bipolar and depression. In such a lawsuit, the offender may have illogical reasoning due to deficiency of intellectual content. Consequently, habitual-offender laws such as the Three-Strikes laws will be incompatible. Additionally, some offenders make impulsive decisions without weighing and considering the costs and benefits of their actions. While applying habitual-offender rules, the probability of the punishment becomes uncertain due to lack of uniformity. This increases the chances of breaking laws, as one is not sure about the sentence to face.
Since the Three Strike statutes are overly severe, therefore, the public believes that the laws are meant to deter serious felonies such as those with previous criminal records. Nevertheless, most of the offenders committed under these laws are nonviolent. For example, the United States supreme court subjected Jerry Helm to a “Class 1 Felony” which is life imprisonment and a $25,000 fine after being convicted of driving while intoxicated, due to his previous criminal records, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983).
Contrary to this thesis, some proponents argue that habitual-offender laws deter offenders. They believe repeat offenders should receive severe sanctions since they are unable or unwilling to comply with the statutes. They agree that imposing certain and severe punishments to people with previous criminal records deter them from committing future offenses. The key element in deterrence theory is the certainty of the punishment.
In conclusion, from the two discussed school of thoughts, it is evident that habitual-offender laws have not acted as an important function in deterring offenders in the society. Lack of public awareness regarding the statutes can is one of the reasons that have contributed to increased crime rates despite the implementation of the laws. Potential offenders may not fear to break the laws since they are uncertain about the punishment they will face. Potential offenders suffering from mental illnesses are also likely to commit criminal offenses repeatedly due to lack of intellectual capacity to rational reasoning. Since habitual-offender laws have been believed to be severe and targeting serious felonies, offenders who had previously committed severe criminal offenses may think that committing nonviolent crimes will not lead to severe punishments. Following this evidence, it is compelling to argue that habitual-offender laws do not deter offenders.
It is vital for policymakers to understand to what extent has habitual-offender laws succeeded. If the law has not achieved its deterrence effect, then they can explore other mechanisms to strengthen it or opt to different strategies for deterring potential future offenders.
Irrespective of the evidence presented in this discourse of the argument that habitual-offender laws do not deter the offender, there are some restrictions. For instance, it is skeptical to believe that offenders with criminal records are not knowledgeable about the implementation of severe punishments once they commit future offenses. Additionally, ignorance is not a form of defense in the court of law. Therefore, once convicted and subjected to a Three Strikes law due to previous criminal records, it will act as a lesson to other potential offenders.
Work cited
Work cited
Beres, Linda S., and Thomas D. Griffith. "Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense-Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation." Geo. LJ 87 (1998): 103.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2003).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983).
