In the paper “Desire and the Human Good,” Richard Kraut states that the theory used to defend pluralism, Desire Satisfaction Theory, is weak and cannot be able to provide the defense required, because of this, he offers an alternative. In the paper, Kraut presents an argument against the Desire-Based Theories by giving examples whose main aim is to show how the success theory ends up as a false theory. According to The Desire Satisfaction Theory, the life of an individual will end up being good if and only if the desires of the individual are satisfied, in case the desires are not satisfied, the life of the individual is not considered to be a good life (Kraut 40). For the Kraut to justify the counterexamples that he offers regarding the Desire Satisfaction Theory, he makes modifications on the idea of the theory. He first states that the desires that individuals have must be developed with open eyes, he also states that the individual must be able to have full knowledge of the desires that he or she has. Kraut also states that the desires need to be persisting in nature. He argues that the individuals living a good life are those that can portray the characteristics and traits which are essential to individuals of the same kind, for instance, in human beings, individuals with good life have; desired traits, individuals related to the desired traits and being able to justify other people rationally. Kraut says that “My reply is that the extent to which it is intrinsically worthwhile to engage in reasoning, or good reasoning, is itself a matter that is subject to rational evaluation.” Through this, he tries to explain the idea of rational reasoning (Kraut 48). Kraut presents ideas and objections that are justifiable; he offers examples and counterexamples justifying the position that he takes. Through this, it can be noted that the Desire Satisfaction Theory is weak in explaining Good Life, we can explore the options that are presented by Kraut.
Work Cited
Kraut, Richard. "Desire and the human good." The American Philosophical Association Centennial Series (2013): 39-54.
