Kant’s deontological ethics banks on categorical imperatives that qualify a conclusion from a strong premise. In the order of his arguments, a derived principle only proves true if its basis also remains convincingly practical. However, some counterexamples to the logical sequences in the ethics of right and wrong, that is, moving from premises to conclusions, become challenging when viewed through the three-phase order that Kant applies in arguing for and against immorality and irrationality (Pojman and Fieser 121). In the claim that Galactic supernatural beings may find it rational to treat humankind the same way the latter handles animals, the logical argument proves the categorical imperatives wrong at every stage of the three-phase logic: founding the maxim, universalizing, and deriving the principle.
The case of galactic super-rational counterexample operates from a sound maxim that the extraterrestrial beings would hate humankind; therefore, they will always handle the latter as inferior to them. This logical basis proves acceptable given the observed power relations between humans and animals. In other words, the case provides a maxim that merely tries to use the analogy of humankind-animal relationship to forecast on what may happen between the super-rational and human beings (Pojman and Fieser 123). Then, the rationale for this maxim also stems from the fact that the two types of creatures would be different: humankind would become animal-like to the super-rational extraterrestrial counterparts. However, the maxim leaves out a vital aspect of realism that matter in drawing logical foundations for philosophical arguments (Pojman and Fieser 125). For instance, no observed reality proves that galactic creatures hate humankind. In fact, the relations between the two beings may take a cooperative perspective rather than a confrontational one. In other words, the aliens may become rational in cooperating with humankind rather than fight them. Indeed, no clear logic can support the positive maxim without facilitating an argument for the counterargument to the same point.
Consequently, both universalizing and deriving of the principle becomes flawed. The faulty maxim then proceeds to impair the acceptability of the rationality of the argument when moving into the universalization of the basis as morally right. The universal consideration from the maxim means that the super-rational extraterrestrial beings would always kill humans and mistreat them in many other ways. However, only a positive maxim would lead to this argument (Pojman and Fieser 139). On the contrary, a negative counterpart would support the other universalization that the galactic creatures would never kill or mistreat humankind. Indeed, no philosophical conclusion ever holds true when the premise is false. As a result of the unsounded maxim, the derived principle from the case that the extraterrestrial beings would lawfully kill and mistreat humankind becomes elusive. In this case, therefore, Kant’s categorical imperatives, which argue that the premise must remain true for a conclusion to hold, prove more logical than the logic in the counterexample (Pojman and Fieser 125). For instance, the maxim must have only one side, either supporting that the super-rational creatures would treat humankind as animals or the direct opposite, without giving a room for the counterargument. Otherwise, the overall argument becomes illogical and inconsequential in building an acceptable conclusion.
To conclude, Kant’s categorical imperatives prove that the galactic super-rational creatures may not find it morally right to treat humankind as animals. The premise relies on the maxim that the extraterrestrial beings would hate humans; thus, they will always kill, fight, and mistreat them. However, the opposite view may also hold thereby rendering the argument redundant. In fact, it would be irrational for the supernatural beings to harm humans if they find that cooperating with them is better for than fighting them. Indeed, the deontological ethics prove complicated in arguing on both observed scenarios and imagined ones.
Work Cited
Pojman, Lous P., and James Fieser. Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong. 8th ed., Cengage Learning, 2016.
