Karl Popper's Explanation of Scientific Theories
Karl Popper explained the factors that could determine the scientific nature of various theories. Inductive methods were often used to create conclusions from experiences and observations. Generalizations were usually developed from occurrences in a random sample of participants. Popper argued that Albert Einstein's theory of relativity constituted genuine science in comparison to other theories. In fact, Einstein predicted that starlight would ordinarily bend near the sun's surface. Several astronomical observations verified the truthfulness of Einstein's theory during a solar eclipse in 1919 (Cover and Curd 63). Isaac Newton's theory of gravity was subsequently disproved and replaced by the theory of relativity. Scientific theories gained greater credibility when predictions were made before observational tests were conducted. The possibility of disapproval through experimentation and observations defined true science. Adler's theory of inferiority complex and Marx's history theory were in full agreement with established facts (Cover and Curd 63). Besides, it was vital for scientific theories to acknowledge factors that could not be explained. Falsifiability rather than verifiability was to be used as the basis of grading scientific theories. Consequently, it was possible for researchers to distinguish between pseudoscience and science.
The Problem of Induction
Nevertheless, the problem of induction seems unfathomable and controversial. Inductive reasoning was defined as neither reasonable nor reliable (Cover and Curd 442). Hence, the concept of falsificationism needed further clarification. Developing universal conclusions from single statements was quite fallacious since circumstances differed. Scientific experiments were often conducted under different conditions. Researchers had to consider prevailing factors before making inductive statements. I have tried to apply the concept of inductive methodology to certain observations. However, the outcomes have been quite confusing since there were extenuating factors. Therefore, it is critical to evaluate the circumstances under which inductive reasoning could suffice.
Work Cited
Cover, Jan A., and Martin Curd. Philosophy of science: The central issues. New York: Norton, 1998.
