The mind is a core concept in philosophy, and the human mind constitutes just one sort of mind despite the many variations. Scholars over the years have developed to explain the nature and functioning of the mind. While the academic world has no unifying theory of mind, at least it is now agreed that there is a “space of possible minds.” With the advancement of artificial intelligence, the possibilities are endless. Theoretical creatures beyond our planet are also in the map of possibilities. In this discourse, we explore how one would test such a creature for a mind and what theory of mind the test would endorse.
Since the alien creature is not human, it would be advisable to approach the study as though we were studying the theory of mind in an animal. The creature presumably cannot talk so observation would be key to establishing whether it has mental state concepts. Another necessary consideration is the observed behavior must not have occurred by chance or as the result of a nonmentalistic process (Call 343). The “False Belief” test would be appropriate in this context. The test seeks to determine whether the creature can recognize other’s mental states by tracking its gaze. I would put an object in a box in the presence of the creature and a second human. The second character would then leave, after which I would put the object in another box. If the creature stares first and longest at the box where the second human last saw the object, it suggests they recognize the wrong belief of the second character (Apperly 828).
The variation of the “False Belief” test used on the theoretical creature proves the presence of mental aspects by tracking the creature’s gaze. The test endorses the logical behaviorism theory. This framework maintains that any mental state or condition can be understood in terms of observable physical processes and events (Moore 685). The theory is appropriate for the scenario since there would be limitations if we were to start considering the creature’s spirituality. While it may exist if studied extensively over a long duration, it wasn’t feasible then. Endorsing logical behaviorism helps avoid the pitfalls of substance dualism. The latter emphasizes the existence of a distinct, non-physical mind where all mental events take place. The mental concepts are only meaningful when translated into physical concepts. However, there must be no loss of content. This factor was considered when running the “False Belief” test to avoid wrong results.
The mind-brain identity theory, on the other hand, introduces the notion that the mind and brain are the same. The theory denies the existence of irreducible non-physical properties associated with the mind in theories such as dualism. Mind-brain identity mirrors the principle of materialism that states that all aspects of being exist as matter. If I were to use this theory to gauge the creature’s mental state, I would reduce it to that of an octopus because of their physical similarities. However, given that it lives on a different planet and has adapted differently to environmental conditions that would be an incorrect inference. Lastly, functionalism maintains that mental states are distinguished by their function rather than by their substance. Like logical behaviorism, this theory insists that mental states are realized by physical states. It is a strong theoretical framework, but the limited form of the alien creature would limit the functional tests that are feasible.
Works Cited
Apperly, Ian A. "What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences." The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 65.5 (2012): 825-839.
Call, Josep. “Past and Present Challenges in Theory of Mind Research in Nonhuman Primates.” Progress in Brain Research, vol. 164, 2007, pp. 341–53. PubMed, doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(07)64019-9.
Moore, Jay. "Three views of behaviorism." The Psychological Record 63.3 (2013): 681-691.
