In the 20th and 21st centuries, philosophers and apologists have been engaged in arguments to defend the existence of God. One of the most popular arguments from apologists is the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA) that has been theorised and popularised by philosopher William Lane Craig and Sinclair. According to Krauss (2012), these apologetic argumentations must be evaluated to ensure their validity and tenability. This paper is a critical assessment of the response from Craig and Sinclairs to the objection of Mackie towards the Kalam cosmological argument. Mackie has presented a strong argument against KCA, and the proponents of this argument have not successfully responded to the questions that he presents.
The Kalam Cosmological Argument
The Kalam argument is one of the concise and most robust defences that have ever been presented to back the existence of God. It is categorised as an apologetic argument, and it holds that
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
2.10 If the universe did not occur to exist, then an infinite temporal regress of event exists
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist (2.11, 2.12)
2.20 If the universe did not begin to exist, then the temporal series of past events is infinite
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be infinite
2.22 The temporal series of past event is a collection formed by successive addition
2.23 Hence the temporal series of past events cannot be infinite (2.11, 2.12)
2.24 Hence the temporal series of past event is not endless (2.13)
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence
Mackie’s Objections
The validity and tenability of the Kalam argument and sub-arguments have experienced objections from several quotas. In the 20th
century, serious objections and criticism came from John Mackie who contends that the sub-arguments cannot be demonstrated to be rigorous (Oppy, 1991). He objects to all three of the kalam cosmological arguments. For example, he states that there are no good reasons that have been provided to suppose that argument 1 holds. Also, he argues that if this objection he has provided fails, there are enough reasons to suppose that the proponents of KCA cannot propose that God came into existence uncaused and yet they reject a similar proposition that the universe can exist uncaused (Oppy, 1991).
Mackie asserts that sub-argument 2.20 expresses a bias contrary to an actual infinity by portraying the impossibility of traversing the infinite. He argues that since the apologetics propose that an infinite space cannot be traversed and that the past was unbounded, then the present would not have arrived. However, their argument is ridiculous since today has been actualised and therefore the past is finite. Mackie states that if argument two that the universe began to exist is granted, there will be no reason to admit argument 1. He explains that there is no upright explanation why the beginning of the universe that has not been caused by anything should be objectionable yet the coming into being of a god with the supremacy to create things is acceptable (Oppy, 1991).
Response from Craig and Sinclair
Philosophers William Lane Craig and Sinclair have been involved in popularising the Kalam argument. They insist that the existence of God is not temporal and he exists timelessly and changelessly. According to apologetics, God has entered into a temporal relationship with the universe through creation and time arose from the first event. Craig gave a response to the above objections by stating that Mackie has not given any substantial justification to support his postulation that the circumstances that lead to the existence of real infinite holds in an actual realm (Chilton, 2014). He argues that in the real world the irrationalities that Mackie questions do not come up because there is no actual infinite (Chilton, 2014). Craig and Sinclair (2009) write that no person believes that things such as an Eskimo village or horse can appear in the world without a cause and they link this argument to the reality of a universe. Craig and Sinclair assert that Mackie’s objections concerning argument 2.2 is a mistake and he was wrong to call it a prejudice as it does not deny the existence of an actual infinite. They stress that no advocate of the Kalam argument has ever prepared an assumption that involves an infinitely distant beginning.
The response from Craig and Sinclair to Mackie’s criticism of sub-argument 2.1 is confusing. They agree that there are logically conceivable domains in which many infinities exist and insist that there is a puzzle on whether they can be instantiated in the real world. However, their response leaves more questions than answers and Oppy provides suggestions to help understand it better. Oppy (1991) writes three suggestions from Craig and Sinclair; whether it is possible to have an infinite in the actual world, the second as to whether there are any infinite in the actual world, and a third is whether it is possible for there to be any infinite in any world. However, these arguments do not hold as Craig and Sinclair had already conceded that there are others realms where infinities are possible. Furthermore, the response to the criticisms in
Conclusion
The main replies from Craig and Sinclair to Mackie’s criticisms do not make any significant contributions to the Kalam cosmological arguments and sub-arguments. They make an argument to convince the opponent that it is possible for something to begin to exist uncaused. However, the claim requires them to provide more explanation to eliminate any logical inconsistency. Craig and Sinclair only give their views that it is possible for one to come up with an argument to establish the claim. Until they give a substantial explanation that it is possible for something to begin to exist uncaused their argument remains to be doubted, and the Kalam cosmological arguments do not hold.
References
Chilton, B. (2014, October 20). A Defense for the Tenability of the Kalam Cosmological Argument. Retrieved from https://pastorbrianchilton.wordpress.com/2014/10/20/a-defense-for-the-tenability-of-the-kalam-cosmological-argument/
Craig, W.L. and Sinclair, J.D., 2009. The kalam cosmological argument. The Blackwell companion to natural theology, pp.101-201.
Krauss, L.M., 2012. A universe from nothing: Why there is something rather than nothing. Simon and Schuster.
Oppy, G., 1991. Craig, Mackie, and the kalam cosmological argument. Religious Studies, 27(2), pp.189-197.
