The Euthyphro Dilemma
The Euthyphro dilemma originated from Plato's dialogue, Euthyphro, in which Socrates inquires whether "Is the pious loved by gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods (Brickhouse and Nicholas)?" The impasse brought about significant effects on the philosophical theism of the monotheistic religions but in an altered way. Ever since the subject surfaced, there have been numerous challenges for theists, although others view it as a false dilemma despite it being an object of philosophical and theological discussions. Based on that, we would discuss the difficulty present by analyzing the significance of the question and the difference between various options.
Euthyphro and Socrates Argument on Morality
Euthyphro and Socrates argument on morality is what brings about the dilemma (Cohen). The situation illustrates a problem related to Divine Command Theory which cannot be accurate as morality is not objective and grounded in god as Euthyphro believed. Both Euthyphro and Socrates meditate on the first part of the question and ignoring the second viewpoint. Socrates notes that if both stances were valid, a vicious circle would result which leads to the conclusion that the pious is not similar to the god-beloved (Cohen). It is because what comprises of the holy is not what makes the god-beloved. The dilemma applies to the context of the theological and philosophical discussion, mainly with regards to Christianity, Islamic, and Jewish. There is a general agreement on whatever God wills is just and reasonable but a question exists on whether it is because God wants it or whether God wills it because it is right and only.
Supporters of the First Viewpoint
Supporters of the first viewpoint of the dilemma base their argument on rationalism, naturalism, objectivity, and intellectualism. The position is of the view that there are acceptable and independent moral standards. The stance is acceptable by both Euthyphro and Socrates in Plato's discussion (Brickhouse and Nicholas). Different scholars justified the position with arguments such as God is powerless to engage in injustice and the relation between good and evil with moral standards significantly comprising of natural law. On the other hand, criticism of the notion relates to areas such as freedom of will, omnipotence, sovereignty, and morality without God. Nonetheless, there has been a varied response to the criticisms with some philosophers arguing that branding divine command theory a personal philosophy of value makes ethics arbitrary.
Supporters of the Second Viewpoint
In the second part of the question, supporters of the ideology base their view on the fact that there are no moral standards other than God's will. The stance is sometimes known as voluntarism or divine command theory. The view was partially endorsed by Scotus who argued that not all the Ten Commandments belong to natural law when strictly analyzed. He continued justifying his position stating that despite our duties to God being true by definition and self-evident, our responsibilities to others were within his authority to replace and revoke. Scotus notes that although the last seven commandments are highly consistent with the natural law, they do not adhere to principles known in virtue.
Criticisms and Responses
Other philosophers went on to share their thoughts noting that, God does not command right actions due to that fact they are right or prohibit evil ones because they are evil. Based on that, there are numerous criticisms of the stance that contribute to its problems. One is that there is no morality without God. If morality exists due to God, then his non-existence results in the loss of morality. Other issues relate to pure contingency, what God's command obligate, God's goodness, a reason for God's non-existence, and the naturalistic fallacy (McPherran).
A typical response to the Euthyphro dilemma centers on the difference between obligation and value (McPherran). Responsibility is given a voluntarist treatment while the value is independent of divine commands. The result is the restriction of religious theory applicable to a particular area of morality. The view allows for a non-voluntarist treatment of badness and goodness and therefore of God's moral attributes. God's rules are not arbitrary as there are facts which guide his commandments based on badness and goodness. There is no possible reason for God to issue horrible commands and the acceptance of abiding by the rules results from a sense of gratitude. However, the solutions are controversial as they steer the view back into problems associated with the first part of the question.
An existent problem for the view is that if God's goodness depends on virtuousness, then on what does it depend? Could it be something other than God? Nonetheless, there has been disapproval when we identify the ultimate standard for goodness with God's nature. It appears as if we are relating it to particular properties of God such as being just and loving. The divine theory in itself is a false dilemma as true propositions can exist independently of God. Atheism challenges the assumption of God's existence hence eliminating the need to decide whether God is non-omniscient or the source of morality. Secular humanism disapproves that morality is not dependent on religion but ethical rules should get based on experience, reason, and democracy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, if there is a need to determine why Socrates asked the question, it is evident he wanted to illustrate the absurdity of an objective morality grounded in god (Cohen). His premise is correct as ethics should be personal and not determined by external forces.
Works Cited
Brickhouse, Thomas C., and Nicholas D. Smith. Plato's Socrates. Oxford University Press, USA, 1994.
Cohen, S. Marc. "Socrates on the definition of piety: Euthyphro 10A–11B." The Philosophy of Socrates. Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1971. 158-176.
McPherran, Mark L. "Socratic piety in the Euthyphro." Journal of the History of Philosophy 23.3 (1985): 283-309.
