Metaphysically presented, Dualism is the expression of the idea that realities of existence occur in two kinds. These include material existence that is physically defined and immaterial existence that is spiritually defined. This is embodied by Descartes’ among other philosophers’ arguments; in the mind and body problem. While many philosophers contradict the possibility of a mind separate from the body, I am of the opinion that Descartes arguments on these two are valid and logical. To reveal this, I compare Descartes’ arguments on the body and mind with the ideas of John Locke and David Hume; empiricist philosophers who have also contributed to the concept of self and personal identity.
Descartes’ Dualism
Founded on the philosophy of the “cogito ergo sum” (I think; therefore I am), Descartes’ Dualism
is perhaps one of the most outstanding philosophical works on establishing distinctions between the mind and the body. Dualism expresses the belief that the mind of a human being is distinctly a separate entity from the human’s physical body. In this consideration, logic and pure reason are considered as proper objects of philosophy. In attempting to establish truthful facts and reality, individuals depend on both the mind and the body. However, only the mind and not the physical body can contain and establish truths. This is because only the mind that can be certain of any existence and the satisfaction of the mind can satisfy conditions for the same. Additionally, the mind is the only source of logic and pure reason, which are the proofs of certainty. The mind is not made of matter, yet the body is made of the same (Loose 8). This establishes a distinct difference between the two and the need to use them separately when pursuing certainty.
Critical differences between the mind and matter are established in their characteristics by Descartes. Matter is tangible, visible, divisible, destructible, and with the qualities of smell, taste, touch, and texture among others. Contrarily, the mind is immaterial, intangible, indestructible, dimensionless, limitless, and immortal. Notably, all definitions of the mind adopt negative characteristic qualification features to imply the absence of the qualities displayed by matter. The end result is the presence of two properties: mental and physical (Loose 9). With these two having been displayed as separate and distinct, the process of ascertaining truths should have individuals deviating from deceiving images of the senses and sticking to logic and reason in the mind. In this way, the body and the mind constitute human existence.
Personal Identity: John Locke and David Hume
Viewed as empiricists; both Locke and Hume present outstanding contributions to the definition and establishment of personality in the concept of personal identity. Locke’s ideas on personal identity attempt to link identity to survivalism. He expresses the notion that this identity is linked with and same as psychological continuity. Classifying personal identity as the self, Locke expresses the view that this self is based on the memory or state of consciousness (Thiel 100). In my opinion, this approach eliminates the possible application of the soul and the body in establishing personal identity.
Conversely, Hume defines personal identity as a collection of numerous instantaneous impressions occurring discontinuously. This approach also eliminates the probability of applying continuity in personal identity and thought. In his derivation, he opines that all ideas get drawn from impressions. This includes the idea of a continuing and persisting self. Contrarily, all impressions are instantaneous; they lack the quality of persistence. If the impressions result in the ideas of the self, then the latter, just like the former, can be neither continuous nor persistent. In this argument, Hume expresses that the idea of continuity emerges in instances when a mind experiences a series of similar and recurrent impressions that deceivingly present the possibility of continuity (Thiel 396).
Evaluation of Locke and Hume
I believe that although both accounts present inherent series of faulted logic, Locke’s theory remains more plausible than that of Hume. In Locke’s notion, the founding on personal identity based on the memory, and not the body and soul, presents a flaw referred to as the ‘wonderful mistake’. It is obvious that memory is composed of experiences which can only come from the two that he omitted. Thus, a memory can only originate from experiences and not of another memory. However, ideas in the mind can be persistent and not intermittent as displayed by Hume. In my opinion, critical questions undermine the presentation of Hume’s thoughts. While referring to humans as bundles of perceptions, the question of what puts the perceptions together remains a fundamental concern as they always are. Again, the exemplification of perceptions in their uniqueness to individuals and inaccessibility to other individuals remains a challenge. However, Locke’s linkage of the state of consciousness and the self is more logical because it unifies the mind and the body in a way.
Conclusion
Reviewing the ideas of Descartes versus those of Locke and Hume, I find Descartes’ thoughts to appear more logical and realistic than the other empiricists. The mind and body problem is perhaps one of the most challenging in the history of philosophy. I agree that only the mind has the ability to establish truths as expressed by Descartes. Again, I agree that the mind and body are distinct and separate entities; though they work together. This is because their characteristic properties are distinctly different. The body is tangible, visible, divisible, destructible, and with the qualities of smell, taste, touch, and texture. Conversely, the mind is immaterial, intangible, indestructible, dimensionless, limitless, and immortal. This is partly in contravention of the ideas of Locke and Hume.
Works Cited
Loose, Jonathan. The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Hoboken: Wiley " Sons, 2018. Print.
Thiel, Udo. The Early Modern Subject: Self-consciousness and Personal Identity from Descartes to Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print.
