The gradual pervasive view that the World Trade Organization (WTO) does not endeavor to its democratic obligations and hence has “democratic deficit” is an expression coined from debates in the European Union. Opinions regarding undemocratic policies by the WTO range from allegations that the body together with various organizations and globalization actors have been on the frontline of basically rescinding democracy to the dismissal of “democratic deficit” notion founded on the perception that since the institution’s policies are sanctioned by member states, then they essentially are democratic (Moore 14). In spite of the fact that the issue bears significant weight in terms of the organization’s integrity, there is no particular literature directed at enhancing analytical clarity. Furthermore, Moore describes democracy as an enormously contested notion with various conceptions being at play (17). In this case, the numerous democracy types include corporatist, representative, republican, and decentralized democracy. The above perceptions about the policy contain salience in defining democratic legality, and they are extensively inter-related. This paper, therefore, examines the arguments that WTO has been hampered by “democratic deficit,” an issue that may perhaps cast doubt on its legitimacy as well as the prestige of its policies. The essay goes ahead to study the claims that internal processes within the organization such as mediation and settlement of disputes undermine the capability of countries to conduct themselves as required by their populations.
Argument on Democratic Deficit
There happens to be two major components that shape the argument on “democratic deficit.” The first among them is the assumption regarding the content of the WTO policies, the “output” of the entity, while the second claim focuses on the general debate among critics who claim that the respective policies undermine the capability of countries to enact rules that touch on their people’s democratic will (Moore 14). For instance, in the European Community (EC) regarding measures regarding meat products, the WTO panel together with the Appellate concluded that the decision to impose an injunction on the importation of genetically-modified meat by the EU nations went against the organization’s treaty. Lifting the ban would probably go against the desire of many of the European populace as well as consumers who foresee health repercussions generated by the genetically engineered hormones. It is for this reason that the European Community has settled on maintaining the ban and hence suffering the resultant trade sanctions as per the WTO policies (Moore 14). A comparable issue may arise in the coming years regarding the restrictions by the EC on importation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It is thus clear that the WTO has significant negative effects in the affairs of member countries, as it does not allow them to operate freely as per the will of the electorates. Some nations as seen above resort to going against its policies which they deem as being despotic.
There have been concerns regarding lack of democracy during the initiation of a nation into the organization. The state’s populace is generally not involved in making the decision despite the fact that the decision breeds the obligatory WTO requirements which can bear profound impact on the lives of people and their livelihood (Cass 33). For instance, ratification is usually the role of the executive arm of the government rather than the legislature which is the representative branch of national authorities Even in the case where the WTO offers are tabled before the legislature arm of government, it is highly unlikely for certain countries, more so the developing states to retreat from a treaty at the tail end stages. In essence, the small economies are left at the mercy of the strong economies to dictate the way forward through policies. This act is highly undermines democracy as the emerging nations lack the forum to air their grievances let alone setting rules that can protect their interests in the unstable global market.
The procedure of negotiating treaties or accession deals is an issue that people have generally not been well versed about, as they have historically been discussed by trade experts in secrecy (Busch and Reinhardt 720). Moreover the negotiating technocrats tend to represent the interests of a few and are not often skillful at anticipating the “non-trade” effects of trade deals, more so in the sectors such as health, human rights, and environment. In any case, the arms of government delegated with preserving human rights usually make minimal contributions in trade negotiations. It is worth noting that governments should employ a more inclusive approach to their global obligations in order for their trade and human rights specialists to work together. Indeed, Busch and Reinhardt have reiterated the fact that trade discussions are too essential to be assigned to the ministries of trade of particular countries only (722). It is debatable that the negotiation process at WTO basically amplifies the political muscle of the actors who generally have massive nationwide influence from multinational corporations which are the driving force of international trade (Busch and Reinhardt 722). It is thus worth noting that the institution is greatly influenced by super powers who have control over great multinational corporations, thus making democracy within the organization an illusion.
Non-Trade Concerns
The WTO negotiators largely hold dominant commercial attitudes, thereby, inclining the negotiated policies towards a free-market trading system and proficient marketing values (Esty 123). For instance, the food regulation policies which hold significant effect on constitutional rights to healthy food and medical services provision are analyzed in regards to their particular technical justifiability under the WTO regulations. However, much focus is put on the regulation`s effect on trade movement instead of their effect on human healthcare. Likewise, environmental guidelines are generally evaluated in regard to their trade impact rather than concentrating on their influence on the environment (Esty 123). There are many regulations that affect trade (and equally touches upon trade on various social aspects) with the center of trading effects forming the background of non-trade concerns. In a case where trade and the non-trade values clash, the latter is likely to be disadvantaged.
The non-trade interests have had an adverse impact in the pursuit of democracy by WTO, since some crucial components that were entailed in treaties had been overlooked in order to fulfill the wishes of the superior few (Esty 126). For instance, elements like environmental lobbies and human rights were never effectively represented during the Uruguay Round negotiating phase. It is without doubt illegal for the WTO institutions to subsequently derive conclusions founded on results of such debates that eventually have effect on similar non-trade concerns. Nonetheless, the organizations’ Panel and Appellate divisions have settled on a number of resolutions in regard to areas touching on health and environment. There exists a correlated argument states that primacy accorded to trading values in the WTO greatly undercuts the capability of states to honor worldwide obligations within the famed non-trade sector (Esty 127). For instance, it has for long been contended that the resolution on genetically modified organisms undermined the mandate of the EU states to honor the right to adequate health standards in regard to food safety. Certainly, an added benefit to trade interests suggests that the institution does not provide any processes whereby the negative impacts of a trade hampering policy can be defied. The result of this aspect is the eventual fulfillment of the non-trade interests over other member countries that hold the principle of democracy (Esty 132). Furthermore, the WTO has gone ahead to intensify its association with non-trade associations such as intergovernmental bodies like the UN Food and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Developing Nations
The biasness experienced by the non-trade interests is by far negligible to the kind of biasness that developing nations are exposed to by the WTO in favor of the industrialized states. To begin with, the emerging economies are sometimes regarded as “the South,” while their industrialized counterparts are referred to as “the North” (Glenn 220). The titles in some way depict the nature of development in the two regions of member states. The countries that are a part of the WTO are normally guided by local political agendas in a bid to establish a bargain considered to be most favorable to their industries instead of setting a fair bargain for all members. Nonetheless, there may still be a fair eventuality by nature as the diplomats are mandated to find a common ground in the case where every member has a similar cut-throat approach; it, however, only happens if the negotiating nations have equal power (Glenn 222). Nevertheless, the strongest member states in the WTO, like the EC and the United States, have evidently exercised massive influence over negotiations resulting into the Doha and WTO round consultations as compared to the small, less-industrialized countries. Even supposing the WTO agreements were embraced by consensus with the future outcomes of negotiations being approved by arrangement, Glenn still suggest that the organization in reality runs under a structure of de facto multitude, imitating administrative clout as well as market size (222).
It is impractical to imagine developing nations having held up the whole WTO membership with the goal of seeking a more suitable deal. It is as a result of the massive administrative burden that would be presented on them by the super powers. Moreover, negotiators as well as other important personalities from the less-industrialized nations may not have adequate technical know-hows that could enable them efficiently present the interests of their nations (Glenn 220). Definitely, enormous discrepancies could arise in regard to the size of the negotiating delegations. For instance, during the Hong Kong Ministerial assembly of 2005, United States had a total of 356 delegates, as compared to Burundi’s three representatives (Glenn 227). The huge discrepancy in the number of delegates speaks volumes on the nature of democracy within the WTO. Furthermore, provided the intense nature of the ongoing discussions, one can easily conclude that the 356 US representatives were far well informed than their Burundi counterparts. There is also the financial muscle aspect where the unindustrialized WTO members are not capable of maintaining the organization’s assignments in Geneva, hence being unable to partake in various interim debates.
WTO and Democracy
The WTO has been marred by allegations of undemocratic policies, but it is important to give credit where it is due as the organization has enhanced democratic governance at the national level through creating favorable conditions for democracy to thrive. Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director General, has in recent times elaborated how international trade policies together with global human rights initiatives are an embankment contrary to autocracy. It is generally contended that economic clarity enhances political clarity in a number of ways (Howse 6). To begin with, the concept mentioned above enhances economic growth, hence helping create novel economic leaders who can contest dictatorial authorities, thereby, creating additional openings for the public. The situation encourages the establishment of the middle-class considered to be much learned and which ultimately strives for greater administrative and social sovereignty. Lastly, foreign investors tend to demand for adherence to the constitution as illogical decision-making unbearably threatens their assets (Howse 6). Indeed, the theories are grounded on evidence: democracy, civil, and political sovereignty have a tendency of flourishing in well developed nations which normally have intense liberal trade administrations. The situation is different when compared to the poorer developing nations which normally are comprised of more restricted administrations.
It is an uphill task converting the WTO into becoming more democratic as there is a considerable relationship between economic freedom among the members and promotion of a thriving private sector. The two aspects coexist to safeguard the separation of power and wealth among the members (Howse 18). Whenever the public administrative sector controls economic resolutions, they, on the other hand, may oversee economic power. Indeed, the latter turns out to be the sole path to wealth. Nonetheless, developing countries become a vital tool for maintaining democracy as well as human rights. The emerging economies act as a source of resources for promoting positive rights and also prevent a ‘zero sum’ society.
Conclusion
The WTO could be facing its fair share of challenges in regard to upholding to democracy but the truth is that the organization has endeavored to ensure that democracy prevails in the midst of unequal economically stable members. The complication, usually overlooked, is that legitimacy on the policy outcomes cannot be achieved solely by following such an approach. Democratic rights do not only involve elections and an open choice of governance via the majority but entail personal rights in order to establish a meaningful opportunity of engaging in the administrative process. Certainly, no particular person has the privilege of veto, especially considering that their political considerations must be fulfilled. On the other hand, the majority preferences have no guarantee of being fulfilled. The WTO will continue holding its legitimacy as well as the prestige of its policies as long as the organization conducts itself in a satisfying manner. Indeed, there have been cases as noted in the paper where internal processes within the institution such as settlement of disputes have appeared to undermine the capability of countries to conduct their selves as required by their populations but all this happens in accordance to the reigning policies.
Works Cited
Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. “Developing Countries and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement.” Journal of World Trade, vol. 37, no. 4, 2003, pp. 719-735.
Cass, Deborah Z. The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization: Legitimacy, Democracy, and Community in the International Trading System. Oxford University Press, 2005.
Esty, Daniel C. “Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organization: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion.” Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 1, no. 1, 1998, pp. 123-147.
Glenn, John. “Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Stifling the Voice of the South.” Third World Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2, 2008, pp. 217-238.
Howse, Robert. “How to Begin to Think about the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO.” International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns, Springer, 2003, pp. 1-21.
Moore, Mike. “Ten Years of the WTO: A Success Story of Global Governance.” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, vol. 2, 2005, pp. 12-20.
