A Rigid Designator
A rigid designator only designates a similar object to all possible worlds that hold existence of the object (Dowding and Bosworth 2016). This philosophical technical concept has critical metaphysical and epistemological consequences felt throughout in philosophy. In order to determine whether a statement is necessarily true, contingent or false; we have to assess whether its designators are rigid or non-rigid. Given a statement’s clear epistemological status as either a priori or posteriori, the metaphysical status is at times rendered out of accord in regard to personal expectations thereof. Central statements under philosophical investigation sub disciplines are affected ranging from philosophy of science to ethics, mind and aesthetics. It follows that much of discussions held are correspondent to the distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators.
Saul Kripke and the Rigid Designation Theory
Saul Kripke came up with the rigid designation theory to tackle this problem. Rigid designators are terms that basically designates an individual that is the same in every logically possible world where that individual exists (Jacquette 1987, p.295). This relates to the distinction between truths that could have been wrong and truths that could have not been wrong. A rigid designator falls under the truth that could not have been false, a person’s name is fitting example of this; If we say, “He is Tiger Woods” then it is a truth that could not have been wrong. However, the descriptive statement “He is the winner of the PGA Tour” is a non-rigid designator considering in different logically possible worlds the winner of the PGA Tour can be any golfer. This theory applies as follows; Let Bobby be a name, the name being a rigid designator of a person, and let A be a rigid designator of Bobby’s body. This means that Bobby is identical to his body, A, thus concluding that Bobby and A requires each other in order to exist.
The Problem of Trans World Identity
There exists a problem of trans world identity. This problem is avoided by drawing assumptions that a person rigidly designated in a logical world exists and holds contradicting nonessential properties compared to ones in alternating logical worlds. However, these logically possible worlds are not being closely studied to ascertain whether there are individuals living in them. Therefore, it becomes difficult to establish the occurrence of similar objects with radically different properties in these different logically possible worlds.
Reductive Materialism
Reductive materialism regards only the material world to be true, and that realities and processes observed in the universe can be reduced to scientific components like molecules and atoms, or matter in general. For instance, a reductive materialist would acknowledge miraculous as well as unexpected healing of a cancer patient. On the other hand, some might acknowledge the healing as a result of avoiding factors that may be contributing to biological factors.
The Mind-Body Identity Problem and Interactionism
The Mind-Body Identity problem explores the question of how a body can have a separate entity, called the mind, controlling it and being controlled by it (Swinburne 2013). This relates to the Substance Dualism theory that explains that the world is made of both mental and physical substances, and that the nonphysical substance cannot be reduced to or explained through physical substances. The simple response to this is expressed in the Mysterianism theory by Colin Mcginn that says our brain is compartmentalized therefore consciousness is unsolvable by the human mind. However, a more intricate response can be found through a philosopher by the name of Saul Kripke that argues that the mind-body identity theory can be defeated through the Rigid Designator theory which will be explored further in this essay.
The mind-body theory relates to the interactionism theory which explains the relationship between the mind and the body where both variables have an effect on each other (Armstrong 2018). This is shown in when the mind is feeling anxious our hands sweat and shake due to our heart physically beating faster, or when people are exhausted they lose focus. However, this takes it back to the original problem of how can a body have a mind inside of it controlling it; which then takes it back to substance dualism. However, modern science has deduced through empirical scientific investigation that our mind is a result of different neurons in our brain firing and resulting in different physical outcomes thus making the mind and the brain, which is physical, one thing. However, it can also be argued that the mind is what causes our neurons to fire thus taking it back to interactionism and ultimately back to the mind-body theory.
The Mind-Body Identity as an Empirical Hypothesis
Expectations are held on Reductive materialist’s admission that mind-body identity fails to be contingently true. They are also expected to acknowledge that it is possible for the mind to be distinct from material object. Acknowledgement of a logical possibility of dualism of mind and body for rigidly designated body and mind is highly imprudent (Swinburne 2011). In the event that a materialist advocate for mind-body dualism, Kripke’s refutation is undermined. This is because the mind may happen to be non-identical with and distinct from non-rigidly designated material body. It follows that Kripke’s argument possess weaker and different force compared to its supposition. Therefore, the mind-body identity may either stand or fall an empirical hypothesis of science by interpretation and accumulation of experimental data.
References
Armstrong, D.M., 2018. The mind-body problem: An opinionated introduction. Routledge.
Dowding, K. and Bosworth, W., 2016. Rigid designation and essential contestability.
Jacquette, D., 1987. Kripke and the Mind‐Body Problem. Dialectica, 41(4), pp.293-300.
Swinburne, R., 2011. Free will and modern science.
Swinburne, R., 2013. Mind, brain, and free will. Oxford University Press.
