Personally, I argue in support of the proposition that psychological egoism is the view that all persons seek their self-interest. As suggested by Batson (218), with no exception, every person is motivated by the actions that seek to advance their interests even in situations that might be considered as acts of altruism. The act of altruism in seeking self-interest is, however, controversial. For example, consider a scenario where a mother assiduously attends to her sick child in the hospital making her lose health, languish, and die afterwards when released upon the improvement of her child’s health. The imperative question that we are compelled to ask is: what interests does such a mother seek to achieve from the slavery of attending to her sick child in the hospital which finally results in her death?
Nevertheless, the most surprising reality is that even is such extreme occasions, psychological egoists argue that people still help others with the primary goal of achieving some forms of self-interests. Conserving the case of the mother and her sick child provided above, in this situation, the mother is willing to sacrifice her health because she knows that her attendance to the child is a helpful action that will offer a reward in the putative afterlife. So, just as hypothesized by Batson (223), in whatever help that people issue to others, they have already associated their actions with the expectation of a reward in the end.
As result, people, in many instances, if not all, make the decision of helping others only on the condition that such deeds will augment their personal benefits. Levit (26) report that it is an inarguable fact that majority of the individuals often help with the expectation of obtaining some rewards and profits either indirectly or directly from any act of helping. Since the ultimate motive for all the voluntary human actions is driven by the determination to experience pleasure, no one, therefore, does anything without the desire of receiving appreciation in return. Helping others has, thus, been linked with the desire of expecting reciprocation as well as gaining reputation and respect. In this context, virtually all the helpful actions are merely considered as instrumental means of propagating selfish goals ultimately (Levit 27).
Theorists have also confirmed the idea of “psychological hedonism” (a form of psychological egoism) which posits that human actions are perpetrated by self-interests which uses pleasure as the final cause of behaviors immediately and in the future. In this regard, psychological egoism argues that all human actions are used as tools intended to increase pleasure and decreasing pain regardless of the possibility to realize immediate changes in the satisfaction levels or not. The most intriguing aspect of psychological egoism is the fact some individuals can always have the willingness of pursuing the extreme actions by enduring pain with the ultimate goal of achieving and enjoying the greatest net pleasure (Mees and Schmitt 161-162; Levit 28).
In conclusion, therefore, everything good done by a person is based on the principle of wanting to get a reward either from people or God. In this regard, goodness is proliferated to pacify the feeling of serving oneself and not helping others because of tenderheartedness and mercy, but rather to get profit for personal gains and treatments. Consequently, the ultimate psychological egoistic motives are driven by the objective of gaining pleasurable feelings, avoiding punishment and pain, and attaining such rewards as power, pride, self-worth, and reciprocal beneficial actions.
Works Cited
Batson, C. Daniel. The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer. New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2014.
Levit, L. Z. "Egoism and Altruism: The Antagonists or the Brothers?" Journal of Studies in Social Sciences 7.2 (2014): 20-30.
Mees, Ulrich, and Annette Schmitt. "Goals of action and emotional reasons for action. A modern version of the theory of ultimate psychological hedonism." Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38.2 (2016): 157-178.
