The Problem of Induction
The discussion about the “problem of induction” continues to become a controversial debate today. Different philosophers, including Hume and Goodman, have written their arguments on the problem of induction. The definition of induction, according to Sloman (2005), is “a method of reasoning by which a general law or principle is inferred from observed particular instances.” In general, induction is a systematic way of explaining the relationship between what is observed today with what will happen in future. The future happenings can be predicted by the observations made in the past. The natural phenomena such as the rotation of the sun can be explained with the concept of induction. If anyone asks me if the sun will rise tomorrow, I would definitely say yes because it has been doing so for many years. The uniformity in nature would help us to predict that the rotation of the sun takes approximately 24 hours. The assumption that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on the assumption that what happens today must resemble what happened yesterday (Sloman 97).
Hume's Argument
According to Hume, our future observations are likely to be invalidated even if they are strongly supported by past observations because the empirical phenomena have no pre-requisite connections. Hume believe that the natural phenomena cannot satisfy the principle of uniformity. He doubts the applicability of generalization principle by describing it as a normal human expectation based on the repeated encounter of a similar phenomenon. Generalization cannot be validated because it is just a psychological instinct which is not supported by scientific methods. Hume justified his arguments by employing both demonstrative and experimental reasoning approaches. The demonstrative reasoning is whereby an individual disagrees with the conclusion of the phenomenon although they agree with its premises. On the other hand, experimental reasoning argues that it is impossible to observe a conclusion (Arnold 11).
Goodman's New Riddle of Induction
The arguments of Hume on generalization were refuted by Goodman who developed a ‘new riddle of induction’ with fact, fiction, and forecast as its construals. As evident in Goodman’s book (1983), he believes that the induction problem basically demonstrates the difference between valid and invalid predictions. The argument of Goodman claims that a rule is valid if and only if it gives an accurate prediction and it conforms to a valid induction rule. This assertion demonstrates his belief that predictions based on factual past observations are more reliable than when using any other alternatives. He argues that prediction rules must concur the practices associated with inductive reasoning if valid results are to be produced. In general, Goodman believes in the dissolution of the old principle and justification of induction with help of past regularities.
Conclusion
It is evident from the above discussion that Hume and Goodman simultaneously agree and disagree on some aspect of induction problem. Hume disapproves the principle of generalization because he strongly believes that empirical phenomena have no pre-requisite connections. According to Hume, generalization is just part of the normal human expectation based on the repeated encounter of a similar phenomenon. Goodman believes in generalization principle as he claims predictions based on factual past events are more reliable. Hume and Goodman agree that the validity of the conclusion depends on the premise although they disagree on how to establish the validity of the premise. I strongly believe that Goodman’s argument is more justifiable because factual observations can accurately predict the future happenings.
Works cited
Arnold, Eckhart. "Discussion: Can the Best-Alternative-Justification solve Hume's Problem? On the Limits of a Promising New Approach." (2010).
Goodman, Nelson. Fact, fiction, and forecast. Harvard University Press, 1983.
Sloman, Steven A., and David Lagnado. "The problem of induction." The Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (2005): 95-116.
