The mind-brain identity theory is termed as a physicalism type hypothesis, which assumes that a person’s mental occurrences and events are categorized into types that are then correlated with similar varieties of physical activities in one’s brain. Brie Gertler’s conceivability argument is put forth as borrowed from Descartes, who asserts that “something that is conceivable is logically possible, and the inconceivable one is logically impossible (Gertler 34). The disembodiment argument is constructed on the premise of dualism, which comes forth with the concept that the physical and material body has an immaterial mind. In disembodiment, Brie argues that anything conceivable is possible. The fact that one conceives pain means that it exists in immaterial being meaning if it were a physical state, then it could not exist in immaterial being. Thus, it is not identical to any given physical state. Therefore, the concept of disembodiment means that physicalism is false, and so is the identity theory that it is constructed upon. Brie further states that "we conceptualize pain as something that has no hidden essence." Hence, the essay herein seeks to ascertain whether or not Brie's statement that refutes the identity theory is true or false, giving purpose to the argument for and against. In its finality, the paper defends dualism with emphatic critiquing of the criticisms of Gertler’s argument.
Disembodiment Argument
The philosophical construct created by Brie Gertler is almost wholly based on Descartes in his assertions with regards to how humans meditate. Gertler's position is in defense of Descartes with a further conceptualization of the need to have careful experimentation to back up Dualism, Disembodiment and Identity theory, which is the premise Brie sets upon disembodiments construct with conclusive refutes of all other physicalism critiques. Further, the Philosopher proves that Natural Dualism exists through defining pain and its crucial features that are mental and physical before analyzing the same through process experiments. In finality, Brie discredits the physicalism reality ideas.
The conceptualization of the identity theory as a potential identifier means that for physicalism to exist, the identity theory posits that specific immaterialism has to be in tandem with a corresponding material or physical state. The acceptability of the hypothesis above is valid even though there are criticisms with evidence to suggest otherwise. For instance, many critics purport that pain has a direct relationship with the C fiber incitement as indicated by Brie and that the same can also be felt across the body without necessary affliction of these nerve endings. There are incidences where one can explore and experience pain even without having the receptor nerves that traverse the very pain. A good example is an amputee feeling pain regarding a hurt toe, yet they do not have toes. The model is a clear indication that torture does not necessarily abide by materialism, it is immaterial too. On the off chance that this idea of agony can, in any case, be recalled and even experienced inside a man who never again has feet with C-filaments, at that point the relationship must be erroneous. Furthermore, "the harm to the toe is merely the common reason for the sensation, which is spatially situated in the toe, the impression of a stubbed toe can in truth be experienced inside the cerebrum or mind without resulting from the C-fiber incitement. Accordingly, this yields an altogether extraordinary idea of torment, one that Gertler centers around and one that clarifies Mind-Body Dualism. To demonstrate physicalism is false, Gertler moves to confirm that agony can happen without any physical state, and to help illustrate this, Gertler utilizes prove from thought investigations to figure out what is possibly conceivable. The manner by which thought tests work is by the utilization of one's creative energy one plays out an idea try by endeavoring to envision a given situation, and afterward precisely consider the result of this activity. Since everybody's creative energy is extraordinary, one's discernment might be not the same as somebody else's, though tests are not ensured to be precise, but instead can offer answers to the Disembodiment contention.
The argument posed by other critics over Brie’s Disembodiment Arguments contradict, yet some agree that it seeks to show that one may undergo pain on numerous occasions but in bodiless form. The notion is supported by the fact that through the immaterial reach of thought and exposure to adverse mind situations such as stress and witnessing harsh experiences, one will feel pained excruciatingly. Also, the conceptualization of events that are yet to happen and may not occur can cause pain. Thus, the thought of having to go through the fathomed ideas is in itself a conception that is made possible and felt deeply as pain even though it is immaterial. Gertler’s argument asserts that the conceptualization process is exceptionally dependent on the reason and cause of what is physical. The named hypothesis is subject to numerous criticisms. Pain is non-mental in many instances while agony, which is more or less pain, requires “no hidden essence” (Gertler 290). Thus, Mind-Body dualism dwells on Gertler’s concept that among other experiences, as the occurrence that does not need physical encounter to exist, it also requires no proof more than the mere fact that it makes one feel and be influenced to think in a particular manner.
One can in certainty envision the impression of agony without encountering C-fiber incitement, and thus, demonstrates that Dualism exists by showing that the envisioned situation of spiritual torment is conceivable. By demonstrating that the Disembodiment contention is supportive of Dualism, Gertler has likewise shown that physicalism is defective.
Brie Gertler's fundamental point in her exposition is that Mind-Body Dualism is obviously conceivable by the examination of immaterial torment. Since the situation can be envisioned, it is entirely understandable and discredits physicalism. While physicalism clarifies C-fiber and torment relationship, it does not adequately prevent the likelihood from claiming free agony. Gertler effectively makes her focuses by characterizing exhaustive ideas of torment- what is physical, and what is mental inside her idea tests. Suffering is only the sensation or feeling of distress. In this regard, it requires no shrouded embodiment or spurring variables, for example, water involves the development of H2O (Gertler 293). The physical, while depicted by Descartes as that which reaches out in space, is preferably characterized by Gertler as that which is non-mental, and which permits her idea investigations to be performed efficiently.
Some of the key recommendations that could beef up Gertler's theory is the clarification of what is mental in philosophy. The descriptions would be better of detailed than shallow because the failure to have a thoroughly defined concept of material and immaterial substance leaves room for critic and doubt, as well as pave the way for further research and debate. The shortcomings of the ideas put forth in personal opinion are that in the time's experimentations are done on Gertler's concepts, everything shall narrow down to the physical existence of identification of material and immaterial, which emanates from the brain and cerebrum. The demonstration and further proof of Dualism and disembodiment lie in the detailed definition and description of what is mental and what is not. Critics come across as disapproving of the idea that tests undertaken in any way are small ones that pose as a reflection of the world we live in and in the manner with which we do live. The ambiguity of definitions gives room for a broad scope of philosophy from which to base as many arguments as possible, which are contradicting and counter-contradicting each other. It is worth noting that the most fundamental idea of passionate pain does not appear in Brie’s arguments and that of many critics. On a personal viewpoint, it is crucial to incorporate experiences that are sought after by people whether material or immaterial.
Conclusion
Envisioning of dualism, identity theory, and disembodiment hypothesis is all based on how best the definition of critical features is undertaken such as what is mental, material and immaterial. The cognitive approach to what is felt with or without the infliction of physical activity qualifies the concept to the disembodiment argument lay forth by Gertler. Through experimentations by Gertler, there are confirmations that the scope of philosophy on the mind-brain identity theory is extensive. For instance, the test that the physical impact on specific nerves can only cause pain is not as accurate as depicted in the essay. Thus, Brie Gertler is right in her assertions that we conceptualize distress as an occurrence with no hidden essence and that the identity theory is not wholly convincing.
Works Cited
Gertler, Brie. "In defense of mind-body dualism." Reason and Responsibility, 13th Edition, Wadsworth (2007).
